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ABSTRACT 
 
The petroleum industry concern itself with natural resource extracting activities which are highly 
sensitive for contributing to environmental degradation by oil spills or gas flaring. A large 
proportion of the world’s oil and gas reserves is located in developing countries where the 
presence of multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) is high as host countries often lack the 
infrastructure needed or are financially unable to conduct extracting operations on their own. The 
Niger Delta in southern Nigeria has one of the largest oil reserves in Africa and is one of the 
world’s leading oil exporters. MNOCs like Shell, Chevron, Total, ExxonMobil and Statoil are 
some of the firms present in the Niger Delta region. The oil-rich area in the developing country 
poses high levels of political risk for the MNOCs. Local grievances, paired with environmental 
degradation and human rights violations by the oil companies, have led to a tense relationship 
between the local stakeholders and the MNOCs, with so-called petro-violence at the center of the 
oil conflict. Frequently, oil installations are sabotaged and crude oil is stolen, causing major 
financial losses for the firms, and armed attacks on oil facilities and kidnapping of MNOCs’ staff 
constitute the majority of political risks facing MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta. 
This study investigates how MNOCs can successfully manage such political risks, providing a 
business advantage in a challenging business environment. By addressing the companys’ own 
behaviour, the research analyses if social engagement through corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) can mitigate political risk in the Niger Delta. The study looks at two different MNOCs 
operating in the Niger delta, Shell and Statoil, and scrutinises their methods of implementation of 
their CSR initiatives. The difference in approaches to CSR is elucidated where Shell claims it 
has repositioned its approach from a top-down angle during the first years of conducting CSR 
projects, to a more stakeholder-oriented approach. Yet, their approach is still found to carry 
elements of the previous top-down approach, and has not resulted in satisfactory performance in 
relation to stated goals. Statoil undertakes a stakeholder-oriented bottom-up approach, executed 
with a high level of commitment. The stated CSR goals have to a great extent been met. By 
assessing the two companies’ CSR strategies in relation to the frequency of political risks 
experienced by each MNOC, the study finds that CSR has the potential to mitigate political risk 
depending on the approach to implementation, and could serve as a political risk management 
strategy.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
IV 
 
OPSOMMING 
 
Die brandstofbedryf is betrokke by die ontginning van natuurlike hulpbronne, ’n aktiwiteit wat 
hoogs sensitief is vir sy bydrae tot omgewingsbesoedeling as gevolg van storting van olie en 
opvlamming van gas. ’n Baie groot deel van die wêreld se olie en gas reserwes word aangetref in 
ontwikkelende lande. Die teenwoordigheid van Multinasionale Olie Korporasies (MNOKs) in 
hierdie lande is groot omdat daar gewoonlik ’n gebrek aan toepaslike infrastruktuur is en die 
lande ook nie finansieel in staat mag wees om die ontginning op hulle eie te doen nie. Die Niger 
Delta in die Suide van Nigerië beskik oor een van die grootste olie reserwes in Afrika en is een 
van die voorste olie uitvoerders in die wêreld. Shell, Chevron, Total, ExxonMobil en Statoil is 
van die bekende MNOK wat ontginning doen in die Niger Delta gebied. Die olieryke gebiede in 
’n ontwikkelende land kan groot politieke risiko vir die MNOKs inhou. Plaaslike griewe 
gekoppel aan omgewings besoedeling en menseregte skendings deur die oliemaatskappye het 
gelei tot ’n gespanne verhouding tussen hulle en die plaaslike belange groepe, en sogenaamde 
“petrogeweld” staan sentraal hierin. Heel gereeld word olie-installasies gesaboteer en ru-olie 
word gesteel, wat natuurlik groot finansiële verliese die firmas inhou. Daarby word gewapende 
aanvalle op die olie-installasies uitgevoer en van die MNOKs se personeel ontvoer. Al hierdie 
dinge vorm die groot politieke risiko’s wat die MNOKs in die Niger Delta in die gesig staar. 
Hierdie studie ondersoek hoe die MNOKs met welslae hierdie politieke risiko’s kan teenwerk 
om vir hulle ’n suksesvolle besigheid te vestig in ’n baie mededingende bedryfsomgewing. Deur 
te kyk na die maatskappy se eie gedrag, sal die navorsing analiseer of 
gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid deur korporatiewe sosiale verantwoordelikheid (KSV) die politieke 
risiko in die Niger Delta kan temper. Die studie kyk na twee verskillende MNOK wat in die 
gebied bedryf word, Shell en Statoil, en kyk noukeurig na die manier waarop hulle KSV 
inisiatiewe toegepas word. Die verskil in benadering tot die probleem word toegelig deur die feit 
dat Shell beweer dat hulle ’n bo-na-onder benadering in die beginjare van KSV projekte 
verander het na ’n beleid waar meer na die betrokkenheid van belangegroepe gekyk word. Tog 
word gevind dat daar nog oorblyfsels is van die bo-na-onder benadering en dat doelwitte wat 
gestel is nie bevredigend bereik is nie. Statoil daarenteen. Implementeer ’n onder-na-bo 
benadering met betrokkenheid van belangegroepe en ’n hoë vlak van toewyding deur die 
maatskappy. Die gestelde KSV doelwitte is grootliks behaal. Deur te kyk na die twee 
maatskappye se ervaring van politieke risiko in verhouding met hulle KSV strategieë bevind 
hierdie studie dat KSV wel die potensiaal het om, as dit suksesvol toegepas word, politieke risiko 
te temper en dus kan die as ’n strategie om sodanige risiko te bestuur. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research Study 
 
1.0 Background to the Research 
The billion-dollar oil industry is highly characterised and dominated by Western multinational 
oil corporations (MNOCs) operating all over the globe. In their search for oil and gas revenues, 
MNOCs also explore and invest in developing countries that often lack the infrastructure needed 
or that do not possess the financial pre-requisites to conduct such operations on their own. As the 
political and social situations in developing countries often present uncertain conditions for the 
MNOCs, there are political risks1 associated with such investments. Some countries are fragile 
and prone to conflict, thus presenting unique challenges caused not only by heightened risks of 
recurring political violence, but also by structural and institutional weaknesses (MIGA, 
2011a:29). Regardless of such conditions, however, MNOCs realise the value of acquiring an 
early market share even if it is in areas that appear risky (Alon et al., 2006:623-624). The risks 
concerned with investing in such environments mean that MNOCs need to evaluate the political 
risks involved at all times. Political risk analysis sets out to assess the probability that various 
factors within a political system will affect business and investment climates in such a way that 
forecasted profit will be negatively impacted (Brink, 2004:21). Importantly, political risk 
analysis also enables corporations to develop risk management strategies that allow them to 
identify and manage the various risks identified.  
 
Doing business in a politically risk-prone country thus requires MNOCs to explore ways to 
manage political risks strategically. Industry-specific2 political risks in addition require specific 
attention from the company. By extracting natural resources, the nature of the activities of the oil 
and gas industry is subjected to various political risks, including kidnapping of employees, 
physical sabotage of oil pipes and oil theft. Besides representing economic power (Brink, 
2004:152) as part of a country’s main income source, MNOCs’ dominance within host 
communities is also felt through their social and environmental impact. This has led to the 
growing discontent of locals and resistance towards the oil industry in many host communities 
due to the devastating impact they can have on the environment and livelihoods of local 
communities. Footprints left by MNOCs could therefore influence or even contribute to industry-
specific political risks (Brink, 2004:152). During the last decade there has been an increasing 
                                                           
1
 The term ‘political risk’ will be used broadly in this study, incorporating socio-political risks as these pose 
industry-specific risks for MNOCs (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:547). This will be further outlined in Chapter 2 under 
the section of conceptualisation.  
2
 The term ‘industry-specific political risk’ will be used throughout this study, but this can also be referred to as 
‘micro political risk’ (Brink, 2004:38). 
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demand for MNOCs to engage with host communities beyond mere profit-seeking activities. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a catalyst for meeting such expectations, and 
is of strategic importance to most large companies today. CSR is a commitment from 
corporations to act in an ethical manner and contribute to their host communities, of which they 
are an integrated part. CSR in developing countries incorporates formal and informal ways in 
which business makes a contribution to improving the governance, social, ethical, labour and 
environmental conditions of the developing countries in which they operate (Visser, 2010:131).  
 
Africa has been at the centre of international competitive power positioning by foreign parties as 
well as by local elites for at least the last 150 years (Clarke, 2010:66). Today, one of the main 
arenas for such strategic play concerns African oil and gas resources. The Niger Delta, located in 
southern Nigeria3, contains one of the largest oil reserves on the African continent and Nigeria is 
among the leading oil nations in the world; specifically, it has one of the world’s top ten largest 
oil and gas reserves and ranks as the sixth largest oil exporter and the eleventh largest natural gas 
exporter in the world (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Several MNOCs therefore have a great 
interest in the Niger Delta and more than twenty of the world’s largest oil and gas companies are 
present in the region today (Shah, 2010). Yet, despite excessive revenues from the oil and gas 
production, Nigeria is considered to be a developing country with problems of poverty in the 
midst of plenty with 64 per cent of its population of 155 million people living on less than 
US$1.25 a day (CIA World Factbook, 2010; World Bank, 2011a; Amaeshi et al., 2006:83).  
 
The political and social challenges in the country are pressing, providing a demanding and high-
risk business environment for MNOCs. The oil and gas sector’s history in the region is one 
characterised by frequent oil spills, environmental degradation and conflictual relations between 
the MNOCs and the local people. The MNOCs have faced numerous demonstrations and 
uprisings against them and are confronted with the ethical dilemma of extracting oil resources 
while leaving little but profit for the elite and oil spills behind. As a result, civil riots and attacks 
by armed rebels represent some of the main political risks for MNOCs in the Niger Delta. The 
question concerning this study, therefore, is whether CSR programmes could contribute to 
minimise the footprint left by the MNOCs and facilitate sustainable development in host 
communities and to reduce political risk. This background lays the foundation for this research, 
which aims to investigate if CSR could serve as a political risk mitigating tool for MNOCs.  
 
                                                           
3
 See Map 1 and Map 2. 
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1.1 Literature Review 
The literature that lays the foundation for this research will cover three main areas, and the texts 
range from older studies with valuable contributions to its field to new texts with the most recent 
information. Industry- specific political risk management is at the core of this study, and will be 
the theoretical grounding of the research. Yet, political risk and political risk analysis will also be 
covered as political risk analysis and political risk management are intricately intertwined 
(Brink, 2004:164). There is a vast amount of literature on political risk and risk management; 
however, one of the main texts reviewed for this research is Brink’s (2004) Measuring Political 
Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment. In this book, Brink accounts theoretically for both the areas of 
political risk and political risk management and will therefore be one of the most frequently 
consulted texts in this study. ‘An Introductory Context of the Methodological, Conceptual, and 
Theoretical Framework of Risk Analysis’ by Hough (2008) is also of great value to the research, 
along with Frynas and Mellahi’s (2003) Political Risks as Firm Specific (Dis)Advantages: 
Evidence on Transnational Oil Firms in Nigeria, Berlin et al.’s (2003) Managing Political Risk 
in the Oil and Gas Industries, Bremmer and Keat’s (2009) The Fat Tail: The Power of Political 
Knowledge for Strategic Investing, Kobrin (1978) ‘When does Political Instability Result in 
Increased Investment Risk?, Robbock’s (1971) Political Risk: Identification and Assessment and 
Alon et al.’s (2006) Managing Micropolitical Risk: A Cross-Sector Examination. Other authors’ 
views examined for this study include Fitzpatrick (1983), Bekefi and Epstein (2006), Lax (1983), 
Wood (2009), and Wagner (2000). Their articles and books provide insight into the concepts of 
political risk and political risk management, as well as insight into aspects of industry-specific 
political risk. 
 
The second main area covered in the literature review involves CSR. However, a limited amount 
of research has been done regarding CSR and its implications for risk management and risk 
mitigation. According to Husted (2005:175) ‘the relationship of corporate social responsibility to 
risk management has been treated sporadically in the business and society literature’. The article 
by Husted (2005) Risk Management, Real Options, and Corporate Social Responsibility as well 
as Kytle and Ruggie’s working paper (2005) Corporate Social Responsibility as Risk 
Management: A Model for Multinationals will thus serve as a starting point for further 
exploration of the potential relationship between political risk mitigation and CSR. Although 
there is a wide variety of literature concerning CSR, the common themes revolve around whether 
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or not CSR is merely a ‘greenwashing4’ alibi for companies or if CSR initiatives are adequate in 
addressing the challenges they are intended to (see, for example, Frynas, 2010; Utting, 2005). 
However, on the other hand, some studies imply that MNOCs are devoted to their social 
responsibility and implement a thorough and hence successful CSR policy for all stakeholders 
(Aras and Crowther, 2009). To lay the foundation for the analysis in this research, the core texts 
concerning CSR will offer an insight into the concept itself as well as CSR practices in relation 
to the oil industry and developing countries. Some of the main contributors will be Utting and 
Ives (2006), The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility and the Oil Industry; Aras and 
Crowther (2009), Global Perspectives on Corporate Governance and CSR; Rwabizambuga 
(2007), Negotiating Corporate Social Responsibility Policies and Practices in Developing 
Countries: An Examination of the Experiences from the Nigerian Oil Sector; Akpan (2006), 
Between responsibility and rhetoric: some consequences of CSR practice in Nigeria’s oil 
province; Visser (2010), The A – Z of Corporate Social Responsibility and Frynas’ articles 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Societal Governance: Lessons from Transparency in the Oil 
and Gas Sector (2010), and The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies (2005). Other articles that are found 
insightful and helpful include those by Kolk and Lefant (2009), Visser (2006), Obalola et al. 
(2009), Louche (2011), Idemudia (2011) and Aaron (2011). In addition, reports have also been 
reviewed, including NHO and PRIO (2003) Corporate Actors in Zones of Conflicts: Responsible 
Engagement. 
 
The third main area covered by this literature survey overlaps to some extent with the second 
field of literature, and concerns the case study of the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria and the oil 
and gas industry in the region. The texts surveyed concentrate on MNOCs and the various 
aspects of their presence in the area and their CSR strategies in the Niger Delta, and include the 
following; Orogun (2009) Resource control, revenue allocation and petroleum politics in 
Nigeria: the Niger Delta question, Eweje (2006) Environmental Costs and Responsibilities 
Resulting from Oil Exploitation in Developing Countries: the Case of the Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
Wheeler et al. (2002) Paradoxes and Dilemmas for Stakeholder Responsive Firms in the 
Extractive Sector: Lessons Learned from the Case of Shell and the Ogoni, Obi and Rustad 
(2010) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta – Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-
Violence, Watts (2007) Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the 
Niger Delta, Olowu (2011) From defiance to engagement: an evaluation of Shell’s approach to 
                                                           
4
 The term ‘greenwashing’ was coined at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 
to criticise large companies for exaggerating their environmental credentials (Utting and Ives, 2006:15; 
Rwabizambuga, 2007:409). 
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conflict in the Niger Delta, Idemudia (2010) Rethinking the Role of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Nigerian Oil Conflict: the Limits of CSR, and Frynas (2004) Social and 
Environmental Litigation Against Transnational Firms in Africa. However, a significant amount 
of the literature and data gathered to constitute the base for this part of the study consists of 
reports from Shell and Statoil, as well as from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
other institutions: Royal Dutch Shell Sustainability Report (annual, from 2000-2010), Statoil 
Sustainability Report (annual, from 2004-2010), United nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) (2011), Platform (2011), Christian Aid (2004), World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) (2005), and Amnesty International (2009). 
 
1.2 Research Problem and Research Question 
As seen in the introduction, the lucrative revenues of the oil and gas sector have led to a 
competitive power-play that has contributed to the investment of MNOCs in areas of increased 
political risk. As briefly touched upon earlier, the situation in Nigeria is characterised by political 
instability that has resulted in an investment climate of increased political risk, posing challenges 
for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), particularly for the oil and gas industry. Still, according to 
the International Monetary Fund5 (IMF) the Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on the oil 
sector which accounts for over 95 per cent of export earnings and about 65 per cent of 
government revenues (IMF, 2011a). Nigeria has been a member of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Export Countries 6  (OPEC) since 1971, and according to the Energy Information 
Administration7 (EIA), Nigeria exports most of its production of 2.2 million barrels per day 
(bbl/d) (EIA, 2010a; OPEC, 2011a). The oil industry, mainly located in the Niger Delta, has thus 
been a source of conflict where local stakeholders and local groups seek a share of the oil wealth. 
  
Ever since MNOCs established themselves in the Niger Delta, there have been concerns 
regarding the risk aspects as well as the ethical aspects of foreign companies extracting natural 
resources in the area. Dissent has been vividly expressed through ongoing actions such as the 
sabotage of oil pipes and other parts of the oil refinery infrastructure, the kidnapping of oil 
workers, demonstrations and other incidents, which occur on a regular basis. Oil theft, often 
                                                           
5
 The IMF is an ‘organisation of 187 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial 
stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce 
poverty around the world’ (IMF, 2011b). 
6
 According to OPEC, their mission is to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and 
ensure stabilisation of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to 
consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return of capital for those investing in the petroleum 
industry’(OPEC, 2011b). 
7
 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects, analyses, and disseminates independent and impartial 
energy information to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding of energy and its 
interaction with the economy and environment (EIA, 2011). 
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referred to as ‘bunkering’, is also common and often leads to severe pipeline damage that causes 
loss of production, pollution and sometimes forces companies to shut down production (EIA, 
2010a). Nigeria’s hydrocarbon resources are the mainstay of the country’s economy but 
production and growth of the oil and natural gas sectors are often hampered by instability in the 
Niger Delta (EIA, 2010a). Further, there has been increased pipeline vandalism, kidnappings and 
militant takeovers of oil facilities in the Niger Delta since December 2005. The Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one of the leading groups behind politically 
motivated attacks on oil infrastructure and kidnappings of oil workers for ransom, claiming to 
seek redistribution of wealth and greater local control of the sector (EIA, 2011). The region is 
entangled with resistance against the Nigerian state and the MNOCs and the industry have been 
blamed for decades of oil exploitation leading to environmental degradation and loss of arable 
land, political manipulation and state neglect. This has again created a marginalised, 
impoverished citizenry that has culminated in youth militias and sporadic insurrection where 
armed rebellion is a part of everyday life for the locals (Ikelegbe, 2005:208).  
 
Nigeria’s volatile security situation and political complexity renders it imperative for foreign 
investors working in the country to keep ahead of the risks that may impede their commercial 
activity and undermine the security of their personnel and assets (Nigeria Focus, 2010). Brink 
(2004:160) claims that political risk mostly occurs in developing countries and this is based on 
the notion that governments in developing countries are either struggling to meet the 
fundamental responsibilities of primary governance, or lack the political will to see these 
responsibilities met. Fundamental responsibilities here referred to as being primary and 
secondary educational systems, basic national infrastructure, and research in areas of broad 
national concern such as health care (Brink, 2004:160). Owing to corporate scandals and the 
growing interest in environmental issues, there has been increased pressure on MNOCs to adopt 
a responsible role in society and conduct business in a sustainable way. Even more so, there is 
pressure to contribute to sustainable development when doing business in developing countries 
where governments cannot fulfill their fundamental responsibilities, particularly for the 
extraction industry like the oil and gas sector.  
 
The volatile nature of corporate-community relations, resulting in alternatively great revenue and 
profit loss for MNOCs, has contributed to this ‘social license to operate’ and thus become a 
central element of strategic business planning (Idemudia, 2007a:2). As such, most large 
corporations demonstrate commitment to CSR, and it has become an integrated part of most 
multinational corporations’ policy (Louche, 2011). However, critics have argued that CSR is a 
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distraction for business from meeting its primary goal of profit making, an inefficient means of 
allocating scarce resources, and that business lacks the legitimacy and competency to take on any 
such responsibility outside its primary area of expertise (Idemudia, 2008:3, see: Friedman, 1962; 
1970; Henderson, 2001; Levitt, 1958). In contrast, proponents of CSR have responded that the 
monumental increase in business power, the widespread incidence of corporate misdemeanors, 
issues of ethics and the increasing inability of governments to meet their basic responsibility to 
society as well as regulate business activities have meant that the acceptance of social 
responsibility by business was both inevitable and a necessity (Idemudia, 2008:3, see: Davis, 
1960, 1973, 1967, Davis and Blomstrom, 1973, Carroll, 1979, 1991, Bowen 1953, Bowie, 1991; 
Mosen1975; Moon 2001).  
 
CSR has acquired broad support in various international fora, yet there is no universally accepted 
definition of the concept. There is, however, a consensus that it demands a demonstration of 
responsible behaviour on the part of governments and the business sector toward society and the 
environment. The three international institutions, The World Business Council for Sustainability 
Development 8  (WBCSD), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 9 
(OECD) and the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes10 (DJSI) have all underlined the need for 
governments and corporations to adhere to the principles of CSR. They have further identified 
the following core values as integral to CSR: human rights, employee rights, environmental 
protection, community development, stakeholder rights, supplier relations and monitoring 
(Natufe, 2005:449-450). The oil and gas sector has been among the leading industries in 
championing CSR, and oil companies are attaching greater importance to both their social and 
environmental impact as they engage more with local communities than they did in the past 
(Frynas, 2005:581). Some oil companies have taken a leadership role in CSR, yet there are also 
significant variations both within and between companies’ CSR initiatives (Utting and Ives, 
2006: 11). 
 
Given Nigeria’s position as one of the world’s leading oil nations hosting several MNOCs which 
challenge the pressing social and political situation with their presence, including Royal Dutch 
                                                           
8
 ‘The WBCSD is a CEO-led, global association of some 200 companies dealing exclusively with business and 
sustainable development. Their mission is to provide business leadership as a catalyst for change toward sustainable 
development, and to support the business license to operate, innovate and grow in a world increasingly shaped by 
sustainable development issues’ (WBCSD, 2011). 
9
 ‘The OECD provides a forum where governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to 
common problems, and work to understand what drives economic, social and environmental change. Their mission 
is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world’ (OECD, 
2011). 
10
 The DJSI was launched in 1999 and they are the first global indexes tracking the financial performance of the 
leading sustainability-driven companies worldwide (DJSI, 2011a). Extended information is provided in footnote 30. 
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Shell11 and Statoil12, the Niger Delta has been identified as a relevant case study for this research. 
The region is characterised by social discontent aimed at the government and the oil and gas 
industry, resulting in political risks for MNOCs. Anchored in the core values of CSR identified 
by the WBCSD, OECD and DJSI, it is evident that MNOCs have the ability to directly impact 
their host communities through social responsibility. In a developing country with high political 
risk, like Nigeria, this suggests that CSR could not only have an impact for the local stakeholders 
but could also contribute to political risk mitigation for MNOCs.  
As such, the main research question to be investigated in this study is: 
• Do CSR strategies have the ability to contribute to, and therefore function as, a 
political risk mitigating tool for multinational oil corporations in the oil and gas 
industry? 
The independent variable in this research is CSR strategies and the dependent variable is 
political risk mitigation. In order to provide a more comprehensive insight to the relationship 
between political risk mitigation and CSR, the following sub-research questions have been 
identified to supplement and support the main research question:  
• What are the current CSR strategies of MNOCs operating in the oil and gas 
industry in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria? 
• Are the current CSR strategies implemented by Royal Dutch Shell and Statoil in 
the Niger Delta successful in terms of obtaining the announced goal of 
contributing to sustainable development?  
 
1.3 Objectives and Relevance of the Research Study 
The objective for this research study is twofold. The main aim is to investigate whether strategic 
policies of social responsibility initiatives by MNOCs operating in developing and risk prone 
countries could influence and hence minimise political risks. By systematically analysing the 
relationship between CSR and political risk mitigation by undertaking a case study analysis of 
the Niger Delta where the CSR policies of Shell and Statoil will be scrutinised, the study aims to 
elucidate the potential relevance of CSR with regard to political risk mitigation. This implies that 
CSR could provide a business advantage for MNOCs, as found by Porter and Kramer13 in their 
McKinsey 2006 award-winning article stating that CSR can be a significant business advantage 
                                                           
11
 Royal Dutch Shell will hereafter be referred to simply as ‘Shell’, as elaborated on in footnote 29. 
12
 Further presentation of the two MNOCs will be conducted in the following chapters. 
13
 Porter and Kramer won the McKinsey Award 2006 for the year’s most significant article with their work: 
‘Strategy and Society: The link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (Baue, 
2007). For the past fifty years, the McKinsey Foundation for Management Research has offered awards for the best 
articles published each year in Harvard Business Review (HBR). These awards, judged by an independent panel of 
leaders in the business community, recognise outstanding works that are likely to have a major influence on the 
actions of business managers worldwide (HBR, 2009). 
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(Baue, 2007). As mentioned, CSR has grown in relevance internationally during recent years. 
The number of global companies is growing, economic and political globalisation is increasing 
and there are growing demands on companies from society– at the same time the companies 
themselves need to maintain legitimacy and secure a license to operate (Jamali and Mirshak, 
2007:243). Little research has been done on risk management and CSR as an entity and 
improved knowledge on the relationship between the two will become useful to companies, 
authorities and society. The main aim of this study is therefore to contribute to this knowledge 
and supplement the existing literature on the topic which, according to Husted (2005:175) and as 
mentioned earlier, has only been addressed sporadically in the academic literature.  
 
Secondly, by analysing the CSR strategies, the study aims to investigate how MNOCs can 
contribute to sustainable development in their host community. The sub-research questions will 
provide insight into CSR practices by MNOCs in the Niger Delta, and by doing so address 
another unexplored field as, according to Rwabizambuga (2007:408), little is known about firms’ 
CSR policies in the international context, especially in developing countries, as most research 
has focused on domestic issues in developed countries. This study thus explores the importance 
of corporations’ awareness of their social responsibility. In developing countries like Nigeria, 
this question is timeous.  
 
1.4 Research Design and Research Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the effect that the undertaking of social responsibility 
expressed through CSR programmes might have in mitigating political risk in the oil and gas 
sector. The study has thus been given a qualitative research design and by conducting a case 
study analysis which is both explorative14 and explanatory15 the research will be able to provide a 
more detailed and richer account for the dynamics explored, adopting an inductive as well as 
critical and descriptive approach (Neuman, 2006:40; 60, Babbi and Mouton, 2008:281). The 
research will be explorative as it will explore a little understood phenomenon, and it will be 
explanatory through the focus on the CSR - political risk mitigation nexus. The research will be 
descriptive as it will describe the current situation in the Niger Delta. The data used in the 
research study will consist mainly of secondary data such as academic articles, risk reports, CSR 
reports from the corporations in question and other corporate documents, books, and newspaper 
articles. Data will be gathered continuously in order to allow for changes to the research or 
                                                           
14
 Explorative research is ‘research in which the primary purpose is to examine a little understood issue or 
phenomenon to develop preliminary ideas and move toward research questions by focusing on the ‘what’ question’ 
(Neumann, 2006:33). 
15
 Explanatory research is ‘research in which the primary purpose is to explain why events occur and to build, 
elaborate, extend, or test theory’ (Neumann, 2006:35). 
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collection methods (Neuman, 2006:46). Limited primary data have been collected in the form of 
key interviews with relevant experts in the field of CSR and the oil and gas industry. However, 
the study is aware of the problematic aspects of relying too heavily upon the researcher to 
identify relevant information and thus intends to undertake a non-linear and circular research 
path to ensure that new data will continuously be collected (Neuman, 2006:222; 152).  
 
The theoretical framework of this study will be based on decision-making and problem-solving 
theory. As the study will undertake an inductive approach, secondary theoretical frameworks 
will be utilised to complement the study, here by integrative and protective techniques as well as 
real options theory. With regard to the time frame of the analysis, it will include sources dating 
from the early 2000s needed for historical perspective and analysis, yet it will focus on Shell and 
Statoil’s recent CSR strategies dating until October 2011.  
 
1.5 Limitations and Delimitations to the Research Study 
The nature of the limitations to this study determine that a less comprehensive and accurate 
analysis than is desired will be provided. Yet, an attempt to overcome this by specifying concrete 
elements of the topic to be explored will be made, and a comprehensive analysis based on the 
chosen focus areas will be conducted. One of the limitations to this study is thus that only certain 
elements of CSR will be focused upon, and others, such as, for example, employee satisfaction 
and security routines at the workplace will not be regarded, which limits the full spectrum of 
what CSR entails. Neither will every CSR initiative in the Niger Delta be included in the analysis 
as this requires a wide-ranging research project of greater dimensions than is possible here. Also, 
what have been identified as political risks specifically by Shell and Statoil through political risk 
analysis is confidential, so the analysis will be general in terms of the industries investigated in 
the Niger Delta. In addition, undertaking field research in the Niger Delta in order to collect 
primary data could have enhanced this research and its findings, but the research study was 
unable to undertake this type of primary data collecting due to cost and time restraints. However, 
this is rectified by telephone interviews and e-mail correspondence with primary sources with 
expert knowledge of the field of political risk and CSR, who have work experience from the oil 
and gas business in the Niger Delta or are familiar with this industry in the area. Still, the 
secondary data gathered will be the main sources for this study. Importantly, it is necessary to 
take into consideration the lack of objectivity of publicised reports from both Shell and Statoil 
where these have not been outsourced. A final limitation to this study is of a practical nature 
regarding the length requirements of this research study and time-related limitations. 
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Figure 1: Outline of the Remainder of the Research Study
 
Chapter two of this study will explore the theoretical grounding of the study, decision
and problem-solving theory and it will further conceptuali
to this study. Effectively, this chapter will provide a theoretical foundation for the a
CSR’s potential to serve as a political risk mitigating tool for MNOCs operating in developing 
countries in general and the Niger Delta in particular. Chapter three will present the case study 
and contextualise the following
in Nigeria will be provided, before an introduction of both Shell and Statoil’s activities in the 
Niger Delta will be reviewed. The primary objective of this chapter, however, is to present the 
general industry-specific political risks identified in the Niger Delta, as well as the CSR 
initiatives and practices of Shell and Statoil in the region, manifesting the basis on which the 
analysis will be conducted. Chapter four will undertake a critical analysis of the
the former chapter, anchored in the theoretical grounding presented in chapter two. CSR will 
then be scrutinised with regard to political risk management as a risk mitigating tool, evaluating 
the various policies’ impact and potential im
this regard. Chapter five will conclude this research study with an overview of the previous 
chapters in the light of the research questions. The findings of the undertaken research will be 
evaluated, reaching concluding remarks in terms 
Finally, a number of recommendations for further research in certain areas of the field
political risk management and CSR will be given.
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1.7 Conclusion 
The first chapter of this research study has served as an introduction to the topic explored 
through the background and problem statement, building up a context for the research questions 
and their relevance. In addition, it has outlined the technical aspects of the study, exploring the 
methodology and research design as well as the limitations and delimitations. The first chapter 
has thus laid the foundation for the further investigation of MNOCs’ opportunities to mitigate 
political risk through ethical values and social engagement with the aim of contributing to 
sustainable development in regions where governments do not fulfill their social commitments. 
The following chapter will begin this journey by providing the theoretical perspective of this 
research study and by conceptualising key terms.  
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Chapter II: Theoretical Perspectives and Conceptualisation  
 
2.0 Introduction 
Today’s business world is one of a globalised marketplace where many risks exist and must be 
considered before decisions to invest in or to expand a business operation are made. Risk is a 
constantly present factor in the business decision-making process, making it crucial to determine 
appropriate ways to manage and mitigate risks in order to achieve success in such business 
investments (Berlin et al., 2003:1). Particularly, it is of paramount importance to the oil and gas 
industry due to the high economic reward at stake and the extensive time frame required for the 
completion of such investments. Yet, although the oil and gas sector is susceptible to market 
price and commercial risks, it is also an industry which is highly exposed to political risks given 
that the production pattern is directly related to the geopolitical location of oil reserves16. Thus, 
political risk management in the energy industry is of the utmost importance and should 
therefore play a key role in business strategies (Berlin et al., 2003:2). 
 
This chapter aims to introduce and present the theoretical foundation guiding this study. By 
doing so, the directions and principles for the analysis and findings of this research are given. 
This chapter will further clarify the main concepts used throughout the study by providing a 
conceptualisation of the main concepts. This is deemed necessary as key concepts such as 
political risk and corporate social responsibility (CSR) covers widely. The clarification of what 
this research is referring to by using these concepts is therefore essential in order to follow the 
argumentation in the upcoming analysis.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework – Problem Solving and Decision-Making Theory 
Every aspect of business is ultimately a result of decisions made, a process of weighing and 
considering alternative possibilities in a given situation. This is, according to Simon et al. 
(1987:11), what steers the course of society and its economic and governmental organisations, 
namely the process of problem solving and decision making. Problem solving involves the work 
of fixing agendas by choosing the issues that are to be given attention, setting goals, and 
constructing appropriate actions to undertake. Following this is the decision-making part, which 
involves evaluation and finally choosing the decision to make (Simon et al., 1987:11). These acts 
require that organisations and individuals be rational and, therefore, risk-averse actors aiming to 
minimise and mitigate any uncertainties through utilising detailed information. As such, decision 
                                                           
16
 According to Berlin et al. (2003:2) the major oil reserves are located in the regions of the world characterised by 
an unstable political environment. See Figure 4: Distribution of oil reserves in appendix A. 
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problems will continuously occur throughout the decision-making process. A decision problem 
is defined as ‘the acts or options among which one must choose, the possible outcomes or 
consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or conditional probabilities that relate 
outcomes to acts’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981:453).  
 
It is, however, important to bear in mind that ‘problems’ do not exist in a vacuum but relate 
externally to the explicit decision-making environment as well as internally to the individual’s 
perceptions of reality (Brink, 2004:30). This may bring additional uncertainties to the table, 
deriving from limited knowledge or from the objectively random nature of the process occurring 
in or around the decision-making environment (Beroggi, 1999; Bunge, 1998; Rapoport, 1983 in 
Brink, 2004:30). Brink (2004:31) makes an interesting link to Kaufman (1991) who explains the 
difficult choice for businesses to decide among one or more choices under conditions of 
uncertainty and risk. He explains this to be a result of comparing the existing situation with a 
future imagined state of affairs that constitutes a desirable goal for problem solving. Put 
differently, the ‘problem’ refers to the discrepancy between an existing situation and a desired 
state of affairs. In order to reduce such uncertainties, Chicken (1986 in Brink, 2004:30) suggests 
taking the steps involved in decision making, including conceptualising the idea to invest or 
expand operations as well as conducting a feasibility study of the possible outcomes. Linking 
this to the field of political risk as mentioned in chapter one, a political risk analysis provides 
such an insight, enabling the decision maker(s) to draw attention to the various problems 
political risks might pose to the profitability of the investment (Brink, 2004:30). Once possessing 
such knowledge, strategies on how to manage this need to be devised, and it is the aim of this 
research study to address this discrepancy between the current situation and any uncertainties 
preventing a desired goal by exploring the potential of political risk management through CSR 
initiatives.  
 
2.1.1 Real Options Theory 
Complementary to problem-solving and decision-making theory, this study finds the real options 
theory useful to highlight the role of CSR in relation to political risk management. The 
relationship of CSR and risk management has only been addressed sporadically in the business 
and academic literature. However, Husted (2005:175) suggests that by applying the real options 
theory, there is a negative relationship between CSR and a firm’s ex ante business risks when 
allowing for a strategic view on CSR. Spicer (1978 in Husted, 2005:175) found evidence for this 
negative correlation between the two; as CSR increased, risk decreased. The argument relating 
CSR to risk is straightforward: as part of strategic management, CSR may be used to reduce 
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business risk as firms with proactive CSR strategies engage in managerial practices like 
environmental assessment and stakeholder management that tend to anticipate and reduce 
potential sources of risk, such as potential governmental regulations, labour unrest or 
environmental damage (Bowman, 1980; Wood, 1991; Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001, in Husted, 
2005:176). Based on these findings, Husted (2005:175-176) launches the notion of CSR being a 
real option. CSR involves corporate decisions about the allocation of resources, and therefore 
stands the chance of being overlooked based on a traditional analysis of cost and benefits 
projects in terms of cash flows. However, what is not considered in such traditional evaluations 
is the value of strategic flexibility that CSR investments may create. Husted analyses this 
flexibility in terms of the concept of real options: ‘An option refers to those investments, 
resources, and capabilities, which provide the decision maker with “the ability to select an 
outcome only if it is favorable” ’(McGrath, 1997:975). As a result, options are a tool of risk 
management because they limit ‘downside outcomes’ (Husted, 2005:176). Real options are, 
unlike financial options, based on operating assets and they include both the option to undertake 
activities and to acquire resources.  
 
2.2 Conceptualisations of Core Terminology  
This section aims to conceptualise the key terminology found relevant for this study. By doing 
so, it will clarify and help to further an understanding of the field of political risk management as 
well as the intentions of CSR. This is vital in order to present and analyse the research data in 
chapters three and four. To commence this section, a conceptualisation of the terms risk and 
political risk will be provided. Following this will be a discussion on macro and micro risk, or 
industry-specific risk, as the analysis that will follow in chapter four is micro in its scope. The 
concept of risk management and risk mitigation will then be addressed, being the core of this 
research. Finally, a discussion and conceptualisation of CSR will be presented. 
 
2.2.1 Risk 
To fully grasp the idea of political risk, the concept of risk must first be defined. It can be 
understood as ‘the desirable and potential harm or danger to anyone that results from behavior 
and action, or from a particular event, situation or issue’ (Hough et al., 2008:10). A more 
comprehensive definition of the term is offered by Vertzberger (1998:22) who states that ‘risk is 
the likelihood that validly predictable direct and indirect consequences with potentially adverse 
values will materialize, arising from particular events, self-behavior, environmental constraints, 
or the reaction of an opponent or third party’. As this definition suggests, risk can arise from a 
range of areas. It is, however, closely related to and often wrongly equated with the terms 
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uncertainty and instability. These are both properties of risk, with the latter referring to biased 
uncertainty about the probability of political events taking place. Instability refers to unexpected 
or unforeseen changes originating within the environment, leaving instability to be a property of 
the environment whereas risk is a property specific to the organisation17 (Kobrin, 1978:114). 
Uncertainty, which in itself is a key aspect of political risk, results from inadequate information, 
whereas risk is a more objective measurement of the amount of doubt, in contrast with the more 
subjective nature of instability and uncertainty (Brink, 2004:19). Information is thus the crucial 
element in enabling organisations to convert uncertainty into risk that is at least ‘measurable, 
insurable, and avoidable’ (Haendel et al., 1975 cited in Kobrin, 1979:68).  
 
Without any uncertainty there would be no need for political risk analysis and risk management 
tools as they aim to reduce risk by reducing uncertainty. To make a final separation between the 
two concepts, uncertainty entails a characteristic of the environment referring to the unexpected 
or unforeseen, while risk on the other hand is a ‘phenomenon presents [sic] in the organisation-
environment interface’ (Friedman and Kim, 1988:64). Importantly though, one must not 
overlook that risk can be associated with possibility, accordingly resulting in gains as well as 
losses (Robock, 1971:7; Hough et al., 2008:10). Risk may therefore have positive outcomes in 
terms of, for example, financial or political advantages if, for instance, a change of government 
occurs. The presented definitions imply that risk is generally understood to carry negative 
consequences rather than the contrary. 
 
2.2.2 Political Risk 
The field of political risk and the analysis thereof is one of great importance not only 
academically, but also within the increasingly globalised business forum where transnational 
investments and operations occur. Political risk concerns multiple fields, including international 
businesses, development agencies, political organisations and NGOs, each of them offering a 
unique understanding and definition of the concept. Other variables affect what the concept 
entails, as Alon et al. (2006:626) states: ‘the nature and scope of political risk changes with 
respect to the specific time, home and host countries, and organisations involved’. Potential risks 
to an investor can be divided into hard factors and soft factors. Hard factors refer to those events 
that are clearly and observably a risk to the investor, while soft factors are those events that 
could potentially be a risk to the investor but are not clear and observable (Boshoff, 2010:19). 
Failed states; political instability; states of emergency; the erosion of support for government and 
government consent; external, internal or border disputes; military mutiny; fiscal or monetary 
                                                           
17
 Throughout this research study the term ‘organisation’ will refer to both business and non-for profit organisations. 
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decisions overwhelmingly influenced by ideology; foreign policy and international relations; and 
leadership succession issues are all examples of hard factors. The more subtle and less obvious 
soft factors which could contribute to political risk, include: low levels of adult literacy; 
uneducated or unemployed politically mobile workers; and scarce resources. Health-related 
aspects may also contribute to political risk, as for instance the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), which can represent a possible 
economic and political threat to a specific country (Brink, 2004:25). 
 
Historically, the term political risk has been used in a broad sense to refer to the aggregate of 
several various types of risk, including social risk, policy risk, security risk and economic risk 
(Alon et al., 2006:624). As such, given the social conditions in the Niger Delta, a brief look at 
what social risk entails is deemed valuable. Many social issues can affect an organisation 
operating in any given country, whether in a developing or developed country. However, some 
industries are more prone to these risks than are others, especially businesses with large 
installations like factories, ports, mines and refineries which can lead to dissatisfaction and 
unrest in a local population when there is a perception that local expectations are not being met, 
the surrounding area is being polluted, or business is undertaken in a region of general political 
unrest and where the military protects a site while at the same time harassing the local population 
for reasons unrelated to the business. The local population can sometimes associate the company 
with these practices, and begin to target it as a proxy for the government or the military (Bekefi 
and Epstein, 2006:11). Social risk may also occur on the basis of empowered stakeholders 
addressing a social issue and who apply pressure on a corporation by, for example, exploiting a 
vulnerability in the earning drivers like corporate image or reputation. This could lead a 
company to change its policies or approaches to the marketplace (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005:6). As 
will be shown later in the contextualisation, several risk factors facing the MNOCs operating in 
the Niger Delta can be attributed social risks.  
 
Multiple definitions of the concept political risk exist in the wide literature on the field. In the 
narrowest sense, political risk can be explained as concerning itself with the effects of politics on 
the markets in which companies currently or potentially operate (Bremmer and Keat, 2009:VII). 
To elaborate on the concept of political risk, Robock (1971:7) explains that political risk in 
international business exists when discontinuities occur in the business environment, when they 
are difficult to anticipate, and, when they result from political change. To constitute a ‘risk’ these 
factors must have the potential to significantly affect profit or other goals of the enterprise. 
Compared to the term risk, political risk thus suggests a more direct concern with the effects 
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political issues may have for an organisation. Before reaching a suitable definition, Lax (1983:8) 
explores the two terms ‘political’ and ‘risk’ separately. He explains that ‘risk’ revolves around 
the probability of changes in current conditions in which risk may arise; hence risks are future 
occurrences that may change the initial settings. He further explains that the term ‘political’ 
refers to decisions and events that concern the authoritative allocation of values and resources, or 
that otherwise involve issues of legitimacy, authority, or the use of force. With these terms 
separately explained, he arrives at a definition which is neither too broad nor too narrow in its 
scope as several of the existing definitions might tend to be. He states that ‘… political risk is the 
probability that the goals of a project will be affected by changes in the political environment. It 
is the likelihood that political changes will prompt a change in the investment climate regulating 
a project’.  
 
Like Lax, Fitzpatrick (1983:249) also argues that the definitions that exist are wide ranging 
between the general and the specific, and that there is not yet consensus on the precise meaning 
of the term. Still, most political risk authors seem to agree that political risk broadly supposes 
‘the probability that business will either earn less money, or suffer losses in profit as a result of 
stakeholders within a political system’s (in)actions or reactions to events, decisions and policies’ 
(Brink, 2004:18). A more specific definition is offered by Simon (1982:68) who holds that 
‘political risk can be viewed as governmental or societal actions and policies, originating either 
within or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the 
majority of, foreign business operations and investments’. These definitions suggest that political 
risk implies losses for the organisation, and as mentioned in the conceptualisation of ‘risk’, it 
may, however, result in both positive and negative outcomes (Robock, 1971:7). As the presented 
definitions emphasise different aspects, for the purpose of this research study the definitions 
offered by Brink (2004) and Simon (1982) will be utilised throughout the analysis as they 
differentiate between macro and micro risk18, as well as consider political risk in the general 
environmental context.  
 
2.2.3 Macro and Micro Risk or Industry Specific Risk 
The political risks that may pose a threat to organisations are not necessarily universal in scope 
in the sense that not all organisations operating in the same country are affected. Rather, certain 
risks only affect specific industries. As mentioned briefly above, risks change according to 
various factors, including the type of organisations involved. This therefore suggests a broad 
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 Macro and Micro risk refers to two types of political risk which will be further outlined and conceptualised in the 
next section of this study. 
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variety in types of risks and scope, and some types of risks can in fact affect all industries in a 
host country. Political risks to a multinational company can therefore be identified as war and 
security issues, governmental fiscal policies and trade barriers, for example. This is the nature of 
macro and micro risk, but the magnitude of their effect will inevitably vary from one company to 
another, depending on the nature of the business and the industry in which these organisations 
are involved. (Alon et al., 2006:625).  
 
These different types of risk are divided into macro and micro types of political risk. Macro risk 
can be identified as unexpected and politically motivated environmental changes which are 
broadly directed at all foreign enterprise (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250). They tend to have a sudden and 
dramatic impact on a state’s economy and political risk profile, as opposed to micro risk (Lax, 
1983:10). Micro risk refers to environmental changes intended to affect only certain foreign 
enterprises with specific characteristics or selected fields of business activity (Robock, 1971:9). 
This is also referred to as industry-specific risk, or firm-specific risk, which is discriminatory by 
nature as it is directed at a particular company (Berlin et al., 2003:4). In addition, macro risk 
occurs on a national and transnational level, whereas micro risk occurs on a regional or local 
level (Bremmer and Keat, 2009:3). For the purpose of the upcoming analysis, Frynas and 
Mellahi (2003:541) offer a fitting definition of micro political risk as they expand the definition 
by casting transnational corporations (TNCs) as ‘actors capable of acquiring and upgrading firm 
specific resources and capabilities for coping with or even benefiting from political risk’. When 
understanding industry-specific risk in this way, assessment of CSR as a means for handling risk 
becomes possible.  
 
Macro risk can further be divided into internal and external dimensions. Internal causes of macro 
political risk stem from within the country, while the external causes are brought upon the home 
country by a third country, or the global environment (Alon and Martin, 1998:12; Robock, 
1971:9). To illustrate, an example of an internal source of macro risk could be seen in the 
uprisings in Libya that started in February 2011. Foreign oil companies decided to shut down 
their activities in the country in the same month due to the high risk involved in operating in 
Libya under such conditions. An example of an external source could again be taken from Libya, 
when international sanctions were imposed on the Gaddafi regime in the early 1990s for a 
decade and this had an effect on the entire country regardless of the industry. Compared to macro 
risk, which is often more dramatic and visible, micro risks are more prevalent and occur with 
greater regularity. As stated above, however, the different types of investments affected by these 
industry-specific risks differ considerably from industry to industry.  
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The extractive industries, particularly petroleum and mining industries, face a high degree of 
political risk because of growing nationalistic feelings and a conviction that natural resource 
endowments should be exploited for the welfare of all the people in a nation rather than for 
private profit (Robock, 1971: 10). Examples of risks directed at this industry include the risk that 
a government will nullify its contract with a given firm or that a terrorist group will target the 
firm’s physical operations (Berlin, 2003:4; Wagner, 2000). Another important element of micro 
risk worth noting is that within a specific industry there are two factors that can change the 
potential for micro risk over time. Firstly, the higher the share of foreign-owned companies in a 
specific industry, the higher the micro risk the industry faces. Secondly, the greater the capacity 
of nationals to operate the business successfully, the greater the micro risk to the industry 
(Robock, 1971:10). The number of foreign-owned MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta could 
thus in itself be seen to impact the political risk environment.  
 
2.2.4 Risk Management and Risk Mitigation 
Identifying and managing risk is what we are about. There are very few countries in which an 
oil company cannot operate. Most risk is manageable, but cannot be eliminated completely.  
    Tony Ling, BP regional security advisor in the 1990s cited in Alon et al., 2006:633 
 
Risk mitigation plays a vital part of MNOCs’ management of their operations abroad. Economic, 
social and political consequences are at any given time at stake, and determining appropriate 
ways to manage and mitigate risk is therefore crucial for successful investments and business 
operations (Berlin et al., 2003:1; Control risk, 2010). Political risk management can be explained 
as ‘… the sum of actions foreign investors or MNOCs take to try and keep at an acceptable level 
the degree or measure of foreign investment risk associated with their activities’ (Brink, 
2004:149). Specifically, it can be described as a ‘managerial function aimed at protecting the 
organisation, its people, assets, and profits, against the physical and financial consequences 
(adverse) of event risk’ (Hough, 2008:5).  
 
Political risk has traditionally been considered difficult to quantify thus posing a challenge to 
mitigate, often leaving exposures unaddressed. This could be a contributing factor as to why the 
area of defined political risk management has been left underdeveloped to date (Control Risk, 
2010). Yet there are different options to manage risk. One option is political risk insurance, 
which can be obtained either through private companies or multilateral government insurance 
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programmes like MIGA19 or Opic20 (MIGA, 2011a; Opic, 2011). They are both public sector 
insurers and provide project-specific political risk insurance while private market insurers like 
Meridian can provide cover for projects as well as portfolios of investments (Meridian, 2009). In 
addition to providing coverage, political risk insurance may be useful in situations such as when 
banks require coverage in order to arrange finance for a major project. It can also be useful when 
negotiating with foreign powers, especially if the coverage is provided by a government agency 
(Wood, 2009; Berlin et al., 2003:8). However, insurance is essentially a ‘tool of last resort’, and 
there are other drawbacks by investing in insurance coverage as there might be incidents where 
the insurer disputes the claim or the coverage is insufficient. Other more proactive options could 
be to engage a well-regarded local joint partner or to hire lobbying firms that could sway critical 
decisions in the company’s favour (Wood, 2009). These are just some examples of steps that can 
be taken, yet whatever strategy a company chooses there needs to be full commitment (Control 
Risk, 2009). These examples can all be classified under overarching risk management 
techniques.  
 
Brink (2004:156) suggests integrative and protective techniques as two ways of reducing the 
impact political risk might have. Integrative techniques are concerned with ‘reducing the 
frequency of loss and their main aim is to influence relations with institutions and actors in the 
political environment’, while protective techniques are constructed to ‘reduce the severity of loss 
and aim to protect the key internal strengths of the MNOC’ (Gregory, 1988, cited in Brink, 
2004:145). Both of these techniques have specific aims on how to manage political risks. The 
purpose of integrative techniques is to increase the integration of the foreign company with the 
host society, thereby reducing the perception of the company as ‘foreign’ to that specific 
environment. The use of integrative techniques also enables MNOCs to respond to the demands 
of a host country’s political environment as well as responding to the opportunities this 
environment provides. Examples of such techniques include policies which deal with local 
sourcing and having a local partner with political connections, distribution and employment, 
sharing of ownership with host government, and careful selection and training of expatriate 
managers to ensure a cultural match. Integrative techniques are also apparent when firms are 
promoting good labour policy and good relations with the host government by engaging in 
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 MIGA is a member of the World Bank Group and works to promote FDI into developing countries. They provide 
political risk insurance guarantees to private sector investors and lenders. MIGA’s guarantees protect investments 
against non-commercial risks and can help investors obtain access to funding sources with improved financial terms 
and conditions (MIGA, 2011b). 
20
 Opic is the U.S. Government’s development finance institution. They provide political risk insurance and 
guarantees to the U.S. private sector, and work to mobilise private capital to help solve critical world challenges and 
in doing so, advance U.S. foreign policy. Opic helps businesses gain footholds in emerging markets through, for 
example, political risk insurance (Opic, 2011). 
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contractual and joint venture relations (Brink, 2004:156). Protective techniques, on the other 
hand, are designed to discourage host governments’ interference, or if they do, minimise the 
firm’s potential losses and seek to provide non-integration with the host country. Examples of 
these range from financial techniques, maintaining full ownership, intra-company sourcing, 
subcontracting and farming out blocks (Brink, 2004:157).  
 
In order to reach the best risk-management strategy, a MNOC should seek to implement both 
techniques in their risk management strategy for every host country in which they operate. This 
will result in a combination strategy that leaves the firm flexible enough to respond to the 
political environment in which it is integrated, as well as being able to protect their competitive 
strengths, minimising the severity of loss if high levels of political risk should occur with a 
negative impact (Brink, 2004:156-157). This research study will, however, focus on integrative 
techniques as CSR is an example of such21. Importantly though, and as discussed under the 
section of theoretical framework, one must keep in mind that risk and therefore risk management 
is ultimately a question of how it is perceived and processed by individuals, groups and 
organisations: different individuals assess the likelihood of events (risks) taking place in 
different ways, and they also see the consequences of those events differently. (Bracken et al., 
2008:4-5).This is an essential point to consider when the two MNOCs Shell and Statoil’s 
activities in the Niger Delta are discussed in chapters three and four. 
 
2.2.5 Corporate Social Responsibility 
According to Brink’s (2004:21) definition of political risk, it is the action or inaction of the 
various stakeholders within a political system that could lead to potential risk. CSR policies are 
primarily stakeholder oriented, and CSR can be understood to focus on the control of enterprises 
and the responsiveness of an organisation to its stakeholders and the environment in which it 
operates (Obalola et al., 2009:133). However, the concept of CSR is contested, and there is no 
clear consensus on one established definition (Moon, 2002 in Visser, 2006: 32). Moreover, CSR 
is a very broad concept that addresses many and various topics such as human rights, corporate 
governance, health and safety, environmental effects, working conditions and contribution to 
economic development. Nevertheless, the various definitions usually attempt to capture and 
explain the relationship between a corporation and its stakeholders, and its relationship with 
society as a whole (Aras and Crowther, 2009:23). A straightforward definition of CSR, which 
will be guiding this study, is offered by the World Bank that defines CSR as ‘the commitment of 
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 Although integrative techniques will be the focus of this study, it is worth noting that CSR also contain elements 
of protective techniques, such as discouraging host government’s interference through for example environmental 
initiatives seeking to avoid financial fines for the environmental impact caused by the extracting activities. 
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business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their 
families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life, in ways that 
are both good for business and good for development’ (World Bank 2003:6)22.  
 
CSR has become increasingly important for corporations in recent years and although it has its 
roots in Western economies it has spread to other parts of the world through the activities of 
TNCs. Globalisation and technology have contributed to the spread of these ideas, but due to 
poor developmental infrastructures the acceptance and development of CSR has been slow in 
Africa and little research has been done on the subject in the region (Kolk and Lenfant, 
2009:241). Some believe that the concept of CSR is intrinsically alien to Africa and has no 
bearing on these economies. They argue that this is due to the differences in socio-cultural and 
political antecedents of the African and Western economies (Obalola et al., 2009:131). However, 
in recognition of the fact that context matters, there has been a growing interest, although slow, 
in CSR in developing23 countries (Kolk and Lefant, 2009:241-242).  
 
As mentioned previously, the concept of CSR is contested and there are those who dismiss the 
intentions of CSR as nothing less than a ‘greenwashing’ tool for TNCs. The term ‘greenwashing’ 
was coined at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 to 
criticise large companies for exaggerating their environmental credentials (Utting and Ives, 
2006:15; Rwabizambuga, 2007:409). Owing to corporate scandals and the growing interest in 
environmental issues, there has been increased pressure on TNCs and MNOCs to adopt a 
responsible role in society and conduct business in a sustainable way. As such, most large 
corporations demonstrate commitment to CSR, and it has become an integrated part of most 
TNCs policy (Louche, 2011). This is especially true of the oil sector, as the devastating impact of 
their activities can potentially be, and already have been, tremendous (Frynas, 2010:163-164). 
As such, the oil and gas sector has been among the leading industries in championing CSR, and 
oil companies are attaching greater importance to both their social and environmental impact as 
they engage more with local communities than they did in the past (Frynas, 2005:581). Some oil 
companies have taken a leadership role in CSR, yet there are significant variations both within 
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 An alternative definition which focuses more broadly than on mere philanthropy is offered by the Kennedy 
School of Government’s CSR Initiative who define CSR to ‘encompass not only what companies do with their 
profits, but also how they make them. It goes beyond philanthropy and compliance to address the manner in which 
companies manage their economic, social, and environmental impacts and their stakeholder relationship in all their 
key spheres of influence: the workplace, the marketplace, the supply chain, the community and the public policy 
realm’ (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005:9).  
23
 Developing countries will here refer to a broad category of countries to include those that have relatively lower 
per capita incomes and are less industrialised. For a listing of countries, see the World Bank’s classification of lower 
and middle income countries http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter II 
24 
 
and between companies’ CSR initiatives (Utting and Ives, 2006: 11). Thus, although they 
acknowledge the importance of CSR, companies have had varying success with it as will be 
described in chapters three and four.  
 
CSR initiatives relating to community development have undergone significant changes from ad 
hoc assistance to development partnerships with government agencies and NGOs. Instead of 
adopting a re-active CSR strategy, more weight is being put on sustainable pro-active CSR 
initiatives which potentially may serve as a bridge between oil companies and their stakeholders 
(Utting and Ives, 2006:20). Kytle and Ruggie (2005:1) argue that for the complex and evolving 
area of social risk, CSR programmes represent an excellent mechanism for addressing these 
challenges across the business enterprise. Nevertheless, as the level of stakeholders’ activism in 
the host country may impact or even guide MNOCs to embark on philanthropic gestures of CSR, 
it is desirable to engage the various stakeholders more in determining CSR policies 
(Rwabizambuga, 2007:407; Obalola et al., 2009:135). As mentioned above, CSR in developing 
countries is still a rather unexplored field in terms of available research data. Still, the following 
distinctive characteristics of CSR in developing countries can be identified: CSR tends to be less 
formalised or institutionalised in terms of benchmarks used in developed countries, that is, CSR 
codes, management systems and reports, formal CSR guidelines applicable to developing 
countries seem to be issue specific, for example, HIV/AIDS, fair trade; CSR is most commonly 
associated with philanthropy or charity through corporate social investment in education, health 
and sports development; business often engages in social services usually regarded as 
government’s responsibility, for example, investment in infrastructure, schools and hospitals; 
and, many of the CSR issues in developing countries present themselves as trade-offs, for 
example, development versus environment, job creation versus higher labour standards, and 
strategic philanthropy versus political governance (Visser, 2010:132-133).  
 
Although CSR initiatives originate in corporations, other organisations play a meaningful role in 
CSR issues in the form of guidance and cooperation. Examples of such important international 
organisations include the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 
OECD, Amnesty International, the United Nations (UN), International Labor Organization 
(ILO), European Union (EU) and International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the 
World Bank (Odeleye, 2005:450). The OECD has also developed the General Policies of the 
OECD on CSR which hold that enterprises should take the established policies of the countries 
in which they operate fully into account. With regard to the difference in CSR practices in 
developed and developing countries, there is often a lack of compliance between a company’s 
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CSR policies in a Western country and their implementation of the same stated CSR policies in a 
developing country. Examples of such include environmental considerations, safety policies, and 
human rights. This could be the result of deficient requirements and governmental regulations, or 
the lack of implementation thereof (Vea, 2011; Rwabizambuga, 2007:412). Based on the above, 
CSR holds a key angle of approach to the complicated question of political risks facing MNOCs 
in the Niger Delta. The stated intention of CSR to contribute to sustainable development could 
have a major impact on communities in the Delta, and through this open room to investigate 
whether such initiatives could potentially mitigate some political risks for MNOCs.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to provide a conceptualisation of the key terms relevant to 
this research study, as well as to explore the theoretical framework on which this research is 
grounded. Political risk management was located in decision-making and problem- solving 
theory, supplemented by the real-options theory. The conceptualisation of main concepts 
followed, including risk and political risk, macro and micro risk (industry-specific risk), risk 
management and risk mitigation, and finally, CSR. Having explored these theoretical and 
conceptual aspects of the research sets a frame for the upcoming chapters. Chapter three will 
address the history of MNOCs in the Niger Delta before looking more closely at Shell and 
Statoil’s role in the region. The main focus of the chapter will be investigated when the two 
companies’ CSR strategies in the Niger Delta are discussed.  
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Chapter III: Case Study – Shell and Statoil in the Niger Delta 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The Niger Delta is a region characterised by political and social challenges. Embedded in these 
challenges are factors like increased population pressure due to immigration, while at the same 
time the health and educational facilities are in a deplorable state of neglect in many areas 
outside the state capital, Abuja. Further, formerly a net food exporter, the Delta now reportedly 
imports 80 per cent of its food. Life expectancy in the region is only 48.8 (UNDP, 2010; ECCR, 
2010:10). As seen in the previous chapters, the Niger Delta question represents one of the most 
intractable sources of political destabilisation (Orogun, 2010:459), affecting the business 
environment in which the multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) operate. In such a resource-
abundant area where poverty is widespread, MNOCs may be perceived as representing, or as an 
expression of, wealth and income generated and retrieved from the local communities based on 
revenues from oil extraction. Additionally, a severe consequence and downside of the activities 
performed by the MNOCs include environmental degradation, jeopardizing the livelihoods of 
plenty. Attacks on oil installations and oil bunkering24 express the grievances held by many of 
the local people in the Niger Delta. Given the nature of oil extracting with the constant risk of oil 
spills and the fact that this concerns extracting one of the most valuable natural resources on 
earth, expectations and demands for MNOCs to ‘give something back’ to society have been an 
implicit ethical desire. Establishing enduring and mutually beneficial relationships with the 
societies in which MNOCs operate is necessary in order to expand and sustain their business 
(Statoil, 2010d). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can function as a channel for 
corporations to address this dilemma, which can be viewed as an ethical imperative, or as a 
business strategic necessity. The question is, however, how MNOCs approach these initiatives in 
their aim to build beneficial relationships for both the company and its stakeholders.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the CSR initiatives provided by two of the 
MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta region: Royal Dutch Shell and Statoil. The two companies 
have been chosen for this case study based on their international recognition as leaders and 
serious actors within their field, both promising commitment to social responsibility in the 
workplace as well as in the local communities where they are present. In line with increased 
pressure on MNOCs, companies have gradually realised the need to undertake social 
responsibility programmes in response to the demand to give back to local communities. This 
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 The expression ‘bunkering’ refers to theft of crude oil from pipelines and tankers or via barges and flow stations 
for the underground oil market. (Ukiwo, 2007:588; Shell, 2006). 
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chapter will begin with a brief background to the case study by contextualising the political and 
social conditions in the Niger Delta, both historically and contemporarily, which constitute the 
business environment in which MNOCs operate. A short overview of MNOCs’ footprints in the 
Niger Delta will follow, serving as a background for the later presentation of Shell and Statoil’s 
CSR measures. Following this, there will be a section assessing the local resistance before 
identifying some of the main political risks facing MNOCs in the Niger Delta. The essence of 
this chapter will thereafter be given when firstly, a discussion regarding Shell’s CSR initiatives 
in the Niger Delta will be presented, followed by an overview of Statoil’s CSR initiatives in the 
region, thus providing a background for the upcoming analysis of corporate social 
responsibility’s potential to serve as a political risk mitigating tool. The conclusion will close the 
chapter. 
. 
3.1 The Niger Delta – A Host Region for the International Oil Industry 
 
[For oil companies in Nigeria,] kidnapping is just a cost of doing business, ethnic militants 
often kidnap their staff and demand money or jobs [and] oil firms really do hire people at 
gunpoint, or at least pay them to go away. Shell, the largest operator in Nigeria, said that 10 
per cent of national oil output is lost to thieves, who puncture pipes to get at the contents. But 
these expenses are bearable. It still costs under $5 a barrel to pump Nigerian crude, so the oil 
firms will stay. 
                                 Another Day at the Office, 2003:17 cited in Alon et al., 2006:623 
 
The explosion of two car bombs near the governor’s office in the oil city of Warri in the Western 
state of Delta on 15 March 2010 shortly after an online warning issued by Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), served as a rude reminder of the militia’s existence. 
This illustrated that despite the acceptance of an amnesty programme announced in June 2009 
where leading members of ethnic militias agreed on a disarmament process; other factions who 
felt that this process did not address the root causes of the Niger Delta conflict were willing to 
continue using violence to press home their demands. The bombings demonstrated how deep-
rooted the nature of the conflict is, and how solutions that do not go far enough serve only to 
ensure that the struggle for power over, and access to the benefits of, oil remain at the core of 
insurgent violence in the Niger Delta (Obi and Aas Rustad, 2010:1). 
 
Given Nigeria’s position as Africa’s leading oil producer and exporter, the ‘oil war’ in the Niger 
Delta is of critical importance to Nigeria’s economic growth and political stability. Oil-related 
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conflict and ‘petro-violence’25 has assumed insurgent proportions and threatens oil production 
and billions of dollars worth of Western investment and export revenue, as well as the stability of 
Nigeria and its immediate sub-region. The complex drivers of the conflict in the Niger Delta 
have, for strategic, economic, and political reasons brought the Niger Delta to the forefront of 
international energy and security concerns. The complexity of these drivers can be ascribed 
Nigeria’s history, internal contradictions and politics, and the nature of the integration of the 
Niger Delta into the international political economy of oil in ways that have simultaneously 
enriched international oil companies and their partners – national and local elites – thus 
contributing to the disempowerment and impoverishment of the local people, through direct 
dispossession, repression and the pollution of the air, lands and waters of the region (Obi and 
Aas Rustad, 2010:1-2).  
 
As important as the historical aspect of the oil conflict in the Niger Delta is the element of 
ethnicised politics where ethnic minority agitation for local autonomy and resource control have 
metamorphosed (before and after oil became a strong national factor) from non-violent protest to 
militant resistance. In brief, the oil politics in Nigeria has been defined by the high stakes 
involved in controlling power at any cost, by the tension in the country’s fiscal federalism 
between hegemonic federal elites who dominate the control of oil rents derived from oil 
production by the MNOCs in the Niger delta, and the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta who 
are marginalised in the distribution of those rents. These high stakes have turned into a vicious 
cycle of exploitation, protest, repression, resistance, militarisation and the descent into a volatile 
mix of insurgent violence and criminality. The complex nature of petro-violence shows why it is 
of paramount importance to grasp the historic, socio-economic and political context of conflict, 
including the ways in which global forces are implicated in, and benefit from, oil extracted under 
conditions of structural violence and inequity.  
 
The turn to violent resistance took place in the context of prolonged military rule, 
marginalisation and repression of community protests. Frustration from achieving no result from 
the peaceful demonstrations spread, and armed militias soon resorted to violence. Kidnapping of 
expatriate oil workers and attacking oil installations started off as a strategy to attract attention to 
their cause, but this later turned into goals different from the initial ones of protest, resistance 
and demand of resource control. In a combination of a generational shift from local chiefs to 
younger people that took place in the 1990s, and the various actors who emerged, the conflict 
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 The term ‘petro-violence’ was coined by Watts (1999:1 in Obi and Aas Rustad, 2010:1) meaning the violence that 
so often attends the extraction of oil (and necessarily the ecological devastation which is its handmaiden). 
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was further complicated in the absence of peaceful protests, and the lines between militancy and 
criminality became blurred (Bøås, 2010:120-123). Rebellion and insurgency in the Niger Delta 
are thus compounded by a number of factors, yet can in part be seen as an attempt to address 
social injustice. 
 
3.1.1 Oil in the Niger Delta 
With one of West Africa’s longest rivers running into the Atlantic Ocean between the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra, in the Gulf of Guinea, the Niger Delta, a vast coastal plain, is the largest 
wetland in Africa supporting a wide range of biodiversity. The region is very fertile, providing a 
livelihood for the people who reside there from its rich resource base (Obi, 2010:222). It is, 
however, also home to the abundance of oil and gas resources, and therefore it hosts Nigeria’s oil 
industry, including MNOCs, state and local companies, oil service companies, thousands of 
kilometers of oil pipelines, ten export terminals, four refineries and a massive liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) sector26 (Watts, 2007:639). With regard to the national implications of the oil reserves 
in the Niger Delta, it is ultimately the fiscal basis of both state and federal power and economic 
development. Still, 95 per cent of the oil is produced by local subsidiaries of vertically integrated 
MNOCs like Shell, Chevron and ExxonMobil. These are bound to the Nigerian state through 
contracts, underpinning the transnational nature of oil extraction and sharing of profits. 
Dependence on oil rents paid by MNOCs who also control the technical processes of oil 
production makes the Nigerian state more of an oil gatekeeper and oil revenue collector, 
operating in partnership with the MNOCs (Obi and Aas Rustad, 2010:4). This dependency is 
evident through the impact MNOCs have on the environment and thus the livelihood of the local 
people. Environmental degradation has become an obvious and direct consequence of the 
MNOCs activities in the region. This has made the Niger Delta one of the world’s most severely 
petroleum-impacted ecosystems and one of the five most petroleum-polluted environments in the 
world. This reflects a lack of governmental regulation and implementation of environmental laws 
that has resulted in the destruction of local livelihoods and subsistence economies in the region 
(Obi and Aas Rustad, 2010:4). 
 
3.1.2 Background to the Petro-Violence in the Niger Delta 
As mentioned above, understanding history is essential when trying to understand the 
background for the conflict in the Niger Delta. It is a history characterised by struggles for self-
determination and local autonomy by the people of the region, and from the political and socio-
economic impact of transatlantic trade on the region. The British colonised Nigeria in 1914 when 
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they took control of the trade in palm oil. Thus began the division into three regions of Nigeria as 
people were relegated into ethnic groups according to the numerically superior ethnic groups that 
dominated political life in the old Western, Eastern and Northern regions of Nigeria (Obi and 
Aas Rustad, 2010:5). Although Nigeria gained independence in 1960, feelings of marginalisation 
did not dissipate. In 1956, Shell-BP discovered oil in commercial quantities and oil export 
commenced two years later. Still, it was only in the 1970s that the oil business in Nigeria became 
large and several MNOCs joined in. The Nigerian civil war broke out in 1966 after conflicts over 
the Delta and ethnic empowerment involving the Ijaw, Igbo and Biafra groups. The civil war 
encouraged agitation for minority rights in the Niger Delta as the region became the main source 
of national revenue and export earning. Secondly, the Petroleum Act of 1969 stated that all 
petroleum on Nigerian soil was to be vested in the state. This also underscored the power shift 
from regions/states to the federal government by the centralisation of power over oil. In 1966, 
the oil-producing ethnic minority states were given 50 per cent federal allocation from the 
revenue, but by 1996 this share was decreased to only 3 per cent. However, this was raised to 13 
per cent in 1999 partly as a response to the protests in the region. In spite of this, the ethnic 
minorities in the Niger Delta are still demanding control over the oil, and strong feelings of lack 
of justice reign in the area that non-oil producing ethnic groups who dominate the federal 
government also control the oil resources while they who produce oil suffer from neglect, 
exploitation and pollution (Obi and Aas Rustad, 2010:7).  
 
The Land Use Act (LUA) of 1979, updated in 1990, allows for the state government to claim and 
acquire community land in ‘the public interest’. Consequently, this has meant loss of control 
over oil-rich land for the locals, and loss of compensation for trees, crops and property on the 
surface of such land. Further, this act enabled MNOCs to get oil and land leases directly from the 
government without recourse to local communities. Like gasoline to the fire, this feeds local 
grievances and MNOCs are considered to be partners of the government and the actual 
perpetrators of neglect and exploitation of the region’s resources, polluting its waters and lands 
(Obi, 2010:223). As a result, protesting groups emerged. One of the most important milestones 
in the conflict between the ethnic minorities and the federal government was when the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) presented the Ogoni Bill of Rights 
(OBR) to the federal government in 1990. They demanded compensation for oil exploitation and 
oil pollution that was believed to be threatening the existence and survival of the Ogoni people, 
as well as local autonomy and the right to control the Ogoni natural resources. In addition to the 
federal government, MOSOP also targeted Shell, the oldest and largest oil operator in the 
country. Fronted by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the international campaign waged effective local non-
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violent protest and a global campaign that placed the Nigerian government and Shell under 
immense pressure for their roles in the abuse of human rights and exploitation and pollution of 
Ogoniland, resulting in Shell being forced to stop their operations there. However, the 
government replied with military raids and a systematic repression of the Ogoni protest, 
culminating in a flawed trial against Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members. They were 
found guilty of inciting a mob to murder four allegedly pro-government chiefs, and were 
sentenced to death by hanging in a Port Harcourt prison on 10 November 1995 (Boele et al., 
2001:78-81).  
 
In the aftermath of the MOSOP struggle, several other resistance movements were formed, 
including MEND. Despite Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, some elements of the 
youth had become socialised into a belief that non-violent protests were not of much use, and 
violence was considered a legitimate weapon of protest when peaceful protest fell on deaf ears. 
The return to democracy also had wider ramifications for the human rights and pro-democracy 
movement as politicians of the Niger Delta tapped into the groundswell of popular anger among 
the unemployed or alienated youths in the region. As such, some of them became ready tools of 
politicians, feeding into a spiral of local violence in the 1999 and 2003 elections which 
developed into a full insurgency by 2006. This complex conflict involved broad militant 
alliances, like MEND, which combined lethal attacks on and sabotage of oil installations with 
the effective use of the global media to publicise its campaign ‘fighting for the control of oil 
revenues by indigenes of the Niger Delta’ (Obi and Aas Rustad, 2010:8-9). By such means, 
MEND has been successful in forcing a shutdown of a third of Nigeria’s oil production, and 
increasing domestic and international concerns, resulting in huge losses to oil companies and the 
state27. 
 
3.2 Multinational Oil Corporations’ Footprints in the Niger Delta 
Commercial exploration and exploitation of Nigeria’s petroleum resources began in 1956 when 
large deposits of hydrocarbon were discovered at Oloibiri in the River State of Nigeria. Since the 
first delivery of crude oil to Europe in 1958, activities in Nigeria’s oil industry have witnessed a 
dramatic increase (Okonmah, 1997:43). In the following years more resources were discovered 
and as mentioned in chapter one, numerous MNOCs are now operating in the area, including 
large companies like Exxon, Chevron, Total, ConocoPhillips, Shell and Statoil (EIA, 2010). 
Nigeria lacks the capacity to translate oil to cash-yielding assets and therefore depends on 
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foreign MNOCs who possess the required skills and financial power needed in this respect 
(Nwete, 2007:319). Their footprints can be seen in the transfer of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), skills, technology, as major employers of labour, contributions to social projects and in 
accounting for a large proportion of state revenue (Tuodolo, 2009:531). Ironically, although the 
oil industry has brought development to many parts of Nigeria, it has also been a source of 
misery to the people of oil-producing communities whose existence is now threatened by the 
scourge of oil pollution28.  
 
The Niger Delta is a productive ecosystem and thus a so-called High Consequence Area for oil 
spills (Amnesty International, 2009:60). However, although the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency Decree (FEPA) was established in 1977, it was not functional until 1988 
when the FEPA decree was formally promulgated (Okonmah, 1997:47). Part of the agency’s 
responsibility is to protect, develop and manage the Nigerian environment. It should also deal 
with the core elements of oil pollution, namely water quality, effluent limitation, air quality and 
atmospheric protection. Although the decree prohibits and criminalises discharge of hazardous 
substances in harmful quantities, these provisions do not apply where such is permitted or 
authorised by any law in force in Nigeria (FEPA, 1988:4-20). There are several Nigerian laws 
and regulations for the petroleum industry concerning pollution and environmental degradation, 
several of which MNOCs are required to sign in order to get license to operate. For instance, the 
Drilling and Production Regulation Act (DPRA) of 1969 (no.25) requires the licensee to prevent 
pollution of internal waters and territorial waters, and yet another regulation, the Petroleum 
Refining Regulation Act of 1974 (no.43), stipulates that a refinery must provide up-to-date 
equipment to prevent pollution of the environment by petroleum products (Eweje, 2006:47). 
 
Although Nigerian law sets the precedents for MNOCs’ practices and responsibilities, the non-
enforcement of most of these laws by the state means that in reality Shell, Statoil and other 
MNOCs are relatively free to decide whether or not to comply with them (Stappenbeck 
2010:24). In fact, oil companies have refrained from using the best available technology in the 
Delta or follow practices they employ elsewhere in the world (ECCR, 2010:10). Whether this is 
an expression of poor or questionable management from key quarters could be debated, yet, a 
further reflection of the dynamic between the Nigerian government and MNOCs can be 
recognised as such. Inadequate capacity and corruption of regulatory agencies and the shallow 
rule of law mean that even the regulatory laws that do exist remain largely unenforced thus 
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leaving the oil industry in Nigeria highly self-regulated (Amnesty International, 2009:41; Iledare 
and Suberu, 2010:5). Securing the government’s key resource of revenue, typically for a petro-
state, Nigeria’s state security personnel are commonly used to protect MNOCs’ oil production 
facilities (Watts, 2005:11; Stappenbeck, 2010:3-4). Under strict military rule in the early 1990s, 
ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta were subject to extraordinary human rights violations 
perpetrated by the notorious mobile police and by special state security forces like Operation 
Flush, Operation Salvage and Rivers State Task Force (Watts, 2005:19). A Nigerian civil society 
submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council for Nigeria’s Universal periodic 
Review emphasises the human rights cost:  
 
‘The standard response of the government to crush community protests in the Niger Delta has 
been the militarization of the area in order to ensure the protection of oil facilities and the 
continued flow of crude oil. This militarization has resulted in indiscriminate arrests, torture, 
rape and the extrajudicial execution … contrary to the principles of increasing the wellbeing 
of the people of Niger Delta and avoidance of adverse impacts … [L]ands and backyards … 
are being divided, partitioned and allocated to Lagos and Abuja in the name of oil blocks and 
wells without the knowledge and participation of Niger Delta peoples.’ (MOSOP 2009:2-5).  
 
To illustrate such experiences and perceptions, in 2001, 10 000 cases were submitted to the 
Oputa Panel – Nigeria’s Truth Commission – from the Ogoni region alone. By the late 1990s, 20 
per cent of Shell’s workforce was devoted to security, in addition to having an extensive system 
of surveillance to monitor protests and conflicts in the Delta (Watts, 2005:19). In essence, the 
country’s excessive dependence on oil revenues has engendered rent-seeking extremes and the 
abuse of state powers by successively ruthless and politically unaccountable military dictators. 
Attempts by the oil communities to protest or mobilise against their perceived marginality have 
been met by military reprisals, extra-judicial killings and brazen destruction of towns and 
villages (Orogun, 2010:488). From early on, the expanding oil industry has been criticised for 
allowing its financial proceeds be exported or lost in corruption rather than used to provide aid 
for the millions living on about US$1 in the Niger Delta or to reduce its catastrophic 
environmental impact (Vidal, 2011). As it is so important in terms of Nigerian revenue, the oil 
industry is bound to mark the local communities in one way or another.  
 
3.2.1 Oil Spills and Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta 
Compared to oil spills and air pollution in oil-extracting areas in the Western world, the 
environmental impact of MNOCs’ activities in the Niger Delta is severe. For instance, the 
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amount of oil that has been spilled in the Niger Delta since production commenced amounts to 
the volume of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdes disaster, every year (ECCR, 2010:43). Another 
example is the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 where more than 780 million litres of oil 
flowed into the Gulf. This incident received global attention and safety issues were placed on the 
agenda. Although this was the worst US oil spill in recent history, this too represents less than 
the annual oil spills in the Niger Delta (Vidal, 2011; BBC, 2011). Over the past fifty years, 1.5 
million tons of oil have spilled into the Delta. According to Nigerian government figures, there 
were more than 7 000 spills between 1970 and 2000, and there are 2 000 official major spillage 
sites, many going back decades, with thousands of smaller spills still waiting to be cleared up 
(Vidal, 2011).  
 
These leaks affect creeks, streams and traditional livelihood by destroying mangrove forests, 
eroding soil plots and killing marine life. Gas flaring has other consequences such as sulphuric 
acid mists that damage plants and cause acid rain. Amid this pollution many residents in the 
Niger Delta suffer from oil poisoning which causes respiratory ailments. Additionally, they 
suffer from waterborne diseases such as malaria, dysentery, tuberculosis, typhoid and cholera 
(Kew and Phillips, 2007:159-60 cited in Ahonsi, 2010:30). Despite this, an oil spill in the Niger 
Delta rarely makes the headlines in the international news. There are arguably several reasons for 
such severe pollution having been allowed to take place without more national and international 
resistance, but one important factor is governmental complicity and lax environmental 
regulations (EIA, 2010b). Watts (2005:16) questions the extent to which local judiciaries, which 
are often corrupt or limited by authoritarian state policies, are capable of addressing legal action 
brought by harmed parties. According to him, MNOCs in Nigeria often tie up legal cases in the 
courts for ten to fifteen years. Many oil spills are neither recorded nor acted upon, and national 
environmental legislation is rarely effective.  
 
In recent years, however, Nigeria and other African countries have experienced rebukes and 
there has been an increase in litigation against Transnational Corporations (TNCs) for adverse 
social and environmental impact. According to Frynas (2004:363-365), this should be seen in the 
context of changing global governance where litigation can assume a role in creating ‘checks and 
balances’ on the activities of MNOCs. By doing so, litigation presents a strategy to hold MNOCs 
accountable in the absence of effective international policing. But, it is important to call attention 
to the local communities’ part in the oil spills as well. It is not the case that MNOCs can be held 
entirely responsible for every oil spill in the Niger Delta due to, for example, poor maintenance 
of pipelines. Oil bunkering and sabotage on pipelines by rebels and criminals occur frequently 
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and often result in oil spills. As oil spills ruin agricultural land and fishing waters, livelihoods are 
severely threatened. Thus, the issue of money and compensation has come to dominate the oil 
spills agenda in the Delta and clean-up has become less of a priority than establishing who is 
responsible for the spill and how compensation can be maximised. At times, this has created 
perverse incentives; some fishermen and farmers have found that it may be more lucrative to 
allow an oil spill to continue for a number of days before reporting it as they may be likely to 
make more money from a compensation claim than from their primary economic activities 
(Baumüller et al., 2011:20). Similarly, local contractors employed for the clean-up process stand 
to benefit financially from oil spills. Thus the lack of development and employment 
opportunities in the Niger Delta have had an indirect impact on the environment in relation to oil 
spills (Baumüller et al., 2011:20-21). This aspect of oil spills has inevitably led to numerous 
disputes over where the responsibility lies, and it creates a great environmental challenge in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
3.3 The Emergence of MEND and Armed Rebellions  
 
It must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. 
Leave our land while you can or die in it. Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the 
Nigerian government to export oil. 
Part of MEND’s message to MNOCs in the Niger Delta, statement cited by Howden, 2006 
in Obi, 2008:423. 
 
The activities of MNOCs and the government have not gone unchallenged in the Niger Delta.  
A long history of community grievances has fuelled the perceived political disempowerment that 
has been persistently articulated by activists and grassroots leaders in the region (Orogun, 
2010:487). According to Ikelegbe (2010:129), MNOCs have further contributed to this 
resentment in the communities by deploying divide-and-rule tactics, and using military personnel 
to intimidate and molest defenceless communities, further intensifying a culture of impunity and 
violence that fuels counter-attacks by militias and armed groups seeking to disrupt oil 
production. By making cash payments to some armed and youth groups, often through the award 
of ‘surveillance contracts’, MNOCs have tended to accentuate deviant youth participation in 
conflicts, as well as provide funds for arms purchase (Ikelegbe, 2010:129; Human Rights Watch, 
2005:5-7). The Niger Delta has, in recent years, experienced an escalation in armed resistance 
movements and militias, resulting in violence and other criminal activities characterising the 
region of today. As seen previously in this chapter, attempts to explain conflicts such as the one 
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in the Niger Delta commonly emphasises the problem of state recession, combined with the 
emergence of warlords and warlordism (Reno, 1990; Thomas et al., 2005; Rich, 1999; Rashid, 
2001). A crucial aspect of this, however, is the behaviour and actions of the non-state armed 
groups fighting these conflicts, and how these tend to change over time. As such, an important 
question to ask is: why do movements that began as social – albeit violent – rebellion against an 
authoritarian and corrupt state end up as a distorted mirror-image of the state they originally set 
out to destroy? Greed and increased access to resources may be one motive, yet according to 
Bøås (2010:115-117) the contextual frame of the insurgency in regard to pre-conflict and 
structural violence in society also plays a crucial role, thus the violent character of these 
movements needs to be understood in relation to patterns of violence already embedded in 
society. Further, a collective experience of corruption, abuse of power and position, and poverty 
need to be considered as well when explaining the insurgency in the Niger Delta. 
 
The failure by all stakeholders to address the underlying causes of the conflict and to opt for 
long-term solutions has pushed the Niger Delta to the brink of an internationally important 
conflict. Although peaceful action for change continues, it is perceived by many as unsuccessful 
thus making violence a more attractive and acceptable option for many of today’s disengaged 
youths (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2010). Eweje (2006:15), argues that business has an 
ethical responsibility to become more involved in dealing with social concerns, and should not 
isolate itself, leaving it up to others to find the answers and tell it what to do. The communities in 
the Niger Delta believe that the MNOCs should do more in terms of development projects and 
also to reduce the environmental impact of oil exploitation. This places MNOCs in the midst of 
the conflict, portraying the role as proxy for the government.  
 
The multifaceted dimensions of a militarised culture within the Niger Delta communities have, 
according to Orogun (2010:494), fostered a persistent pattern of impunity, extra-judicial killings, 
sea piracy, youth restiveness, repeated military occupations and recurrent reprisal raids within 
the political economy of violence, predation, pillaging and profiteering. Much of the Delta’s 
population resents the fact that oil revenues seem to be distributed among foreign businesses that 
exploit the country’s natural resources. They also resent their historically corrupt government, 
which they perceive to be unresponsive to its citizens’ needs. This sentiment has put many 
foreign businesses in the crosshairs of militant groups, which not only look to grab their piece of 
the pie, but in some cases to capitalise on a booming oil market (O’Rourke, 2008:60). The oil-
rich reserves located in the swamps, creeks, and mangrove coastal communities have thus 
become the geo-territorial targets for militancy, brigandage and insurgency, with consequential 
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effects for the region and the broader international energy markets. From the beginning of oil 
activities in the region there have been protests and activists fighting for better rights and justice. 
However, since 2005, the resistance against both the state and MNOCs operating in the Niger 
Delta has taken a more violent and sophisticated turn with the emergence of Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and there has been an increase in attacks on oil 
facilities and abduction of expatriate and local oil workers by insurgents (Courson, 2009:19). 
 
 MEND emerged from the backwaters of Warri as an Ijaw militant group and is still led by Ijaw 
youths. It currently networks with several militant organisations in the Delta and has taken up 
agitations of the people of the Niger Delta for resource control and the wider struggles in Nigeria 
for democracy and good governance (Ukiwo, 2007:605-606). MEND is the main militant 
organisation attacking oil infrastructure for political objectives in the Niger Delta, claiming to 
seek a redistribution of oil wealth and greater local control of the sector (EIA, 2009). According 
to their spokesperson Jomo Gbomo, MEND’s objective is to ‘totally destroy the capacity of the 
Nigerian government to export oil’ (cited in Courson, 2009:18). The activities of MEND and 
other groups operating in the region have resulted in the shutting-down of about a quarter of the 
nation’s daily oil production, costing at least 800 000 bbl/d, or over 25 per cent of the country’s 
oil output (Ukiwo, 2007:606; Courson, 2009:7; Hanson, 2007). They are behind numerous 
kidnappings of oil workers, several bomb attacks against various MNOCs, oil bunkering and 
other criminal activities and are also threatening to target and sabotage MNOCs’ installations 
(Courson, 2009:18-19). Such disruption of the oil flow from the Niger Delta to the global market 
has had a severe effect on the federal government, MNOCs and the international community. 
Attacks on the infrastructure of the oil industry, particularly oil production and oil export, has 
had the effect of cutting oil production and pushing up the price of oil in the tight and nervous 
market.  
 
MEND as a group has no clear leadership structure, and is a loose coalition of shadowy cells and 
a number of leaders across the states of the Niger Delta. The strategy of not having a single 
command structure has made the movement elusive, but highly efficient in guerrilla warfare, 
extending over the whole region. As such, the ‘invisible’ nature of MEND makes it difficult for 
the government and the MNOCs to target the organisation effectively and neutralise its activities 
in the region. Its use of local force to block the global oil trade has been significant as it has led 
to international attention being focused on the situation in the oil producing communities, 
especially the plight and demands of the people. At the same time, it has raised the energy 
security stakes of the world’s established and emerging powers in the region. By taking Western 
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nationals as hostages and the shut-downs resulting from sabotage of oil facilities that contribute 
to a higher price of crude oil, MEND has connected these acts to a sophisticated strategy for 
engaging the global media through the use of IT and the media, drawing attention of intervention 
agencies to the crisis in the region (Courson, 2009:19).  
 
MEND has demonstrated the intention as well as the capability of planning and executing 
coordinated attacks on government and the assets of oil companies, with numerous attacks on 
their résumé. As they claim to fight for justice, they have additional demands other than control 
over the oil resources for the Niger Delta. Among these demands are: the demilitarisation of the 
Niger Delta; upgrading of infrastructure of schools, roads, electricity; clean water; job creation 
for locals; compensation for pollution; and the release of jailed activists. By anchoring their 
actions in the need for political, social and economic change they have created a huge following 
in the delta communities. They have also inspired fear and awe among the oil multinationals. As 
such, many locals identify with their cause and they have gained legitimacy and support among 
the local populace, making them a potent enemy with a strong foothold in the region. The oil 
industry, as MEND sees it, has not only sided and colluded with the Nigerian government in 
crackdowns on peaceful protesters, but it has also neglected the needs and concerns of the local 
population by allowing oil spills, corruption and decay to ruin the delta for decades. Therefore, 
international oil firms, and their staff, have become legitimate targets. (Nodland and Hjellestad, 
2007:14-16). Although MEND represents only one example of a militant group’s activities 
targeting MNOCs and the government, it illustrates the complex and comprehensive resistance 
found in the local communities of the Niger Delta.  
  
3.4 Political Risk in the Niger Delta 
Political risk has leapfrogged up the corporate agenda over the past years. A series of events 
from the war on terror (September 2001), to the financial crisis (August 2009), to British 
Petroleum’s (BP) Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico (April 2010), to the tumultuous Arab 
uprisings (January 2011), to Japan’s post-tsunami nuclear crisis (March 2011), has shown that 
even the biggest corporate behemoths are vulnerable to political and public opinion; that the 
global economy is as fragile as a house of cards; that entrenched regimes can suddenly topple 
and that decades-long energy policies can be transformed almost overnight (McLellan, 2011). As 
mentioned in chapter two, risk presents different consequences for different companies, as 
Kobrin (1982:40) stated that ‘the impact of most political events varies from firm to firm and 
from project to project’. Important to recognise is also the point made by Hough (2008:13-14) 
that certain factors have to be taken into account concerning Africa specifically, the regional 
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situation being one factor as different markets may dominate in a specific region. Another factor 
is that African countries are particularly vulnerable to external events, such as commodity price 
fluctuations, increases in crude oil prices, and climate change. Additionally, the effect of the 
AIDS epidemic, prevalent in Africa, is especially pertinent (Hawkins, 1996:8-15). It has been 
stated that ‘profit opportunities abound for medium-sized companies that make a name for 
themselves by opening operations in Africa, but disaster looms if they do not do their 
homework’ (Hough, 2008:14). Still, return on investments in Africa can be four times higher 
than in developed countries (Coplin, 1994:5). By identifying some industry-specific political 
risks to the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta, this section seeks to outline the main political 
risks that MNOCs in the Niger Delta are facing and need to mitigate or manage in the best 
possible way.  
 
The relationship between the oil and gas industry and political risk is a dynamic and evolutionary 
one and this must be taken into account when conducting a political risk analysis or when 
identifying the current core industry-specific political risks in the Niger Delta (Alon et al., 
2006:626). However, as the focus of this study is not on political risk analysis per se but rather 
political risk mitigation, a political risk analysis will not be conducted in this research study as it 
will rely on empirical data. Thus, for the sake of this case study, in which the socio-economic 
aspect of political risk is prominent, the research will draw attention to these factors, but also 
include other elements of political risk as conceptualised in chapter two.  
 
According to the political risk analysis company AON, Nigeria is currently rated at a High Risk 
level, being the second highest level on a six-point political risk scale from low risk to very high 
risk. AON identify the current political risks in Nigeria in terms of five factors: war/civil war; 
strike, riot, civil commotion or terrorism; sovereign non-payment; political interference; and 
legal and regulatory risk (Aon, 2011). Firm-specific (micro) political risk is by nature 
discriminatory, for example, a terrorist group will target the firm’s physical operations, while 
country risk (macro) is not directed at the firm, but is countrywide, for example, the outbreak of 
a civil war within the host country. Further, a second distinction to be made is between 
government risks that stem from the governmental authority, and instability risks that stem from 
political power struggles (Berlin et al., 2003:4). This can again be further categorised, as seen 
from Kobrin’s (1982:67) framework for political risk assessment where he divides socio-related 
and governmental-related risks into internal and external risks. Internal micro socio-related risks 
include selective terrorism, selective strikes, selective protests and national boycott of firms, 
while external society-related risks involve international activist groups, foreign TNC 
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competition, selective international terrorism and the international boycott of firms. These 
distinctions consist of a number of variables within industry-specific (oil industry) risks, 
including: sabotage, kidnappings, oil-bunkering and international boycotts (Boshoff, 2010:53; 
Berlin et al., 2003:4-5). Although traditionally most prominent regarding onshore operations, 
another aspect of sabotage and kidnappings has materialised concerning the offshore operations 
beyond the marine frontier of the Delta where piracy has emerged and the Niger Delta rebels 
operate (Reuters, 2011).  
 
 In political risk reports by Bergen Risk Solutions, Nigeria is described as a demanding and 
challenging place for companies to do business, and where MNOCs are at the ‘receiving end’ of 
rebels’ and militant groups’ rage (Bergen Risk Solutions 2007:4; 2010). Statoil (2010d:154) 
agrees with this as they admit that their interests in Nigeria could be disrupted by the instability 
of the political, economic and social environment. They list war, terrorism, guerrilla activities, 
civil strife, strikes, political unrest and insurrection as risks that may impact their operations and 
further business opportunities in the region, and they submit that these factors could lead to a 
decline in production. Like Statoil, Shell has also identified their operations in Nigeria would 
expose them to political risks such as social instability, terrorism, piracy and local security 
concerns (Shell, 2010a).  
 
3.5 Social Engagement in the Niger Delta  
The oil and gas sector makes strong claims to business ethics and CSR in terms of human rights, 
employee rights, stakeholder rights, environmental protection, transparency, corruption, 
community relations or codes of practice (Frynas, 2005). MNOCs are active in developing good 
corporate practices and engagement with different facets of society, and several are involved in 
international commitments like the United Nation’s Global Compact, the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), the Sullivan Principle, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 
the Millennium Development Goals, Dow Jones Sustainability Index, and the World Summits on 
Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg to mention some (Tuodolo, 
2009:531). In Nigeria, under the banner of CSR, MNOCs invest large amounts of money in 
community projects and direct payments to communities (Baumüller et al., 2011:33). Until the 
1990s, MNOCs did not regard community matters in the Niger Delta as their responsibility and 
they restricted their engagement with local communities to a top-down approach in the form of 
donations of what they considered was needed by the various communities, such as schools and 
hospitals. These assistance programmes involved dealing primarily with chiefs, local 
government officials and other ruling elites, purchasing consent through cash payments or 
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infrastructural projects, and awarding construction contracts to indigenes with the occasional 
short-term service contract to local youth (Watts, 2005:27).  
 
By the late 1990s, conflict and militancy had triggered change, as violence in the Delta increased 
sharply. The inadequacy of the community assistance programmes was addressed after the Ogoni 
case which was a public relations disaster for Shell and also, inevitably, for all the other major 
MNOCs in Nigeria. After all, the companies had documented human rights abuses and had relied 
on the corrupt and violent Nigerian mobile police and state security forces to protect their 
installations; none could hold up any community relations success. Shell’s renaming of 
community assistance to community development in 1997 was intended precisely to present a 
new face and a new set of practices shaped by the World Business Council’s CSR initiatives 
(Watts, 2005:28). This was the turning-point for MNOCs’ social engagement in the region, 
moving away from policies of community aid and started focusing on community development. 
Later, in 2005, the strategies of social engagement once again shifted focus, to sustainable 
development practices. As such, along with increasing international awareness and recognition 
of the importance of CSR, there has been clear re-positioning of CSR strategies in the Niger 
Delta since the 1990s. Today there is therefore a great variety of MNOCs’ CSR projects in the 
Delta, including a growing collaboration with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The 
following section will introduce two of these MNOCs, Shell and Statoil, by taking a closer look 
at their presence and CSR strategies in the Niger Delta. 
 
3.6 Shell in the Niger Delta 
Shell has been in Nigeria since 1936 and was the first to find oil in 1956 in a joint venture with 
British Petroleum. It was then called Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company, but later the 
Nigerian Federal Government owned shares in the company, nationalising BP’s shareholding in 
1979. Nigeria has an important position among Shell’s African businesses due to the varied 
nature of assets held there (MBendi Information Services, 2007). Royal Dutch Shell operates 
through several companies in Nigeria, most notably the Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(SPDC), Nigeria’s largest private sector oil and gas operator. SPDC is a wholly-owned Shell 
company that operates on behalf of the partners of an unincorporated joint venture agreement 
between the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which holds 55 per 
cent, Royal Dutch Shell 30 per cent, Total/Elf Nigeria 10 per cent and Agip 5 per cent (Shell, 
2011e; ECCR, 2010:12). Although there is a legal difference between Royal Dutch Shell and 
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SPDC, Shell is the operator and it considers SPDC to be a ‘Shell-run company’29. It employs 
about 6 000 people directly and another 35 000 staff through third party contract labour (Shell, 
2011e; ECCR, 2010:12; Emmanuel, 2010:51; Stappenbeck, 2010:3). Shell operates the most 
crude oil production capacity in the Niger Delta, estimated at between 1.2 and1.3 million bbl/d 
and approximately 1.650 million standard cubic feet (scf) of gas per day. This accounts for about 
half of the total oil production, constituting a total of 100 oil fields, eighty-seven flow stations, 
two oil terminals, 62 000 kilometers of flowlines and pipelines, and several gas stations. This 
clearly illustrates the heavy presence of Shell in the Niger Delta. 
 
3.6.1 ‘Giving Back to Society’: Shell’s Development Initiatives in the Niger Delta 
The adaption of Shell’s corporate strategy required a policy anchored in and emphasising social 
as well as ethical aspects. Internationally, Shell is now considered to be one of the most 
responsible oil and gas companies and is viewed as a CSR champion (Watts, 2005:396; Wheeler 
et al., 2002:313). This recognition is prominent through various leading private indices that 
assess companies’ economic, environmental and social performance on behalf of investors. Shell 
has been included in the sustainable indices Dow Jones Sustainability Index30 (DJSI) since it 
started in 1999, and, with the exception of 2010, it has remained in the top 10 per cent of the oil 
and gas sector, as well as in the FTSE4Good Index31 every year between 2001 and 2009 (Shell, 
2011e; Shell, 2010b; DJSI, 2010). Further, Shell is a member of the United Nation’s Global 
Compact (UNGC) which has set up ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, 
environment, and anti-corruption 32  (UNGC, 2011; Fritsch, 2008). In 2010 Shell was ranked 
second by Goldman Sachs GS Sustain ESG (environmental, social and governance), which 
focuses on sustainable investment in the energy sector. Shell also did well in the Carbon 
Disclosure Leadership Index33 rankings, being one of three energy sector companies included in 
the Index, with eighty-nine points in 2010 up from seventy-five in 2009 (Shell, 2011f).  
                                                           
29
 See for example Brinded (2009) ‘It is time to move on’. Also, Shell itself refers to ‘Shell Nigeria’ – see 
http://www.shell.com.ng/.  
30
 The DJSI is a market initiative that identifies and ranks companies according to their corporate sustainability 
performance. The concept of sustainability captures qualitative information about criteria such as reputational risks, 
stakeholder relations and corporate social responsibility. Out of the 2000 largest capitalised companies it identifies 
and ranks the top 10 per cent in each of sixty-four industry groups with regard to performance in corporate 
sustainability and includes them in the index on the basis of a yearly review. The assessment criteria (which are 
general as well as industry specific) include among many more responsibility for environmental performance and 
social issues, child labour and occupational health and safety (DJSI, 2011b). 
31
 Companies must meet the index’s criteria on the environment, relationship with interested parties, supply chain 
labour, resistance to bribery, and human rights to be included. There is no ranking within the index (Shell, 2010b). 
32
 Participants of the compact are committed to align their operations and strategies with the ten accepted principles, 
and by doing so, business, as a primary driver for globalisation, can help ensure that markets, commerce, technology 
and finance advance in ways that benefit economies and societies everywhere (UNGC, 2011). 
33
 The Carbon Disclosure Project is an independent not-for-profit organisation launched in 2000 to collect corporate 
information on climate change (Shell, 2011f). 
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Since 1997, Shell has published annual sustainability reports based on The Global Reporting 
Initiative’s34 (GRI) guidelines, reporting on their environmental and social performance and the 
sustainability report from 2008 was revised by GRI and received the best possible grade (Shell, 
2009; Murphy and Bendell, 2002:227). As mentioned above, Shell has sought consultation with 
USAID and NGOs regarding implementation of CSR projects, resulting in cooperation with 
some of these. They have partnered with environmental biodiversity experts, with, among others, 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Wetlands International. The 
IUCN and Shell have been working together on energy and biodiversity issues since 2000, and in 
2007 they signed a five-year collaborative partnership agreement with the overall objective to 
enhance the biodiversity conservation performance by Shell and raise the biodiversity 
performance standards in the energy sector and supply chains (IUCN, 2011). The partnership 
with Wetlands International started in 2008 with a duration of five years. The cooperation aims 
to minimise the loss of nature and negative impact on livelihoods in the Niger Delta wetlands 
(Wetlands International, 2011).  
 
In the mid-1990s, Shell’s approach to dealing with stakeholder concerns came under significant 
pressure. This culminated in November 1995 with the previously discussed Ogoni controversy 
resulting in the hanging by the Nigerian military regime of Ogoni writer and environmental and 
human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Media and civil society groups accused Shell of having 
degraded the Ogoni environment and the Delta for over forty years while providing little or no 
social or economic benefits to the community. Worse still, some of those groups which had 
supported the Ogoni cause since the early 1990s accused Shell of having played a role in the 
death sentences (Wheeler et al., 2002:300-301; Stappenbeck, 2010:22). As radical activists 
attacked Shell gas stations in Europe to state their disapproval of the company, the majority of 
commentators, however, saw the events of November 1995 simply as the inevitable, tragic 
outcome of the company’s clumsy approach to dealing with the Ogoni community over the 
previous four decades. Nevertheless, whatever the evidence and merits for the accusations, the 
company’s reputation was severely tarnished. World-wide campaigns for disinvestment were 
launched against Shell by various actors, including Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and The 
Body Shop. In 2000, Shell was fined £26 million in Nigeria’s court for an oil spill in Ogoni land 
thirty years earlier when thousands of gallons of oil escaped into farmlands and rivers (Vaughan, 
2011). As a result of the Ogoni experience, Shell International revisited and updated its 
Statement of General Business Principles, first crafted in 1976. The corporate strategy was re-
                                                           
34
 The Global Reporting Initiative is a network-based organisation that has developed the world’s most widely used 
framework for reporting on sustainability and CSR (GRI, 2011). 
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invented in line with principles of sustainable development which involved a Sustainable 
Development Road Map and a Sustainable Development Framework, both of which made 
explicit reference to stakeholder interests (Wheeler et al., 2002:301).  
  
The foundation of Shell’s CSR strategies is based on its Business Principles, which contain the 
company’s core values of honesty, integrity and respect for people, all of which are applied 
through their Code of Conduct. Further, the Shell Commitment and Policy on Health, Security, 
Safety, and the Environment (HSSE) is designed to help protect people and the environment and 
it includes aims aligned with its Business Principles (Shell, 2011i). By following these 
guidelines, Shell affirms its aims to earn the confidence of customers, shareholders and society, 
and to contribute to sustainable development (Shell, 2011g; Shell, 2010d). Through this, Shell 
and its subsidiaries, including SPDC, states commitment to various principles, with some of the 
fundamental responsibilities set out in the Business Principles being: 
• […] to support fundamental human rights […] and to give proper regard to health, safety 
and environment. 
• […] manage all social impacts of our business activities carefully and work with others to 
enhance the benefits to local communities, and to mitigate any negative impacts. 
• […] to make sure that our employees understand the principles and confirm that they act 
in accordance with them (Shell, 2010c). 
 
Complying with these official basic principles is essential for Shell and its subsidiaries, including 
SPDC, if it is to be considered a serious and responsible actor. Thus, the purpose of the Code of 
Conduct is to enable Shell’s employees to put the principles into practice (Shell, 2010d). 
Importantly though, this business code is strictly a guideline and therefore cannot be monitored 
by an external party, therefore violations can only be reported by employees of Shell companies 
(Shell, 2006). However, occurrences of major violations of the business code concerning 
environmental and social aspects are reported by NGOs and civil society groups and this often 
leads to media or public attention. This has been the case for Shell in the Niger Delta, and as 
mentioned earlier, the oil industry in Nigeria is poorly regulated by the state. Instead of 
regulating the oil industry more effectively, the Nigerian state has increasingly handed the 
obligation of providing remedies for oil-related damage to the oil companies themselves 
(Amnesty International, 2009:78). The specific CSR issues that Shell has engaged in and 
prioritised, reflect to a large extent the state of play regarding activist and global concerns on 
social and environmental issues (Utting and Ives, 2006:19). As such, reputation building was 
reported to be very important following decades of bad publicity.  
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As seen in previous sections, the negative publicity stemmed from, among other things, Shell’s 
close ties with the Nigerian Government. Oil conflicts and political-military conflicts abound in 
the oil-producing region, with Shell inevitably becoming a part of this. Despite these conflicts 
starting off as conflicts between the federal government and local communities, in the absence of 
federal government officials to whom grievances could be expressed, Shell (and other MNOCs) 
became proxy targets as the best way to obtain government response to community grievances 
due to the vital nature of oil production for Nigeria (Rwabizambuga, 2007:416). Given the 
operating agreements between the government and the MNOCs, security in the operating regions 
is the responsibility of the state, which has often responded to community protests heavy-
handedly, rather than seeking dialog and peaceful conflict resolution. Thus, given the historically 
close collaboration between the state and Shell, the latter was increasingly perceived to be an 
accomplice of government violent tactics. As such, an attack on Shell was regarded as an attack 
on the Nigerian government. Shell has further been accused of having been supportive of 
repressive tactics directed toward protesting communities, and has also been accused of being 
involved with the import of arms on behalf of government security forces (Rwabizambuga, 
2007:416). This, and other issues previously touched upon like environmental degradation and 
the Ogoni case, have severely damaged the reputation of Shell and this explains the importance 
of restoring its reputation through social engagment (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:556). 
  
Some of the earlier CSR strategies Shell introduced to the Niger Delta concentrated on social 
infrastructure, which they ‘sponsored’, examples of such being the building of school and health 
clinic buildings. However, they failed to provide personnel or medicines. Virtually all the major 
projects were subjects of community conflict, either inter- or intra-community. Some 
communities were not included in the projects and thus felt marginalised, while other 
communities were left with abandoned or uncompleted projects and they did not have the ability 
to complete these themselves or provide staff and equipment to run them, for example, the new 
schools and hospitals (Akpan, 2006:231). According to Frynas (2005:584), this is the 
consequence of Shell’s previous CSR strategy as they initiated development projects only in 
communities where they had oil operations. To avoid community protests halting oil operations, 
the development projects served as a way of buying the local communities. For instance, Shell 
provided its major contract managers with a development budget, so that when a new pipeline 
was built, the manager could initiate a new development project within a community in order to 
enable the pipeline to continue unhindered. When it was finished, the community development 
budget for the area was simply closed, which followed the logic driven by short-term expediency 
rather than the long-term development needs of a community (Frynas, 2005:584).  
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Having undertaken a more stakeholder-oriented approach in recent years as part of the 
repositioning of CSR, types of stakeholders per volunteering and employment sponsorship of 
Shell Nigeria could be identified as follows; mandated outsiders; independent sponsors; 
influential observers; and influential claimants. Mandated outsiders are friendly with a clear 
mandate, hired or compensated to solve a particular problem. This type of involvement is akin to 
contracting, and may include previous employees of Shell, specialists in consulting firms or 
individual experts. This category also includes NGOs and academic institutions that operate from 
inside out and have special access to the internal environment of the firm. Independent sponsors 
receive no instruction from the firm, and are motivated by the fact that CSR features among their 
main interests. This includes research and advocacy-oriented development and environmental 
NGOs, development agencies and multilateral agencies. They operate from their own resources 
and interact with the firm from the outside, and they draw their influence from their ability to 
reach and sometimes influence wider audiences (Rwabizambuga, 2007:145). Influential 
observers are independent entities with varied interests in the firm’s CSR agenda. These 
stakeholders are driven by the interest of their respective profession and operate from the outside 
in, and include members of the media, academia, political agents and regulatory institutions. 
Influential claimants have direct interests in the firm’s CSR programmes, and mostly consist of 
local community organisations and other organisations that champion the cause of local 
communities. They are often invited by Shell Nigeria to their annual stakeholder consultation 
workshops, and engage with the company on the basis of certain claims and grievances related to 
the allocation of oil proceeds, compensation schemes, environmental matters and so on. They 
often use confrontational tactics to promote their cause and draw influence from their ability to 
mobilise public opinion and run negative campaigns against Shell. They may include 
organisations such as Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Friends of the 
Earth, to mention a few (Rwabizambuga, 2007:415). This clear focus on stakeholder 
involvement has been crucial in Shell’s repositioning and is evidently a major factor in the 
current CSR approach, Global Memorandum of Understanding, GMoU.  
 
3.6.2 Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) 
Shell has changed its approach to CSR in the Niger Delta on more than one occasion over the 
years before reaching the present strategy of GMoU. Learning from the annual sustainability 
report of 2000, Shell stated that, contrary to their earlier experience, they were now benefiting 
from engaging with their stakeholders, including human rights groups and local communities 
(Shell, 2000:2). In 2003, an executive officer of the African operations of Shell confirmed that 
his company had embarked on a fundamental policy shift in the way the company built social 
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partnerships in the communities hosting its operations. Shell was now undertaking a ‘proactive’ 
role in regard to community development, environmental protection and biodiversity 
conservation (Akpan, 2006:224).  
 
Over the years, Shell has adapted how it engages with local communities to deliver development 
projects, and in 2006 the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) was introduced as a 
new way of working with these local communities, thus representing an important shift in 
approach, placing emphasis on more transparent and accountable procedures, regular 
communication with the grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention (Shell, 2011j). Shell 
explains GMoU as an agreement between the company and a cluster of several communities. 
Clusters are based on local government or clan lines with well defined governing structures, 
including a Cluster Development Board (CDB) which functions as the main supervisory and 
administrative organ ensuring implementation of projects. The GMoU brings communities 
together with representatives of state and local governments, SPDC and non-profit organisations 
(Shell, 2011j). The purpose of this is to let it be up to the communities to decide the sort of 
development they want while SPDC provides secure funding for five years, ensuring that the 
communities have stable and reliable finances. SPDC should also provide access to development 
experts or NGOs to help deliver projects and build the capacity of the CBD to grow into 
registered community development foundations. According to Shell, this system replaces past 
practices whereby SPDC agreed to hundreds of separate development projects with individual 
communities and managed them directly. Shell illustrates the improvement of the GMoU 
approach compared to previous approaches as seen in figure 2:  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Development of Shell’s CSR strategy, adapted from Shell (2011j). 
 
Previous Approach GMoU Approach Result 
More representative and 
transparent interface               
Promotes cohesion and 
cooperation 
Single agreement with 
cluster of communities 
Multiple bilateral 
agreements with 
individual communities 
Communities take the key 
decisions 
Shell/SPDC assumes 
direct responsibility for 
development 
Increased local ownership and 
accountability and participation, 
including women 
 
Limited capacity building 
Build community 
capacity to drive own 
development 
Encourages innovation and 
learning, and creates platform for 
other development actors 
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Since the introduction of GMoU in 2006 where communities are given the opportunity to 
identify their own needs, Shell and its joint-venture partners have continued this approach and 
provided funding to implement such projects directly. By the end of 2010, Shell had a total of 
490 GMoU projects in 244 communities (Shell, 2011h). One example of GMoU project 
commitments can be found in Gbarain-Ubie, one of Shell’s key investment areas in Nigeria, with 
several concrete community projects, covering areas like infrastructure, health, economic 
empowerment and public relations. Some concrete examples of Shell’s commitments include: 
providing water to all communities in Gbarain and Ekpetiama kingdoms through the 
construction of appropriate water supply facilities; connecting communities to the Bayelsa State 
Electricity Board (BSEB) power supply system; the rehabilitation or construction of a total of 
fourteen kilometers of roads, seven in each of Gbarain and Ekpetiama kingdoms; the 
construction of and equipment for two health centres at Gbaraintoru and Ogboloma; and the 
provision of the sum of $1.22 million for economic empowerment projects in the kingdoms. 
(ECCR, 2010:60-63; Shell, 2011k: 9).  
 
In a joint venture with NNPC, Total and Agip, Shell planned to eliminate routine gas flaring by 
2008 through the development of gas gathering facilities and capturing domestic and export gas 
markets. The Gbarian-Ubie node in Bayelsa State was chosen for Shell’s largest gas investment: 
the Gbarain-Ubie Integrated Oil and Gas Project (IOGP). The project involves the separation of 
associated gas from crude oil at the flow stations where the gas would otherwise be flared off, 
and its delivery through pipelines to a central processing facility. In accordance with Nigeria’s 
Environment Impact Assessment (NEIA) Decree No.86 of 1992, all such projects must pass the 
EIA process where community consultation plays a central part. Shell undertook an EIA off the 
IOGP to meet statuary requirements, however, the process was much criticised by communities 
for lack of consultation. More than seventy communities claimed not to have been informed, but 
Shell responded by claiming that they had held EIA workshops. Without the knowledge of the 
communities, workshops on sustainable development were apparently held as part of an EIA 
process (ECCR, 2010:58-59). Further, the GMoU was supposed to cushion the communities 
from the negative impact of some of the IOGP activities such as dredging, well drilling and 
construction of road access and pipelines. What has later been discovered is that although GMoU 
is part of Shell’s ‘sustainability community development’ effort, in practice Shell applies this 
development programme only in communities where it extracts oil. 
 
Shell’s annual sustainability report of 2010 proclaims the company’s environmental commitment 
and the continuous work to reduce gas flaring in the Niger Delta (Shell 2011h:4). Shell claims 
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that it conducts environmental, social and health impact assessments before beginning work on 
major projects or existing facilities. This is in order to help understand and manage risks and 
opportunities, and so communities, government, NGOs and environmental experts are consulted 
to help develop plans and inform approach. According to Shell, such early engagement has led to 
re-routing of pipelines, adjusting the schedule of seismic activities and increasing local 
contracting (Shell, 2011k:3). In April of 2011, Shell signed a contract with Saipem worth $101 
million to build a gas pipeline system in the Niger Delta, which it hopes will reduce flaring and 
boost domestic supply to the population. The deal is to build forty-two kilometers of pipeline to 
take gas currently being flared in the vast wetlands of the Niger Delta to a new processing plant 
where it will process thirty million cubic feet per day of gas. A time-frame for the project has not 
been specified (Reuters Africa, 2011). Whether the local communities were consulted prior to 
this decision is not known. As seen in this section, Shell has a variety of CSR projects in the 
Niger Delta, having undergone major changes in their CSR approach.  
 
3.7 Statoil in the Niger Delta 
Statoil is one of the world’s leading oil and gas companies and the second largest supplier of gas 
to the European market. It focuses primarily on upstream35 oil and gas operations, and is among 
the world’s largest net sellers of crude oil and condensate (Statoil, 2010b; Statoil, 2011a:9). The 
main stakeholder is the Norwegian state that used to fully own the company but now holds 67 
per cent stock share after it listed on the Oslo and New York stock exchanges in 2001 (Statoil, 
2011a:10). Statoil is present in over forty countries worldwide and has operations in thirty-two of 
them with an increasing operation base on the international continental shore. Statoil entered 
Nigeria in 199236 when Statoil and BP formed an alliance for international operations in 1990. 
Statoil has been the operator for several exploration fields and partners in others, and has spent 
significant sums of money in Nigeria (Statoil, 2009a). Today, Statoil mainly has an interest in 
the Chevron-operated Agbami field, the largest deepwater producing field located approximately 
110 kilometers off the Nigerian coast. It spans 182 square kilometers and is located in water 
depth of 1500 meters with subsea wells tied back to a floating production, storage and offloading 
(FPSO) (Chevron, 2009:3; Statoil 2010a). Statoil has an interest of 20.21per cent in the field, an 
increase from 18.85per cent in 2010. Besides having operator licenses for the Agbami field, 
Statoil also has interests in other offshore blocks, and has recently completed a first exploration 
                                                           
35
 The upstream oil and gas sector refers to the searching for and the recovery and production of crude oil and 
natural gas. This also includes the searching for potential underground or underwater oil and gas fields, drilling of 
exploratory wells, and subsequently operating the wells that recover and bring the crude oil and natural gas to the 
surface (Oil and Gas IQ, 2012). 
36
 Statoil Nigeria Ltd was established in 1992, and will be referred to as Statoil throughout this research sturdy 
(Amadi et al., 2006:30) 
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phase on block OPL315 where they have a 45 per cent interest (Statoil, 2011a:56; Statoil, 
2008;Statoil, 2011b). As of 2010, Statoil has had fifty-four employees in Nigeria and an oil 
production of 38.000 bbl/d.  
 
3.7.1 ‘Giving Back to Society’: Statoil’s Development Initiatives in the Niger Delta 
Even though Statoil is not as heavily involved in the Niger Delta as Shell is, it does have a 
significant presence and investment in the country. Consequently, it too faces the political risks 
and challenges it entails to operate in the region. The company is hence fully aware of the 
necessity to interact with host communities and this is arguably mirrored in the company’s code 
of conduct. Statoil portrays itself as a business actor that takes social responsibility very 
seriously. Statoil declares that it has a responsibility towards both its owners and the society in 
which it operates. It further proclaims that ‘…shareholders are a company’s owner, while 
stakeholders are everyone else with an interest in its operations – employees, the authorities, 
suppliers, customers and the local community’ (Statoil, 2004 cited in Amadi et al., 2006). In 
2000, Statoil undertook to operate in accordance with the Global Sullivan Principles for business 
ethics, which requires companies to promote economic, social and political justice and to support 
human rights (Statoil, 2000; Leon H. Sullivan Foundation, 2010). Statoil further highlights its 
values, which are to be courageous, open, hands-on, and caring; to be an integral part of their 
Ethics Code of Conduct that describes the requirements that apply to its business practice and 
thus constitute the basis and framework for its performance culture.  
 
The company states that its ability to create value is dependent on applying high ethical 
standards, thus it is determined that Statoil shall be known for these standards. It follows that 
Statoil attempts to comply with applicable laws and regulations and to act in an ethical, 
sustainable and socially responsible manner. Respect for human rights is thus an integral part of 
Statoil’s value base (Statoil, 2009b: 3; Statoil, 2011d: 6; Statoil, 2011a:184). Like Shell, Statoil 
is closely associated with high profile CSR institutions such as stock market sustainability or 
ethical indices, including the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Amnesty International, 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR), and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and it was one of the first companies to sign up as a member of 
the UN Global Compact (UNGC) in 2000 (Utting and Ives, 2006:18; Statoil, 2011c). In August 
2010, Statoil established a corporate social responsibility and ethics subcommittee to ‘…ensure 
an even stronger focus by the board of directors and facilitate the development of knowledge 
about often complex issues. The committee […] will monitor and assess the practicing [sic], 
development and implementation of policies, systems and principles in the areas of HSE, ethics 
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and CSR’ (Statoil, 2011e). As such, Statoil claims that it contributes to social responsibility and 
sustainable development in the Niger Delta through its core activities by: making decisions based 
on how they affect Statoil’s interests as well as the interests of the societies around them; 
ensuring transparency, anti-corruption and respect for human rights and labour standards; and, 
by contributing to local content in their projects by developing skills and opportunities in the 
societies in which they operate (Statoil, 2010d).  
 
The Agbami field was discovered in 1998 but prior to this Statoil, in alliance with British 
Petroleum (BP), was operating offshore west of Port Harcourt (Statoil, 1998; Leadership, 2011). 
Having been aware of other MNOCs’ development projects in Nigeria, when the Statoil-BP 
alliance entered Nigeria in 1992 the two companies consciously attempted to avoid mistakes 
made by others with regard to community relations. Statoil-BP stated that there had been too 
many projects in the Delta which had been unsuccessful or abandoned which they ascribed the 
use of a ‘top-down approach’ that had been imposed on the local residents, rather than directly 
working with the communities at grassroots level (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:558). This 
assumption was based on the results of the early work done when they first entered the region 
and explored new avenues of appeasing communities. This entailed community involvement and 
dialogue with NGOs, which led to the innovation of conducting social impact assessment 
studies. Another innovative result stemming from this exploration was the decision to engage 
only in development projects with a grassroots approach as opposed to constructing externally 
imposed large-scale projects such as hospitals. Still, even more remarkable was the introduction 
of a self-help project based on the premise of sustainable development, executed by two NGOs, 
rather than the oil company itself (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:558).  
 
These early assessments of new CSR approaches in the Niger Delta are still the foundation of 
Statoil’s CSR approach today. Statoil declares that ‘an integrated impact assessment approach 
process that addresses both the environmental and social impacts of our activities and engages 
stakeholders is one of the company’s main tools for ensuring sustainable project performance’. 
Each CSR strategy is initiated with the company’s country-specific business plans and goals, the 
risk and opportunity profile of the area, and local needs and expectations. Extensive mapping of 
relevant context factors also plays a vital role as stakeholder involvement, from politicians to 
local communities, are of great importance in Statoil’s CSR strategy (Statoil, 2011f; Statoil, 
2011g). One concrete example of a practice is told by then senior vice-president of country 
analysis and social responsibility in Statoil, Rolf Magne Larsen: ‘We contact the relevant 
authorities about our plans early on in order to find common solutions and avoid surprises. That 
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makes developments in Nigeria […] a good sign. The political leadership supports cooperation 
with an oil industry which aim to fight corruption through greater openness and transparency’ 
(Statoil, 2004:11). Stemming from this, it suggests that Statoil has had a clear and consistent 
approach to social responsibility in the Niger Delta dating back to its early years in the country. 
The innovative aspects of their stakeholder approach are still part of the core elements of 
Statoil’s CSR approach in the Niger Delta. 
 
3.7.2 The Akassa Project 
The following section will take a closer look at Statoil’s main flagship within CSR in the Niger 
Delta, the Akassa project. This project dates back to 1997 when Statoil had its first meeting with 
the community. Akassa is a remote coastal Ijaw community in the Niger Delta. There are over 30 
000 members in the Akassa clan, are of Ijaw origin, speak the Akaha dialect and are scattered 
over nineteen villages. Most are fishermen, living sandwiched between the saltwater of the ocean 
and the brackish water of the world’s largest mangrove swamps, on sand barrier islands that 
stand only 1.5 meters above sea level. There is no road system, no electricity supply and no clean 
drinking water (Statoil, 2010c). It is therefore vulnerable to any environmental pollution and any 
possible oil spills. Statoil’s operation on the Agbami field is located in the deep water off the 
coast of Akassa, and the Akassa community has therefore been identified as the community most 
likely to be affected by any oil spills from Statoil’s exploration wells in blocks 128 and 129 
(Statoil, 2010e). Statoil partnered with NGO Pro Natura as part of their strategy of applying a 
participatory approach to CSR.  
 
The Akassi project began by gathering communities to discuss, plan and produce a development 
plan that involved all the communities. This resulted in a corporate community-based 
organisation called the Akassa Development Foundation (ADF). All stakeholders are represented 
in the General Assembly of ADF, ranging from community groups like youth and women, to the 
Council Chiefs. Each year, the ADF facilitates the adoption of a development plan for the 
Akassa Development Area, which is in line with the Millennium Development Goals37. By doing 
so, this ensures a range of projects spread across the development area through a prioritisation 
process, and representatives from the communities decide which projects should be given 
priority (Statoil, 2010e). Thus the strategy forces community members to think about the whole 
development area rather than just their own community, removing the potential for powerful so-
                                                           
37
 In September 2000, the UN adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration committing to reduce extreme 
poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets – with a deadline of 2015 – that have become known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The eight MDGs range from halving extreme poverty to halting the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education (UN 2011).  
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called benefit captors to allocate funds to projects in their own community. However, although 
the types of projects are prioritised according to perceived needs, they are usually in the 
following categories; health facilities; educational support; women in development projects; 
youth in development projects; natural resource management programmes; and micro-credit 
schemes (Statoil, 2010e). The chosen projects are then implemented by the relevant institution 
affiliated to the ADF. Each institution must submit a technically correct, fundable proposal to the 
ADF outlining how it will implement the project. In summary, a study was completed to identify 
development needs, community resources and possible action paths. Solutions to problems were 
then explored, focusing on those that incorporated self-reliance and programmes that could 
attract funding and support. In brief, this is the procedure of the Akassa model, seeking to obtain 
sustainable development using a long-term ‘bottom-up’ approach (WBCSD, 2005). 
 
Most noteworthy about this CSR project is that it is based entirely on grassroots priorities, driven 
not by outsiders deciding which specific initiative should be implemented but largely by the 
local people (Frynas, 2005:593). Pro Natura conducted an in-depth appraisal of the needs of the 
community over a long period of time. Pro Natura staff went to live in the villages and had 
extensive discussions with the local people about their problems and causes of these, before 
starting to plan initiatives. As previously mentioned, women and youths also participate in the 
planning process, and importantly, Pro Natura has helped build up capacity of the local people 
by setting up institutions such as development foundations and community development councils 
(Frynas, 2005:593-594). As such, represented by the Akassa model, Statoil’s CSR strategy in the 
Niger Delta can be summarised as an long-term, bottom-up and stakeholder-oriented approach, 
focusing on ‘self-help’ sustainable development. 
 
3.7.3 Chevron in the Niger Delta 
As Statoil’s main interest in the Niger Delta is the Chevron-operated Agbami field, the study 
finds it relevant to briefly present some of Chevron’s experience in the Delta. This is because 
even though the two companies work side by side, they may have different approaches to CSR 
which could affect the implementation of these strategies. As such, the effects of CSR and its 
impact on political risk may be different for the two companies.  
 
Chevron is the third largest oil producer in Nigeria and one of its largest investors, spending 
more than $3 billion annually. Chevron has indirectly been involved in Nigeria since 1913 as the 
history of the company Texaco, now owned by Chevron, dates back to that year when it first 
started to market its products in the country, and later began energy exploration and production 
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work over forty years ago. In 1963, American Overseas Petroleum Ltd – which later became 
Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Co. – discovered oil at the Koluama Field, off the coast of 
Nigeria. In the same year, Chevron Nigeria Ltd started drilling near the Escravos River and 
found the Okan Field (Chevron, 2011a). Today, Chevron operates in a joint-venture with the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and has assets on land, swamp and near-
offshore concessions covering approximately 8 900 square kilometers in the Niger Delta region. 
In addition to extensive interests in the Agbami Field, one of Nigeria’s largest deepwater 
discoveries was made in 1998 with Statoil as a partner. Chevron also has interests in another 
deepwater development, the Usan project located 100 kilometers off the coast in the eastern 
Niger Delta region. NNPC is Chevron’s principal subsidiary in Nigeria, and Chevron operates 
and holds a 40 per cent interest in thirteen concessions while NNPC holds the other 60 per cent. 
Altogether, Chevron has interests in ten deepwater blocks in offshore Nigeria, with shareholding 
ranging from 18 per cent to 100 per cent. Chevron employs 3 100 workers directly and another 3 
500 workers under contract. The majority of the employees are Nigerian. In 2010, total daily 
production averaged 524 000 bbl/d of crude oil, 206 million cubic feet of natural gas, and 5 000 
bbl/d of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) (Chevron, 2011b; Chevron, 2011c).  
 
Chevron’s involvement in Nigeria, and its over forty years of operating history in the Niger 
Delta, has also meant interaction with local communities. Like Shell, Chevron has been 
responsible for several oil spills and gas flaring over the years, and has announced initiatives 
that will reduce the environmental impact of its activities. Despite this, Chevron is still among 
the worst offenders in the Niger Delta, and as in as recently as 2008 they flared over 64 percent 
of its gas (JNN, 2011). In response to the environmental damage caused by the company, 
communities in the Delta engaged for decades in peaceful protests. Chevron responded by 
engaging the Nigerian military Joint Force (JTF), which was created to protect the MNOCs 
from protests or local riots. However, the soldiers of JTF are often accused of heavy-
handedness that results in unnecessary deaths and destruction (AfricanLoft, 2009). This has 
fuelled further accusations against Chevron, and by allowing the JTF to use Chevron’s 
Escravo’s oil terminal as a base for launching attacks, they are seen to be indirectly supporting 
the actions made by the JTF. In general, the accusations against the company have revolved 
around human rights violations, environmental degradation, and for fuelling conflict in the 
communities (JINN, 2011). 
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3.7.4 ‘Giving Back to Society’: Chevron’s Development Initiatives in the Niger Delta 
According to Chevron, the company conducts its business in a socially responsible and ethical 
manner, respecting the law and human rights, protecting the environment, and benefitting the 
communities in which they operate. The company’s foundation is built on its values which serve 
to guide their actions, and their stated values include: integrity, trust, diversity, partnership, and 
protecting people and the environment (Chevron, 2011d). These values are also reflected in their 
Business Code of Conduct and Ethics38 that contains Chevron’s diversity and anti-corruption 
policies as well as the human rights policy it adopted in 2010 (Chevron, 2011e; Si2, 2011:6). 
Since 2004, Chevron has been included in the Dow Jones Index for Sustainability for North 
America, and over the years it has rewarded with numerous awards and recognition for its 
performance within the areas of governance, environment and social and economic development 
(Chevron, 2011f). In terms of the company’s reporting framework, it has annually produced a 
sustainability report since 2002. The GRI G3 Guidelines and the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) and the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) Oil and Gas industry Guidance on Voluntary Sustainability Reporting have 
helped shape its reporting metrics and disclosures. However, while GRI informed its reporting, 
Chevron has not declared a GRI reporting level or made reference to the GRI’s oil and gas sector 
supplement, although it registered its report with the GRI website (Si2, 2011:6; Chevron, 2011g).  
Chevron’s early CSR policies were characterised by a top-down approach, with the company’s 
own analysis of where and what sort of community aid was needed. This resulted in the building 
of schools, roads and hospitals (Chevron, 2003:10). However, these projects did not include 
schoolbooks, medicines, teachers or doctors. Yet, one initiative still continuing today was the 
introduction of the Riverboat Clinic in 2001. The Riverboat Clinic is a mobile health service for 
more than thirty-three communities along the Escravos and Benin rivers in the Western Delta, 
operated in partnership with the NNPC (Chevron, 2010:6).  
 
In 2005, Chevron adopted a new approach to CSR. The new approach sought to improve local 
participation in determining the needs that the CSR programmes should address (Chevron, 
2011h; Egba, 2011). Targeting the communities in its operational areas with its joint venture 
partner NNPC, the new strategy is the community engagement model called GMoU, the same 
model used by Shell. The GMoU model has been implemented in eight community clusters 
referred to as Regional Development Committees (RDCS) across the Niger Delta. The GMoU 
involves a wide range of stakeholders, including representatives from state and local 
governments, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and NGOs. The key principles 
                                                           
38
 See more on http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronbusinessconductethicscode.pdf 
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underlying the GMoU concepts include participatory partnership and stakeholder engagement, 
transparency and accountability, sustainability assurance, conflict mitigation and resolution, and 
continuous monitoring and evaluation (Egba, 2011). As such, the main aim of adopting this 
approach to CSR is instituting community-driven development in the clusters of communities 
neighbouring Chevron’s operations, with a focus on the socio-economic and environmental 
issues of the Niger Delta. So far, the memoranda have generated approximately 200 projects in 
more than 400 communities, villages and chiefdoms (Chevron, 2011h).  
 
As part of their new approach to CSR, Chevron has also established, and continued, cooperation 
with NGOs and other institutions to improve the implementation of the CSR initiatives. 
According to Chevron, local NGOs play an essential role in the implementation process of 
GMoU. They help provide technical assistance and are helping to resolve conflicts that arise in 
the communities (Chevron, 2011h). The Arrive Alive Road Safety Initiative serves as one 
example of such collaboration where the Lagos state government and NGOs have been part of 
the project (Chevron, 2011a). Another notable collaboration is with USAID. Together they will 
give $50 million over a four-year period to the Niger Delta toward socio-economic development 
of the region through the Chevron-established Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) 
Foundation (Chevron, 2011h). As such, the new approach to CSR taken by Chevron aims to 
bring stability and sustainable development to the areas in which they operate through 
stakeholder involvement. Chevron seeks to do this by providing funding for governance, 
administration, and project and partner costs.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented significant background material for the analysis in chapter four. 
Firstly, it presented the political and social aspects of the Niger Delta, contextualising the 
conditions in which MNOCs operate. By exploring MNOCs’ footprints in the Niger Delta it has 
become evident that oil-extracting activities in an oil-revenue-dependent country like Nigeria can 
have positive and negative implications for the host communities. This chapter has illustrated 
that oil spills and environmental degradation have been prominent in the region. As further 
illustrated, local grievances are extensive and this has led to strong local resistance over the 
years. The chapter also sought to identify the main industry-specific political risk factors in the 
Delta before presenting a general overview of CSR practices in the area. Against this 
background, both Shell and Statoil were presented, regarding their activities in the Niger Delta 
and their CSR strategies for the region. In addition, as it is Statoil’s operating partner at the 
Agbami field, it was deemed necessary to introduce some of Chevron’s experiences and its 
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approach to CSR as this may impact Statoil’s presence. Using Shell and Statoil’s CSR strategies 
in the Niger Delta, the following chapter will analyse whether CSR can impact political risk, and 
this will comprise the essence of this research study. 
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Chapter IV: Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility as a 
Political Risk Mitigating Tool for Multinational Oil Corporations 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Political risk represents a significant challenge for multinational oil companies (MNOCs) 
operating on a global scale where certain regions call for intensified political risk management. 
This requires developing strategies in order to avoid or minimise negative business implications, 
thus an important aspect of risk management concerns risk mitigation. The socio-economic 
challenges experienced by local communities in the Niger Delta reveal intricate and embedded 
problems, and as established in the previous chapter, some of these can be traced to stem from, 
or worsened by, the activities carried out by MNOCs.  
 
The Niger Delta region has been identified as an area of high political risk, thus the industry-
specific political risk picture in the Niger Delta calls for active measures. Political risk mitigation 
is hence of uppermost importance in any MNOC’s business strategy, especially in an area like 
the Niger Delta where a lack of political risk precautions could have major consequences for 
business performance. The purpose of this research study is to investigate the concept Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and its potential for, as well as its relation to, political risk 
management and mitigation. CSR has gained international credibility over the last decade, 
simultaneously developing a public expectation or demand for such initiatives by larger 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), especially in developing countries. Although covering a 
wide area, CSR most notably entails the ‘giving back to the society’ aspect which perhaps has 
been at the centre of public attention. The notion of CSR has thus been recognised as a necessity 
by MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta in order to build or maintain a constructive relationship 
with the local communities, with a main focus on environmental and socio-economic initiatives. 
Some of these initiatives address social grievances in the Delta or attempt redemption of past 
mistakes, however, could CSR serve to function as a political risk mitigating tool? If so, how 
successful is it likely to be? 
 
Thus far in the study a comprehensive overview of the relevant theory, as well as a description of 
the case of MNOCs in the Niger Delta has been given. This chapter presents the focal point of 
this research study and will proceed to analyse whether or not CSR has the potential to mitigate 
political risk. The information presented in the previous chapters one, two and three, will be 
processed and serve as the basis for the discussion. The presented CSR strategies will be 
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scrutinised against political risks (armed attacks, kidnappings, and sabotage), facing MNOCs to 
determine whether these have been successful or not. It is important to note that other factors 
like, for example, local and national elections, change of government, swings on the global 
market, or intensified militia conflict, can impact on political risk. At the outset of the chapter an 
overview of the CSR strategies in the Niger Delta will be presented, after which the implications 
of the CSR strategies of Shell and Statoil will be discussed, also including some of Chevron’s 
initiatives, in three separate sections. A discussion of other political risks of the MNOCs 
operating fields will then follow under each of the three sections, before analysing the presented 
findings of the research study. The main research question will be the focus for the discussion, 
concentrating on political risk mitigation and CSR as part of risk management. The final section 
of this chapter will provide concluding remarks. 
 
4.1 Business-Oriented or Stakeholder-Oriented - Two Approaches to CSR 
The demand for active business involvement in the issues of peace and conflict rests on the idea 
that companies are inevitably a part of the local context in which they operate and, when a 
particular context involves conflict, the company becomes part of that conflict. This is because 
corporate activities are bound to have either a positive or a negative impact on conflict dynamics 
but are never neutral (Idemudia, 2010:834). Some MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta, for 
example, Shell, have even been said to fuel conflict through corporate practices (Watts, 2005:28; 
Platform, 2011b). Thus, host countries’ level of stakeholder’s activity may force MNOCs to 
embark on philanthropic gestures of CSR as in the Niger Delta where MNOCs’ activities have 
resulted in environmental degradation due to oil spills and gas flaring, affecting the local 
population’s means of livelihood. According to Obalola et al. (2009:135-144) this has partly 
given rise to the host communities forming NGOs to articulate their concerns and bring attention 
to their plight. It is further argued that MNOCs in the Niger Delta thus see CSR as a strategic 
response to local grievances.  
 
Having examined various CSR strategies offered by Shell, Statoil and Chevron (in part) in 
chapter three, it became evident that there is variety in companies’ approaches to CSR. MNOCs 
have initiated, funded, and implemented significant community development schemes. They help 
build schools and hospitals, launch micro-credit schemes for local people and assist youth 
employment programmes; they participate in partnerships with established development agencies 
such as US Aid while using Non Governmental Organsiations (NGOs) to implement 
development projects on the ground. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of CSR initiatives in the oil 
and gas sector has been heavily questioned (Frynas, 2005:581). Arguably, this can be seen in 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter IV 
60 
 
relation to the mounting evidence of a gap between the stated intentions of MNOCs and their 
actual behavior and impact in the real world. Some oil industry insiders are also highly critical of 
CSR, whom Frynas (2005:582) found to be mainly of the opinion that CSR is a ‘waste of time’ 
and ‘about managing perceptions and making people inside and outside the company feel good 
about themselves’. However, there are, of course, a number of oil industry insiders who support 
CSR and are genuine CSR practitioners who would undoubtedly dismiss such claims. Hence, in 
order to assess the impact of CSR, it should be seen in a broader context than through the lens of 
the business case, as the expectations of what CSR could potentially accomplish are much 
broader. Nevertheless, it is important to have sober expectations of how far these CSR initiatives 
can go. From a community’s point of view, it is important to assess the contribution that MNOCs 
can make to development (Frynas, 2005:582). Following this, MNOCs’ CSR strategies may 
cause repercussions beyond their stated intentions, influencing, for example, political risk, in its 
attempt to promote social development among other things. However, the actual and potential 
contribution of oil companies to development faces structural constraints. Frynas (2005:583) 
argues that the CSR agenda may be inappropriate for addressing social problems in developing 
countries and may divert attention from broader political, economic and social solutions for such 
problems.  
 
Public pressure has directed MNOCs to embark on CSR strategies in the Delta even though this 
public pressure has been of varying strength, which helps to explain why the reactions of 
companies to call for greater social engagement have also varied. However, a company’s 
motives for social engagement are much more complex than simply a response to external 
pressure and these motives greatly limit the positive developmental potential of corporate social 
engagement. As touched upon above, corporate motivational factors that inhibit development can 
be recognised as business-minded, and include the following; obtaining competitive advantage; 
maintaining a stable work environment; and, managing external perceptions. There are obviously 
MNOCs that are partly driven by a genuine desire to ‘do the right thing’, but the listed factors 
can help to clarify why some social initiatives have only limited development success. They 
represent the business case for CSR, namely using social initiatives to attain corporate 
objectives, thus it is not surprising that many CSR initiatives do not go beyond narrow 
philanthropic gestures (Frynas, 2005: 583). Examples of such, include the donations of hospital 
buildings and school buildings that were left unfinished, and other white elephants such as water 
projects where the water was unfit for consumption (Ereba and Dumpe, 2010:37; Emmanuel, 
2010:60-61; Frynas, 2005:587). On the other hand, the stakeholder-oriented approach to CSR 
has been successful in terms of addressing development issues and stakeholder involvement. 
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Several stakeholder-oriented models have been developed over the last years as this approach to 
CSR in the Niger Delta has gained substantially better results compared to many of the previous 
CSR strategies.  
 
The rethinking of the role of business in the pursuit of sustainable development objectives since 
the mid 1990s has also meant business has had to respond to this changing societal expectation 
by increasingly redefining and justifying its involvement in developmental issues in terms of 
CSR. Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects the CSR premise, the idea of CSR 
presupposes that businesses have obligations to society that go beyond profit-making to include 
helping to solve societal social and ecological problems (Idemudia, 2011:1). Despite the 
turbulent context in the Niger Delta, the centrality of oil in the region highlights the significant 
latitude of opportunity for MNOCs’ leverage to prevent, manage and resolve risks concerning its 
operations. Thus, the conceptual linkage of CSR to political risk management in the Niger Delta 
is based on the assumption that the CSR initiatives that contribute to sustainable development 
have the potential to address local grievances and improve community livelihoods (Idemudia, 
2010:826). Having presented Shell, Statoil and briefly Chevron’s CSR strategies in chapter three, 
the study will now assess these initiatives and how they are followed through. The following 
sections will explore the implications of Shell, Statoil and Chevron’s CSR strategies for the 
Niger Delta.  
 
4.2 Shell’s Approach to Implementation of CSR Strategies in the Niger Delta 
During its early years of promoting and initiating CSR strategies in the Niger Delta, Shell 
undertook a top-down approach to such strategies in terms of planning, deciding and 
implementing the initiatives. Through this approach, Shell’s stakeholder engagement had two 
overarching objectives: mending corporate reputation, which had been tainted by the 1990s 
incidents, and securing a license to operate by abating societal hostility to the company and its 
operation in Nigeria. These two main objectives shaped the implementation of Shell’s CSR 
policies in the Niger Delta, and determined stakeholder engagement process and mechanisms at 
all levels (Rwabizambuga, 2007:416). Shell’s CSR programme has as many supporters as it has 
detractors. Part of this can be attributed to Shell’s focus on PR, in which CSR has played an 
important role. In collaboration with the Nigerian government, in order to combat adverse 
publicity, Shell has spent millions of dollars on advertising and a cutting-edge internet website 
advertising the company’s achievements in Nigeria (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:557).  
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In 1998, after the Ken Saro-Wiwa case, Shell poured more than $150 million into local 
development schemes in attempts to ‘clean up’ its corporate image. The company sought to work 
with villagers to help them with sustainable development, however, three years later, 
independent consultants found that after having looked at eighty-two of the 408 projects, ranging 
from electrification of villages to building schools and hospitals, they concluded that fewer than 
a third had been completed. Farm projects and those projects that aimed to make villages more 
self sufficient by giving them the means to earn more did least well, while micro-credit schemes 
run by women performed best (The Economist, 2001).  
 
During the period in which the company undertook this top-down approach to CSR, the majority 
of its initiatives had limited success. Host communities distrusted Shell’s reports on community 
spending as their perceptions of Shell’s involvement in community development was far below 
the success claimed by Shell. The donations of hospital buildings and school buildings were 
often left unfinished and abandoned, and with no plan of making it sustainable (Frynas, 
2005:583). From the point of view of the communities, the assistance programmes were seen as 
politically corrupt, clouded in secrecy, and inadequate for the issues to be addressed (Watts, 
2005:27). Despite launching programmes to address local challenges, the communities continued 
to lack any meaningful ownership of these projects as they were poorly designed and 
unsustainable (Baumüller, 2011:33). Observations made by Christian Aid on Shell’s CSR 
projects in Umuechem represented a general pattern of Shell’s CSR outcomes in the Niger Delta: 
‘As well as taps that are dry, this town of 10,000 people also has a hospital that has never treated 
a patient, a secondary school where no lesson has been taught, a post office that has never 
handled a letter and a women’s centre that has never held a meeting’ (Christian Aid, 2004:1).  
  
Part of Shell’s CSR initiatives included vocational training and job creation, expecting locals to 
set up businesses after the vocational training was completed. What was not accounted for, 
however, was that the residents in the communities had to be empowered before they could 
utilise the businesses, thus this policy and the programmes emanating from it resulted in failure 
(Oruwari, 2006:15). Shell (2011k:19) acknowledges this, but explains it by communities’ poor 
capacity to plan and execute such projects, resulting in the failure or abandonment of projects. 
Other consequences of the failed CSR strategy were community development pay-offs. The 
youths and elders were paid off whenever there was a complaint, in order to buy peace. First, it 
caused more conflict and violence over the modalities for sharing the money. Second, after the 
money was exhausted, the youths regrouped and caused more violence and collected more 
money. As more groups formed, greed and violence escalated and this created joblessness and 
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idle youths causing trouble in the communities. This degenerated into the youths disregarding 
the traditional order system in the communities and led to disrespect of chiefs and elders by 
youths (Oruwari, 2006:14). From the above description, it is clear that the failure of the stated 
ambitions of the early CSR strategies of Shell in the Niger Delta could have negative impacts on 
the communities, in some cases causing more harm than good, further altering the political risk 
picture. 
 
After taking a new approach to CSR in 2006, every project now follows guidelines and templates 
for commercial processes which Shell publicises and they utilise independent non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to conduct project assessments (MENAS, 2008). They have re-positioned 
their approach to CSR, taking a proactive role by building social partnerships with the host 
communities. This has yielded some success, evidenced in improved relationships between 
Shell, NGOs and some communities where effective facilitation has brought about strategies that 
were not possible in the past, and they have collected several awards for their CSR strategies in 
recent years (Draper, 2010:74; Shell, 2010e). Their new effort is also mirrored in the financial 
budget, and in 2008 for example, it is reported that Shell spent US$84 million – up from US$32 
million five years earlier – on community development programmes in its host communities, as 
well as paying US$158,2 million to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (Aaron, 
2011:780).  
 
Shell has repeatedly expressed its commitment to reducing the environmental and social impacts 
from its extracting activities as part of its contribution to sustainable development. Shell states 
that they have ‘researched and adapted a technique for cleaning up oil spills that we believe to be 
the most effective for the soil and climate conditions in the (…) Niger Delta’ (Shell, 2010 cited 
in Olowu, 2011:88). This is part of a continuous programme initiated to clean up oil spills that 
happened before 2005, numbering seventy-four oil spills. According to Shell, they involve local 
communities by letting them take part in the remedial work on paid contracts and, in a number of 
successful projects, local youths have been employed in the cleanup process. As there are, on 
occasions, problems gaining access to sites by the local community, they are intensifying their 
efforts at negotiation in order to be able to carry out the work of clean ups. They are also looking 
at involving local communities in monitoring facilities (Shell, 2010 cited in Olowu, 2011:88). 
Despite Shell’s own proclamations of satisfactory results from their CSR initiatives of cleaning 
up oil spills, others would claim that Shell engages in image-laundering through media, as 
vigorous campaigns backed by empirical data by civil society groups and the affected 
communities continue to showcase Shell’s claims as grossly inadequate and self-serving (Olowu, 
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2011:89; Draper, 2010:74). There are many such examples of uncorrelated perceptions regarding 
Shell’s CSR initiatives. 
 
Despite Shell’s stated commitment to cleaning up oil spills, the striking UNEP report (2011:98) 
revealed several environmental concerns ignored by Shell. For instance, the discovery of 
abandoned wellheads and other facilities in Ogoni land covered by overgrown vegetation poses 
great danger in terms of fire, and suggests a lack of regular attention from the operator. This in 
turn encourages encroachment by individuals to make use of the site for farming or to tap into 
the facility. There are a number of such Shell-operated sites where there appears to be a lack of 
control, and where pipelines are listed as ‘abandoned’ and no longer operational. There are, 
however, no records of whether such sites have been decommissioned following international 
standards, or, literally, abandoned. Thus, oil often remains in the facilities, potentially exposing 
the site of oil contamination, presenting both environmental and safety risks for the locals 
(UNEP, 2011:99).  
 
The UNEP report further reveals a number of environmental irregularities in terms of the 
pollution of soil, groundwater and drinking water (UNEP, 2011: 112). Although Shell has been 
learning internal lessons regarding clean-up and the changes in their procedures are an 
improvement on the existing situation, they do not meet the local regulatory requirement or 
international best practice (UNEP 2011:149). In fact, an internal report by Shell points out the 
company’s failure to redress poor clean-up performance out of fear of conflict with communities 
(Amnesty International, 2009:67). Shell’s clean-up performance in the Niger Delta generally 
falls below internationally accepted standards and are completely different from the company 
practices in other parts of the world (Pyagbara, 2010:24). Shell’s response to the overwhelming 
criticism by UNEP is characterised by support of the findings, and Shell states they will use the 
findings as a valuable contribution towards improving the understanding of the issue of oil and 
the environment.  
 
Further, a newly released report by Platform39 revealed Shell’s involvement in fuelling human 
rights abuses in the Delta by involving militant groups to help protect its oil infrastructure. In one 
case in 2010, Shell transferred over $159,000 to a group credibly linked to militia violence after 
the company’s siding with clashing gangs and picking the more powerful group. The report 
                                                           
39
 Platform is a UK charity that campaigns for social and ecological justice. The coalition backing the report 
‘Counting the Costs’ includes Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), Friends of the 
Earth, Netherlands/Milieudefensie, Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, Social Action, 
Spinwatch, Stakeholder Democracy Network and Platform (Platform, 2011b). 
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concludes that Shell’s poor community engagement has provided a ‘catalyst’ for major 
disruption and fuelled human rights abuse. The striking report found that Shell has not lived up 
to its promise to end contracts with armed militants, thereby contributing to further deterioration 
of the situation in the Niger Delta. It states that Shell has not taken the necessary steps to de-
militarise its operations in the region, or to resolve long-standing grievances and respect the 
human rights of local communities (Platform, 2011a:7). These environmental violations and 
human rights abuses severely question the legitimacy of Shell’s CSR initiatives, yet Shell 
acknowledges the findings and at the same time calls for greater responsibility from other 
institutions for the environmental and social situation in the Niger Delta. 
 
As mentioned, the new approach to CSR revolves around communities being at the centre of 
planning and implementation of projects, known as the global memorandum of understanding 
(GMoU). Communities identify their own needs and decide how to spend their funding from 
Shell and its joint-venture partners. By the end of 2010, Shell had GMoUs in 244 communities, 
including the provision of electricity to nine communities in Bayelsa state, and in June 2011 
Shell committed N4.324 billion to regular GMoU development projects in the Bayelsa state 
alone (Shell, 2011k:19; James, 2011). The GMoU model has effectively improved Shell’s 
contribution to development by letting the communities plan and execute the projects, resulting 
in far less failed and abandoned projects compared to the earlier approach. An example of a 
successful project was the launching of the Niger Delta’s first community health insurance 
scheme in Port Harcourt in 2010.Over 8,000 people have signed up and receive affordable 
medical treatment, including vaccinations, maternity care and operations, at an annual premium 
of $50, with GMoU subsidising half that amount (Shell, 2011l:19).  
 
The company’s CSR initiatives have been recognised externally, and in 2009 Shell was awarded 
the first annual award for Partnership in Collective Action by the New York-based Global 
Business Council (GBC) for a partnership with Family Health International (FHI) which has 
resulted in the establishment of the Niger Delta AIDS Response Programme (NiDAR). The 
project started in 2007 and provides comprehensive HIV/AIDS care and treatment services in 
five hospitals in the Delta region. According to Shell, the NiDAR project became an ‘avenue not 
only to scale up HIV/AIDS care and treatment services, but a pathway to developing capacities 
of people in different specialized areas’ (Shell, 2011o). NiDAR has thus integrated HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis delivery alongside other health care services at the selected rural hospitals. 
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However, despite examples of successfully implemented GMoU projects, it is evident from the 
presented findings that Shell’s CSR strategies in the region are far from successful. Although the 
GMoU initiative has been profiled by Shell as an effective and successful strategy for CSR 
implementation, as previously mentioned, this has been debated and refuted by NGOs and 
academics40. Watts (2007:27) even goes so far as to claim that the GMoU projects, to the extent 
they exist at all, are shrouded in secrecy and ambiguity, and corporate responsibility on the 
ground often appears as a raft of unfinished community projects all of which have contributed to 
festering resentments among the youth. Returning to the Gbarain-Ubie GMoU project discussed 
in chapter three, ECCR (2010:60-63) found only few of the mentioned sustainable development 
initiatives have been completed41.  
 
Their new approach to CSR has been condemned as demonstrating ‘The usual lack of 
community consultation, top-down approach, failed projects, sporadic cries and questionable 
close ties to locations of company operations. Most projects appear to be less a response to 
priorities of communities than guided by the company’s logic of providing access to locations 
and comfort for its staff’ (Pyagbara, 2010:25). The execution of the new GMoU approach to 
CSR must therefore be evaluated and the change in the approach assessed. The portrayal by the 
company of their success as far as implementation of the projects is concerned also needs to be 
analysed.  
 
4.2.1 Shell’s Political Risks in the Niger Delta 
Shell is one of the MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta which has experienced most resistance 
and attacks, including protests, lawsuits, oil bunkering, sabotage, and kidnapping and killing of 
staff (Shell, 2011b). Shell’s massive presence in the region and its close ties to the Nigerian 
government has resulted in communities considering Shell as being the government and thus 
being equally accountable for the social conditions. Between 1995 and 2006, Shell alone 
recorded an annual average of 300 oil spill incidents resulting in the spillage of over 450 000 
bbl/d in the Niger Delta and a daily gas flaring of about 604 million scf per day (Tuodolo, 
2009:535). Admitting responsibility for several oil spills, including the 2010 spillage of 14,000 
tons of crude oil into the delta creeks in 2009, double the year before and quadruple that of 2007, 
Shell nevertheless argues that over 70 per cent of all its spills over the last five years have been 
caused by vandalism, theft or sabotage by militants and communities, and are therefore the result 
of criminal activity (Vidal, 2011; Shell, 2011m; Shell, 2011n). In its response to the UNEP 
                                                           
40
 See, for example, Amnesty International (2009), Platform (2011), Watts (2007) Frynas (2010). 
41
 See Table 3 in appendix E: ‘Status of Gbarain-Ubie GMoU project commitments’ 
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report mentioned above, the company stresses the need to curb illegal oil theft as they claim that 
this is the key reason for the oil spills in the area. For the case of the Ogoni-land area, Shell 
explains Ogoni-land to pose unique challenges characterised by violent attacks on staff, sabotage 
and theft. Since they stopped production there in 1993, access to maintain facilities in the area 
has been difficult (Shell, 2011L) 
 
Not only are oil leaks costing Shell astronomical financial sums annually, but they also damage 
the company’s chances of signing new contracts by weakening the company’s reputation and 
image when failing to meet its own, as well as international environmental standards, creating 
concerns among investors and host governments (Ma’anit, 2011). Due to its environmental 
history and reputation in the Niger Delta, Shell has met great resistance outside Nigerian borders, 
like in South Africa where there have been demonstrations against its planned gas fracturing 
project in the Karoo. Demonstrators draw on the Nigerians’ experience and demand a halt to the 
project, fearing environmental degradation in the Karoo region (Cape Argus, 2011; Gosling and 
Huang, 2011).  
 
Armed groups and militant groups present a challenging environment in which to operate for 
MNOCs, exemplified by a high number of kidnappings and killings. In the years prior to the 
GMoU approach to CSR, Shell reported a high number of violent incidents against their staff. In 
1999, there were 349 violent incidents of which 102 involved hostage-taking (Shell, 2000:25). 
The annual reports from Shell for 2000, 2001 and 2002 do not report specific numbers for the 
Niger Delta, but state that the number of fatalities and violence was high in general. In 2004, five 
employees lost their lives due to security reasons42, and the same year community incidents 
increased by 10 per cent to 176 compared with 2003 (Shell, 2005:25). The year 2005 saw a 
decline in the number of oil thefts by criminal gangs due to increased government security 
patrols. However, December 2005 saw the onset of a series of attacks on Shell facilities, set off 
by the bombing of a major pipeline (Shell, 2006:27). When the violent petro-conflict reached its 
peak in 2006, and Shell introduced the new approach to CSR, Shell recorded fifty-four incidents 
of kidnapping of staff and contractors, and the loss of nine lives as a result of violence (Shell, 
2007:67). In 2007, forty-seven staff members and contractors were kidnapped by militants, while 
three were killed (Aaron, 2011:780).  
 
                                                           
42
 ‘Security reasons’ is not specified by Shell and could refer to various meanings, not necessarily related to attacks 
by armed groups. 
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The year 2008, Shell re-started operations at twenty-six sites that had previously been shut down 
because of violence, but offshore the Delta conditions worsened. The Shell operated FPSO 
vessel at the Bonga field was attacked by MEND in June, the first time militants reached 
offshore operations in deep water. Shell declared force majeure, a practice which frees a 
company from contractual obligations in the face of extraordinary obstacles and halted 
production of 225,000 bbl/d for about a week. A previous attack in May at its Bonny Light Field 
had stopped production of 130,000 bbl/d for almost two months (O’Rourke, 2008:60). In 
November 2008, Shell temporarily shut down the Soku gas plant which supplies 40 per cent of 
all the gas used by the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG) in order to repair 
damage from fires and oil spills caused by criminal gangs (Shell, 2009:20). In 2009, MEND 
called a ceasefire but later announced an ‘all-out oil war’ after a crackdown by the Nigerian 
military (Vaughan, 2011), and fifty-two employees were kidnapped that year. In 2010, the 
number went down to twenty-six employees kidnapped and one killed in an armed assault (Shell, 
2011d). According to Shell’s (2011d:1) own publications, it is difficult to estimate precisely how 
much oil is stolen as this varies according to the source. In 2009/2010, there were one hundred 
and fifty-five reported incidents of crude oil theft from Shell facilities that involved vandalism, 
spills, fire or arrests of vandals. In 2008/2009 there were two hundred and eleven such incidents, 
and in 2010 authorities arrested one hundred and eighty-seven people, and, among others, twenty 
tankers and fifteen vehicles were seized as well as twenty-eight barges and thirty-eight other 
boats. 
 
4.2.2 Evaluation of Shell’s CSR Strategies and the Implications for Political Risk 
Based on the presented data, the research study finds Shell’s initial approach to CSR to be a 
failure, both in the sense of accomplishing its stated goals, as well as in its contribution to social 
development and reducing political risk. The CSR strategies were implemented in such a way 
that there was little possibility of success, resulting in the opposite of the desired effects. In 
addition, the severe environmental and human rights violation was a strong signal of Shell’s 
‘business’ take, generating more resentment in the local communities than compliance. The 
inadequate CSR strategies and the reprehensible security policies and environmental degradation 
coincided with the most violent period during which there were numerous attacks on Shell’s 
facilities. Although there was a slight decrease in sabotage against oil installations due to 
security measures, the research study finds that the level of political risk increased for Shell in 
the Niger Delta as this approach to CSR continued, with a climax of violent attacks on Shell’s 
staff and facilities occurring in 2006. The findings thus suggest a causal relationship between the 
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unsuccessful implementation of the company’s CSR approach and a growing disapproval in the 
communities, resulting in an increased industry-specific political risk level.  
 
At the petro-conflict’s most severe stage in 2006, Shell introduced the new GMoU approach to 
CSR. Allegedly more stakeholder-oriented, Shell repositioned its strategy to a bottom-up focus. 
From the following year there was a reduction in the level of political risk in terms of armed 
attacks and sabotage on Shell’s facilities; a reduction which has been stable in recent years, 
accompanied by a significantly improved security situation and production in 2010. (Shell, 
2011k). However, the data does reveal that the company faces serious political risk in the Niger 
Delta, with the latest development being attacks on the company’s facilities offshore. Thus, 
despite a clear improvement from the initial years, many elements suggest that the new approach 
to CSR is not as successful as portrayed by Shell. The presented data suggesting that Shell is still 
exercising a top-down approach in its CSR projects, as well as the disclosure of ongoing 
environmental degradation and human rights violations, suggest a failed implementation of the 
CSR strategies. The research study finds that when Shell conducted a new approach to CSR, 
there was a reduction in political risk. Yet, the findings also indicate that the matter of 
implementation is critically important, as a stakeholder-approach to CSR clearly has not been 
consistent.  
 
4.3 Statoil’s Approach to Implementation of CSR Strategies in the Niger Delta 
To avoid the mistakes made by first generation MNOCs in Nigeria, Statoil jump-started its 
operations by first establishing a community development partnership scheme for its host 
community, the Akassa Kingdom, while using an NGO, Pro Natural International (PNI) to 
facilitate the process (Oruwari, 2006:15). The Akassa region was identified as a potential impact 
zone for future oil spills after Statoil had conducted an environmental impact assessment of 
Statoil’s offshore interests. As a newcomer to the Niger Delta, Statoil wanted to establish a 
reputation as a good corporate citizen from the very beginning and sought to promote 
understanding between the company and its primary stakeholders.  
 
Statoil’s corporate strategy seeks to minimise risk and create a safe operating environment by 
obtaining a holistic license to operate, meaning not only receiving formal operating authority 
from the government but also acceptance from the local communities in, or near, its areas of 
operation (Chen, 2007:37). The Akassa project is a bottom-up community-based development 
scheme with activities within five main areas: the environment, abolition of poverty, building 
local capacity, infrastructure, and institutional capacity development. It is based on the principles 
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of participation, democracy and transparency, and all facets of the Akassa society are represented 
and the final development plan is owned by the people of Akassa. Its success is explained by the 
project being largely based on substantial local involvement and participation, where the 
objectives and activities include training the local people to plan and carry out their own 
development work, and the establishment of the Akassa Development Foundation (ADF) as an 
independent development organisation that finances its own activities without assistance from 
Statoil (Oruwari, 2006:15). This bottom-up community-led development approach has further 
led to other MNOCs seeking to adapt and adopt their strategy for their social investments in the 
Niger Delta, as seen in, for example, the Shell-funded GMoU approach (Draper, 2010:67; 
Idemudia, 2007a:15; Oruwari, 2006:15).  
 
Participation and self-help are regarded as the best routes for sustainable development assistance 
by organisations as diverse as the World Bank and Oxfam. A central idea expressed in the World 
Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework is that the ‘doer’ (a person, a community etc.) 
needs to be ‘in the driver’s seat’ and actively help itself (Frynas, 2005:589). Not many of the 
MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta have funded projects which could be regarded as ‘best 
development practice’ along the lines advocated by the World Bank or Oxfam, but the Statoil-
initiated Akassa project in the Bayelsa state is one. According to Frynas (2005:589), the project 
has come to symbolise the potential positive benefits of oil company development work. In 
2005, Statoil’s Akassa project was awarded best community project by the World Petroleum 
Council (Chen, 2007:31). Some of the results reported by WBSCD of this CSR initiative of 2005 
include, human resources development: eighteen health posts have been established and thirty-
two health post attendants have been recruited; natural resources management: an inventory of 
forest resources of Akassa has been undertaken and the Akassa Forest and Wildlife Regulation 
has been amended; poverty alleviation: successful micro-credit groups with a 100 per cent 
recovery; and, infrastructure: rehabilitation of schools and health centres and construction of 
wooden bridges has taken place (WBSCD, 2005). 
 
Draper (2010:67) points to numerous factors that constitute the apparent success of the Akassa 
project, including gender balance and women’s representation in decision-making, residence of 
all key actors and decision-makers in the local community, wide consultancy within and outside 
the communities, focus on the specific geographical area rather than the entire Kingdom, and 
provision of external facilitation, technical and management support. These elements have thus 
demonstrated that community institutions in the Niger Delta can develop capacities and 
accountability; that participatory processes can ensure that even the marginalised can contribute 
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to a programme; and that community projects can be completed, which all in all represent the 
success of this CSR strategy. The people of Akassa have their own development plan, updated 
annually, and a corresponding budget. The plan forms the basis of wider-scale planning whereby 
local or state government or MNOCs can determine what they will support. In addition, it is 
registered with Nigeria’s Corporate Affairs Commission and has bank accounts, a seal and a 
constitution; and it can sue or be sued – factors that make it an accountable partner for 
development.  
 
In comparison with the way Shell claims recognition for their projects by placing logos and 
signboards outside their projects, Statoil does not want their name and logo on signboards in the 
Akassa communities as this may reinforce the belief that these projects belong to the company 
rather than to the community. However, although the communities recognise the Akassa 
Development Foundation as being responsible for the implementation of the project, the 
inhabitants know the funds are provided by Statoil and that the ADF reports to Statoil. Company 
visits are welcomed, also by the youth, in acknowledgement of Statoil’s support and 
empowerment. Other companies that have adopted the same approach experience similar 
acknowledgement elsewhere, like Total in Eastern Obolo and in the Opobo Nkoro community 
(Draper, 2010:74). So it seems that companies fear that a loss of credibility will result in loss of 
goodwill, yet ironically, the companies with most goodwill from communities are those that have 
found a better balance between support and minimal interference.  
 
The Akassa Clan has remained quietly working for their own development, and being 
geographically located between the offshore platforms, oil wells and flow stations, one Reuter 
correspondent called it ‘a haven of sanity in a sea of madness’ (Knight et al., 2000:1). Another 
part of Statoil’s success with its CSR approach can be attributed to their understanding of the 
lack of government capability, arguably the core reason for the Niger Delta conflict. Statoil has 
funded activities designed to build up governance capabilities, such as working in partnership 
with the UNDP and Amnesty International and it has, for instance, funded a local NGO to 
provide training for Shari’a court judges in the north of the country (Frynas, 2005:597). MNOCs 
tend to reject the notion that they could play a constructive role in helping to address governance 
failures, and they have legitimate concern over corporate involvement in the political process. 
However, they are already part of the political process when lobbying for legislation agendas, for 
example, and their extracting activities could contribute to governance failures. As such, 
MNOCs could potentially benefit commercially from governance failures through, for example, 
non-enforcement of certain government regulations (Frynas, 2005:597). Although Statoil’s CSR 
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approach in the Niger Delta has been recognised as one of few to also address governmental 
responsibilities, some of the criticism of the Akassa project concerns this issue. A major 
challenge of the project is to be truly sustainable and it therefore is making the local government 
council assimilate some of the responsibilities that the project presently manages since they 
normally fall within the local government responsibilities, for example, the provision of services 
(Oruwari, 2010:18). Given their significance, governance issues could conceivably be an 
important part of a CSR strategy, and could hence be a more prominent element of Statoil’s CSR 
approach in the Niger Delta. 
 
4.3.1 Statoil’s Political Risks in the Niger Delta 
Statoil has not reported any kidnappings or fatalities of their staff in the Niger Delta since they 
entered the region. However, several political risks are facing the company and Statoil has 
therefore met the need for armed security personnel as a safety measure. Of all its international 
operations, Statoil only sees the need for armed security personnel in two of its locations: at their 
offices in Russia and in Lagos, Nigeria (Statoil, 2004:45). Although Statoil has not reported any 
attacks on their staff or facilities, there have been incidents relating to the Agbami field on a 
couple of occasions. In 2008, there was an attack on an oil supply boat returning from the 
Agbami field, where gunmen hijacked the boat with eight crew members, the vessel belonging to 
the local oil service company West Africa Offshore and carrying supplies to Escravos in the 
neighbouring Delta state. The occurrence emphasised the increased insecurity offshore the Niger 
Delta after military groups announced an escalation of attacks in 2006 (News24, 2008). Also in 
2008, another incident was a threat by MEND directed at Statoil’s operator, Chevron, of attacks 
on the Agbami field (Green, 2008). This threat was put forward only two months after MEND 
had attacked the Shell-operated Bonga field, causing tremendous fear that they would strike 
again. So far though, there have been no attacks on the Agbami deepwater vessel. 
 
4.3.2 Evaluation of Statoil’s CSR Strategies and the Implication for Political Risk 
The research study’s finding of no recorded attacks on Statoil’s staff or facilities in the Niger 
Delta signifies the company’s success of its CSR strategies. The CSR initiatives have generated 
compliance in Statoil’s host community, as their strategy has involved community engagement 
from the very first impact assessment carried out before the company entered the area. As 
elaborated upon above, threats have been made to the Agbami field by MEND, but not to 
Statoil’s facilities. The research study argues that the case of implementation of their strategies is 
decisive for its success and has a direct impact on the low frequency of political risk to the 
company. Statoil’s CSR approach is characterised by a bottom-up angle through all stages, 
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creating a perception and feeling of local ownership of the projects. Statoil is recognised as its 
facilitator, creating compliance and the reputation of an actor who takes its social responsibility 
seriously. The contribution of successful sustainable development practices is therefore an 
empowerment of the community, a resource for the locals where government obligation falls 
short. By paying attention to this aspect, the research study suggests that local grievances are 
being addressed.  
 
4.4 Chevron’s Approach to Implementation of CSR Strategies in the Niger Delta 
Chevron is the operator of the Agbami field, Statoil’s main interest in the Niger Delta, and the 
research study thus finds it relevant to briefly explore the effectiveness of its CSR strategies as 
this could potentially be associated with Statoil and thus influence the political risk picture for 
Statoil. Like Shell, Chevron has been in the Niger Delta for decades and has adapted their CSR 
strategies over the years. As seen in chapter three, Chevron also undertakes the GMoU approach 
to CSR in the Delta as the latest development of their CSR strategy (Chatham House, 2011:33). 
This has resulted in numerous CSR initiatives in the areas where they operate, and, additionally, 
Chevron has also contributed financially to the Statoil-initiated Akassa project for which 
Chevron is being recognised by the local communities in the Akssa Kingdom (ADF, 2005:4; 
Idemudia, 2007a:15).  
 
There are many records claiming great success of Chevron’s CSR strategies in the Niger Delta, 
however, there are also claims of CSR failures. Unlike Statoil, Chevron has not conducted a 
geographical impact assessment and one major issue that has been the cause of tension between 
Chevron and some local communities has been the blurring of the criteria ‘host’ or ‘impacted’ 
community (Faleti, 2009:24). Prior to the GMoU approach, Chevron implemented CSR through 
a top-down approach, often providing a certain group in the community with the task of 
managing the funds donated by the company. Funding placed in the care of such trustees was 
often unaccounted for and spent without any development project being properly implemented 
(Faleti, 2009:16). In one instance, Chevron insisted on continuing to work with the Ugborodo 
Community Trust, which allegedly could not account for $N171 million donated by Chevron to 
community development. Chevron’s continued recognition of the group worsened the 
community crisis. The local community started protesting against Chevron, and the escalation hit 
new highs after the killing of the new chairperson Metseagharun by persons suspected to be 
Ugborodo indigenes. Chevron was accused of being partly responsible since they still cooperated 
with that group. As such, Chevron was accused of employing a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, aiming 
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to set local people up against each other, preventing them from uniting in their demand for their 
rights (Faleti, 2009:17).  
 
The tense relationship between Chevron and the Ugborodo community continued to deteriorate 
due to the lack of response to their social grievances by the company. In 2002, the women of 
Ugborodo invaded and occupied Chevron’s terminal, causing a halt in production for ten days. 
They also blockaded Shell’s facilities, and approximately 25 per cent of Nigeria’s oil production 
was closed down. In 2005 the Ugborodo women attempted a repeat performance to address the 
local grievances, but were repelled with maximum violence by a combined force of armed police 
and soldiers, hired by Chevron to control the protestors. One demonstrator was killed and thirty 
more were injured. Chevron argued it had no control over security forces posted to oversee 
security of the facilities (Platform, 2011a:48; Faleti, 2009:19). The report by Platform mentioned 
earlier, accuses Shell of funding armed gangs which again fuelled human rights abuses in the 
Niger Delta. The same report also identifies Chevron as having committed human rights abuses 
on several occasions in terms of their involvement with armed groups and the military. The 
report further claims that Chevron’s tank-farm was allegedly used by the Nigerian military to 
conduct a series of raids on villages in as recently as May 2009 (Platform, 2011:63). Although 
Chevron promises commitment to human rights, these serious allegations demonstrate the 
inconsistency of words and action, and to what extent CSR is integrated in the company. 
 
As a response to the failing CSR approach, Chevron adapted a bottom-up strategy in 2005. 
However, despite the progress that has been made with the new GMoU approach to CSR, the 
resistance to Chevron has made implementation of the new GMoU approach difficult in several 
communities. One of the most prominent issues has been to gain acceptance for the framework 
in the communities due to local disputes and mistrust of actors involved. There is still a 
perception of the GMoU being imposed on communities, and locals do not feel included in the 
various stages and processes of the projects (Faleti, 2009:23). Although there is mostly 
recognition for the notion of the GMoU, many local people continue to expect and express 
preference for cash payment and claim they have lost access to several benefits they previously 
enjoyed by virtue of their status as host communities, for example, unemployment allowances, 
compensation for environmental degradation etc. Many see the abolition of such payments as 
demonstrating a lack of respect for community members. Still, most importantly, is the anger of 
environmental degradation from Chevron’s extracting activities, including oil spills, which 
threaten livelihoods yet are still not incorporated into the scope of activities covered by the 
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GMoU (Faleti, 2009:23). Chevron’s implementation of CSR in the Niger Delta clearly represents 
a double-edged sword for the local communities.  
 
4.4.1 Chevron’s Political Risks in the Niger Delta 
Although Chevron has a similar history in the Niger Delta to Shell, the reason for incorporating 
Chevron in the study is to examine its history of political risks in terms of being Statoil’s 
operator. The previously-mentioned threat by MEND towards the Agbami field was considered a 
threat towards Chevron, yet, as already stated this threat was never implemented. Chevron has 
experienced several serious operational set-backs due to sabotage of pipelines and oil 
installations. In the early 2000s, Chevron was the target for a demonstration by the Ugborodo 
women occupying Chevron’s terminal and tank farm, due to the company’s inability to fulfill its 
part of an agreement from 1998 (Faleti, 2009:18). When the women demonstrated again in 2005, 
Chevron replied with armed security ending violently, further worsening the tense situation, and 
like Shell, the peak of the petro-violence hit Chevron in 2006 (Chatham House, 2011:25). As 
Chevron does not publicise an overview of political attacks in the Niger Delta, no certain 
numbers or frequency of such activities can be given. However, according to Faleti (2011:25), 
sabotage and oil bunkering have been reduced since 2006. Despite this, Chevron still experiences 
political risk to a great extent, and one of the most prominent examples was in 2008 when 
Chevron shut down its production on the Escravos facilities, halting production by 90,000 bbl/d 
after armed gunmen attacked the pipeline. The same year, Chevron declared another force 
majeure on its oil exports following a particularly destructive attack on one of its oil 
installations, halting production by 100,000 bbl/d, and in 2009, MEND destroyed major 
pipelines feeding into a Chevron facility (CNN 2009b). Additionally, armed attacks and 
kidnappings of Chevron staff continue to be a high risk (see CNN, 2009a; SkyNews, 2011). 
 
4.4.2 Evaluation of Chevron’s CSR Strategies and the Implication for Political Risk 
In the early years of Chevron’s CSR initiatives, the projects sought to ease the resentment 
towards the company in local communities based on the environmental degradation stemming 
from its extracting activities, and its low job creation, especially for the youth. The CSR 
initiatives, however, did little to generate consent within the local communities, as they were 
characterised by a ‘top-down’ approach, often leaving projects unfinished or abandoned. The 
research study finds that during this period, several demonstrations towards the company were 
conducted, as well as oil bunkering and sabotage, resulting in major production losses for 
Chevron, and increased political risk (Faleti, 2009:19). From the 1990s there have been 
numerous demonstrations against the company and there have been a number of kidnappings of 
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their personnel as well as attacks on their oil installations (CNN, 2009; AfricanLoft, 2009). This 
has led to Chevron being forced to shut down its operations on certain platforms on several 
occasions, including during the clashes around the elections in 2003 where some 40 per cent of 
the country’s oil production was shut down for weeks and Chevron suffered $500 million in 
infrastructural damage in addition to significant oil production losses. In 2008, it was estimated 
that Chevron lost $750 million due to community strife and oil bunkering (International Crisis 
Group, 2006:2; Idemudia, 2010:834).  
 
The incident with the demonstrating women of Ugborodo is illustrative of how Chevron’s failure 
to address local grievances damaged the situation (Faleti, 2009:19). Chevron also experienced 
regular attacks and kidnappings of staff during this period, with the local resentment at its peak 
in 2006 (Chatham House, 2011:25). After undertaking the GMoU approach to CSR in 2005, 
Chevron claims that projects have improved because ‘community-sponsored attacks on facilities 
have become a thing of the past due to the end of cash payments to locals’ (Faleti, 2011:25). 
Nevertheless, the new approach to CSR has not led to a mitigation of political risk completely. 
Instead, the execution of the CSR strategies has shown signs of the ‘top-down’ approach, and 
paired with the findings of the UNEP and Platform report, it is evident that environmental 
degradation and human rights violation still continues to this day, thus suggesting a mere 
business take on its CSR strategies. Hence, although Chevron claims local oil bunkering and 
sabotage has been reduced since the new CSR approach, local consent has not been obtained and 
armed militant attacks, including kidnapping of staff, seems to occur frequently and take place 
on a regular basis. 
 
4.5 Analysis: CSR and Political Risk in the Niger Delta 
Chapter three illustrated the complex and diverse nature of CSR strategies in a developing and 
conflict-ridden country. The different approaches to CSR have therefore been scrutinised and lay 
the grounds for the upcoming analysis when discussing the findings. For the sake of the 
discussion, the themes will be debated together rather than splitting the focus on Shell, Statoil 
and Chevron.  
  
The research study has highlighted accomplishments as well as failures of CSR initiatives in the 
Niger Delta, and the limitations of CSR have been apparent through this analysis as the areas 
addressed by CSR in the Niger Delta are essentially areas of government failures. Therefore, one 
must be cautious not to be naive or to expect CSR to accomplish more than it can actually 
contribute. Keeping this in mind, it also became apparent through the analysis that the angle of 
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approach to CSR may be a determinant of its success. Of the CSR strategies examined, the study 
found that Statoil did attempt to address governmental tasks as part of their CSR strategy, as seen 
by the example of the education of Shari’a judges. This, combined with a sincere ‘bottom-up’ 
approach, which incorporates all the stakeholders in every potentially affected community in all 
the stages of the CSR execution, have shown to generate sustainable development. Statoil 
experiences compliance from the host communities as a direct result of the success of its CSR 
strategies.  
 
Shell and Chevron repositioned their take on CSR in 2006 and 2005, towards a Statoil-
influenced approach with the stakeholder-oriented GMoU model. The research study has pointed 
to an inadequate internalisation of such CSR programmes in both companies. For Shell, it was 
found to be a significant improvement from previous community initiatives, yet in practice the 
GMoU approach does not involve local stakeholders at the level it proclaims. Instead, this 
suggests that Shell adds a business-case dimension to its CSR strategies. This finding is backed 
by the disclosure of the continuing human rights violation, oil spills and environmental 
degradation, which goes against the company’s stated CSR intentions and values. Chevron was 
also found to be continuing its previous ‘top-down’ approach to CSR to some extent, showing 
inconsistency in its CSR initiative offers and how the actual implementation is conducted. The 
research study argues that the limitations of CSR, combined with inadequate CSR 
implementation, have led to an inconsistency of the success of CSR programmes for both 
companies. 
 
A significant dimension of the examined MNOCs’ CSR strategies is the use of social 
engagement in varying degrees to portray the company’s social conscience locally and 
internationally. CSR will contribute to reputation or image building, which can be a crucial 
aspect when applying for a license to operate, and a business advantage. After the BP accident in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, more weight is placed on MNOCs’ reputations as serious actors, 
increasingly serving as a pre-qualification for the award of operating licenses (Vea, 2011). 
Owing to the recent reports by UNEP and Platform on Shell’s environmental and human rights 
abuses in Nigeria, the company, which was thought to have transformed its social responsibility 
ways after the Ogoni case, now suffers a major reputation setback as seen in Shell’s attempt to 
establish operations in the Karoo of South Africa. However, it is claimed by Ljosne43 (2011) that 
the CSR initiatives that are successful, for example, educational scholarships, agricultural skills 
                                                           
43
 Olav Ljosne has worked for Shell since 1990 where he has held positions like Director of Corporate 
Communications, Policy Co-ordinator and Regional Director of Communications, Africa. Now, Senior Manager, 
International Operations, Shell. 
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etc., do get recognition in host communities and that this contributes to minimising the local 
resistance in the Delta. As such, CSR can contribute significantly to a MNOC’s reputation, 
creating compliance and recognition in host communities if implementation of CSR is 
successful. Vea44 (2011) claims that Statoil has a good international reputation as a serious actor 
and has acquired a good deal of goodwill, and this was decisive in assigning the company its oil 
license in Angola. According to Vea, other MNOCs with less experience and poor environmental 
track records were not even considered in the tender process. As such, Statoil’s winning CSR 
strategy could provide a competitive edge vis-à-vis other operators in the conflict-ridden Niger 
Delta (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003:558). Thus, CSR could indirectly affect business advantages.  
Another aspect of CSR, which is also an integrative technique of risk mitigation that Shell and 
Statoil have to a great extent made use of, is local employees. This is a sustainable contribution 
to development, and perhaps one of the better ways to ‘give something back’ to society rather 
than empty school buildings and other white elephants. By undertaking an integrative technique, 
and aiming to relate with locals in the political sphere, the perception of the company as 
‘foreign’ is reduced (Brink, 2004:156). As seen above, an important part of CSR is to involve the 
local communities, and create a sense of ownership of the projects. Statoil has managed this 
through its Akassa project which is run by the ADF without any involvement by Statoil in its 
practices, yet the local population recognises that Statoil is behind the funding and that ADF 
reports to them.  
 
The success of Statoil can further be recognised as an internalisation of corporate values, which, 
according to Vea (2011), is important if CSR strategies are to be successful. On the other hand, 
Shell’s pledge of commitment to environmental responsibility is incorporated in their business 
principles, yet it is clear that Shell has not followed up on its own pledges of commitment. 
Again, this must be seen in relation to the company’s internalisation of its values, as Shell does 
not practise such environmental practices in other countries as it does in the Niger Delta. Vea 
(2011) points to the environmental aspect being perhaps the most notable area that mirrors a 
company’s values, considering the double standard often demonstrated when companies 
disregard their stated environmental practices and disregard the host country’s national standards 
given a country’s poor law enforcement and regulation structure, like in Nigeria. 
  
                                                           
44
 Jon Vea is the current Norwegian Ambassador to Angola, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Principe 
and Equatorial-Guinea. He was former Director of International Affairs at the Confederation of Norwegian Business 
and Industry (NHO). He was Chairman of the ‘Reputation-board’, initiated by Norwegian Foreign Affairs, and in 
partnership with PRIO, Vea also published a report on CSR in 2003, and is considered an expert in the field. 
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Shell and its subsidiary companies in Nigeria have sought to provide, and to show, social 
benefits from their presence in the country, and in some areas they have made progress. 
However, the historical context of the company is an important factor to consider when assessing 
the company’s progress. The prevailing view in the Niger Delta is that currently and 
cumulatively the benefits of the oil industry’s presence are far outweighed by the negative 
consequences with which Shell, as the region’s largest operating oil and gas company, continues 
to be closely associated (ECCR, 2010:10).  
 
Comparing the two companies, Shell and Statoil, they have been identified as having two 
different approaches to CSR. The data presented in this study suggests that Statoil undertakes a 
somewhat more philanthropic approach to CSR in the Niger Delta than the business-oriented 
approach that Shell appears to be undertaking. As such, traces of turning CSR into a business 
case can be seen, as there are still reports of the GMoU project being a top-down approach in 
practice. Statoil seems to have taken CSR seriously and has initiated a winning stakeholder 
approach to address local grievances without demanding any credit for the company itself. The 
findings of the analysis can be summarised into two aspects of CSR implementation in the Niger 
Delta: 
           
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The summarised results of two approaches to CSR  
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Providing 
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Statoil: 
CSR as political 
risk 
management 
Shell / Chevron: 
CSR as 
corporate 
philanthropy 
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high 
strategic and 
operational 
impact 
Little 
strategic and 
operational 
impact 
• Short-term benefits  / 
not always sustainable 
• Limited funds available 
• Impact diluted because 
limited budget is 
allocated to many 
charities 
• Misalignment between 
business and social 
responsibilities, 
strategies and functions 
• Corporate values not 
internalised 
• Results in minimal 
social and business 
impact of social 
programmes 
• Mitigates operational 
impact 
• Mitigates operational 
risks 
• Supports external 
relationships, 
reputation  
 
Compliance 
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Importantly, external factors can also impact the political risks facing companies, yet, given the 
capacity of this research the study has not accounted for numerous variables, ranging from the 
emergence of militant groups, local and national elections, to the factors of difference in Statoil’s 
limited presence and history in the region compared to that of Shell, which could potentially 
affect the findings of the research. Still, based on the presented data, the study has found a 
relationship between political risk mitigation and CSR policies. What has been accounted for are 
the different approaches MNOCs take to implement their CSR strategies in the Niger Delta. 
Shell experienced a high frequency of political risk concerning sabotage and armed attacks on its 
facilities and towards its employees from the late 1990s until 2006. The CSR strategies in this 
period were found to be unsuccessful, with some initiatives further damaging the petro-conflict. 
After adopting a stakeholder-oriented approach in 2006, the study shows a reduction in political 
risk in terms of armed attacks and fatalities. Importantly, the level of political risk for Shell in the 
Niger Delta is still high, which based on the presented data, is explained by a failed 
implementation of the company’s CSR strategies.  
 
In the case of Statoil in the Niger Delta, the relationship between CSR and political risk 
mitigation is found to be significant. The study shows that by conducting a thorough stakeholder-
oriented approach, Statoil has managed and mitigated political risk by creating compliance in its 
host communities. Although political risk for MNOCs is very high in the area, including for 
Statoil, the company has not experienced such to date. The initiative to engage the locals before 
Statoil entered the region, as well as dialogue and delivering the agreed objectives, combined 
with the following-up of these projects, has made way for the company as a serious actor with a 
solid reputation among its host communities.  
 
The research found that Chevron has experienced a similar level of political risk in the Niger 
Delta as Shell, explained by factors such as their share size of interest in the region and their 
many years of operating in the Niger Delta. The general data provided for the case of Chevron 
implies a reduction of community sabotage on the company’s oil facilities after the 
implementation of a stakeholder CSR approach in 2005, however, the execution of this policy 
has not been consistent: armed attacks were frequent in the following years. However, Chevron 
financially supports the Akassi project as the Akassa Kingdom was identified by Statoil to be the 
area of potential impact from the MNOCs’ activities, and Chevron has not experienced any 
militant attacks or other political risks on the Agbami field. The case of Chevron further supports 
the research study findings on Shell, that the implementation of CSR strategies influences 
political risk management.  
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MNOCs began embarking on CSR strategies in the Niger Delta in order to develop constructive 
relationships with local communities and improve the stakeholder dialogue. At first, most 
MNOCs undertook a community-assistance approach but this was later replaced by a sustainable 
community-development approach. The adaption of new CSR strategies could be seen as a 
response to increasing resistance in the communities and the emergence of militant groups. 
Watts (2005:28) explains that these actions against MNOCs were shaped by various factors, 
including local and national elections, the emergence of ethnic militias and armed struggle as a 
political programme for some restive youth, and by the deepening of the militarisation of the oil 
fields and oil installations throughout the 1990s. The tactics and repertoire of actions against the 
MNOCs were substantial: demonstrations and blockades against oil facilities, occupations of 
flow stations, sabotage on pipelines, oil bunkering, legal actions, hostages, and strikes.  
 
These factors constitute the main political risks facing the MNOCs in the Delta. The majority of 
such actions have been directed at MNOCs with onshore and near-shore operations in the Delta, 
where Shell and Chevron are the largest companies. MNOCs that mainly operate offshore, such 
as Statoil, are less culpable for environmental offences against and encroachment on human 
settlements and livelihoods, and thus they are less likely to antagonise the Niger Delta 
communities (Omeje, 2011:48). However, in a statement by MEND after the attack on the Shell-
operated Bonga offshore platform, MEND explained that the location was deliberately chosen to 
remove any notion that offshore oil exploration is far from their reach: ‘The oil companies and 
their collaborators do not have any place to hide in conducting their nefarious activities’ (MEND 
cited on Nairaland Forum, 2008). Clearly there are no guarantees or modes of prediction for 
attacks for MNOCs. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The assessment of Shell, Statoil and Chevron’s CSR strategies in the Niger Delta was one of two 
the main objectives for this chapter. The second objective for this chapter was to discuss and 
analyse the findings against the research questions guiding this study. In order to reach an 
orderly and consistent presentation of the data before indulging in the discussion, the outline of 
this chapter began with a brief assessment of CSR in the Niger Delta and what drives MNOCs to 
embark on CSR initiatives. An evaluation of the effect of MNOCs’ CSR strategies presented in 
chapter three then followed, starting with Shell and its policies in the Delta. It soon became clear 
that Shell’s implementation of its CSR strategies was not entirely successful, and the negative 
effect of failing CSR has to a large degree come to override the positive sides of their initiatives. 
Statoil was scrutinised next, and here it was revealed to be one of few, if not the only company, 
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to have a thriving CSR project and strategy in the Niger Delta. Chevron’s experiences were then 
reviewed, with a fairly similar outcome to Shell, however this was based on unspecified data of 
the frequency of political risk, hence concluding on general figures available.  
 
From this, the study chose to investigate the level of political risk to MNOCs, comprising armed 
attacks on facilities, sabotage, demonstrations, oil theft, attacks and kidnappings of staff, as an 
expression for direct political risk in the Delta. The analysis suggests that Shell is the main goal 
for several militants and armed groups in the area, as well as discontent from local communities. 
Killing and kidnapping of staff occurs on a regular basis, and sabotage to their facilities even 
more so. Shell is considered to be a part of the conflict and has experienced tremendous financial 
loss because of it. Statoil has never experienced any direct attacks on their facilities nor on their 
staff. Like Shell, Chevron has seen many attacks over the years, however, none has been directed 
to their Agbami field where Statoil operates and hence has not impacted Statoil’s operations. 
Finally, a further analysis and debate on the findings were provided, addressing the stated 
objective of this research, finding that CSR can assist to reduce the level of political risk if the 
approach to implementing it is successful. In the next and final chapter, the research study will 
be evaluated on its progress and offer implications and recommendations for future research. The 
final section in chapter five, and of this research study, will be the conclusive remarks.  
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Chapter V: Evaluation of the Research Study and Concluding 
Remarks 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis has been to research and analyse the potential of social engagement by 
multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) to mitigate and manage political risk, through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). The objective was to arrive at increased knowledge on the 
relationship between CSR and political risk mitigation and thus expand the existing literature, 
illuminating a potential business advantage for MNOCs. A second objective of this research 
study was to address MNOCs’ CSR practices and contributions to sustainable development in 
developing countries by highlighting the companies’ CSR policies in an international context as 
this is a field of limited exploration.  
 
MNOCs will continuously seek to manage political risk in the best possible way. Several host 
countries of the petroleum industry pose unique and demanding political risks for the companies 
operating on their soil, as the case study of the Niger Delta has shown. The Niger Delta was 
singled out as a particularly relevant example of a hostile environment where MNOCs face high 
levels of political risk. The research study commenced therefore by providing a background to 
the research as a point of departure, showing the centrality of oil to the conflict in the region. 
This justified an enquiry into the relationship between CSR and political risk mitigation. This 
chapter will provide a brief outline of the study’s progression and further review the contribution 
of this study as a whole, as well as identify possible paths for future research. This chapter 
culminates in the final remarks of the study, and a final conclusion brings this research to a close.  
 
5.1 Progress of the Research Study 
The opening chapter launched this research study by introducing the topic, underlining the 
relevance of conducting this study. A review of the literature in the field on which this research 
is based was discussed, emphasising the three central areas: industry-specific political risk 
management, CSR, and the case study of the Niger Delta. An intensified discussion addressing 
the research problem followed, in which the research questions guiding this study were outlined. 
The progression of such was given a qualitative research design, and an extensive account of the 
research design and methodology were specified. Lastly, the limitations and delimitations of the 
research study were accounted for.  
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The second chapter anchored the research in terms of theoretical guidance, displaying the 
theoretical frameworks of problem-solving and decision-making theory further accompanied by 
the framework of the real options theory. Key concepts and analytical tools for the thesis were 
critically discussed, identifying Brink’s (2004:156) proposition of integrative and protective 
techniques as a means of political risk management. Whereas the study argued for an 
incorporation of both techniques as an optimal political risk management strategy, it nevertheless 
proclaimed CSR to mainly have integrative technique qualities.  
 
In chapter three, the research study progressed to the presentation of the case study. Having 
already established the relevance of choosing the Niger Delta as a case study in the previous 
chapter, in addition to their presence in the region, Shell and Statoil were identified as two 
internationally recognised actors within the oil and gas sector and therefore suited for this 
research. Both firms profile themselves as socially responsible, with high standards in all their 
operations. Describing the working conditions for MNOCs stressing the socio-political 
circumstances contextualised the case study. The comprehensive account of MNOCs’ historical 
background in the Niger Delta, their footprints and the local resistance were deemed vital in 
comprehending the underlying dimensions of which industry-specific political risk are to be 
managed or mitigated. The aim of this chapter was to introduce and discuss the presence of Shell 
and Statoil in the region, and more importantly, their CSR strategies. Chevron was briefly 
scrutinised in the same manner as it is Statoil’s operator in the Niger Delta. 
 
The fourth chapter provided the case study analysis. Here, the primary aim was to investigate the 
relationship between political risk mitigation and MNOCs’ CSR policies. This involved 
examining the impact of CSR strategies and approaches of implementation on the local 
communities against their stated goals of achievement, before analysing the frequency of 
political risks, exemplified as armed attacks, sabotage, oil theft, demonstrations, attacks and 
kidnappings of MNOC staff. The results of their CSR programmes were considered and 
discussed.  
 
5.2 Evaluation of the Research Study 
The research study established that social challenges can affect a company’s business 
performance. The petroleum industry is prone to such risks as their presence can lead to 
dissatisfaction and unrest in a local community when there is the perception that local 
expectations of what a MNOC should ‘give back to the society’ are not being met: the 
surrounding areas are being polluted; business is undertaken in a region of general political 
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unrest, where the military is protecting a site and using its presence to harass the local population 
for reasons unrelated to the business. The local population can sometimes associate the company 
with these practices, and begin to target it as a proxy for the government. Consequently, the 
aspect of risk management was at the core of this study, the main research question with which 
this study was concerned was formulated as follows: Do CSR strategies have the ability to 
contribute to, and therefore function as, a political risk mitigating tool for multinational oil 
corporations in the oil and gas industry? Clearly, based on the presented analysis, the findings 
suggest that CSR strategies do have the potential to mitigate political risk. However, the findings 
of the research also suggest that the selected approach to CSR has implications for this outcome, 
directing attention to sub-question numbers two and three: What are the current CSR strategies 
of MNOCs operating in the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria? Are the 
current CSR strategies implemented by Royal Dutch Shell and Statoil in the Niger Delta 
successful in terms of obtaining the announced goal of contributing to sustainable development? 
Question two was addressed in chapter three where the investigated CSR initiatives of Shell, 
Statoil and Chevron all proclaimed a stakeholder-oriented approach to the matter. Addressing 
question three in the fourth chapter revealed that only Statoil practices this claim with a high 
degree of commitment, while the others continue to demonstrate elements of a top-down 
approach. Their degree of commitment is seen to be low as they fall short of their stated 
objectives. As a result, Statoil has been successful at contributing to sustainable development 
through its CSR initiatives, while Shell and Chevron have experienced both some success but 
also considerable failure in their initiatives.  
 
As one of many strategies that can be used to reduce political risk, the main argument in the 
findings of this research study is that political risk can be managed and mitigated through the 
CSR initiatives of an MNOC, on condition that a holistic execution driven by a stakeholder and 
bottom-up agenda is used. The host communities’ compliance with Statoil and the company’s 
avoidance of political risks suggests a relationship between its successful CSR approach and 
political risk mitigation and serves as an expression of Brink’s (2004:156) integrative 
management techniques. This finding was reinforced as the operator of Statoil’s field, Chevron, 
was found to have a failed CSR approach and thus experienced a high frequency of political 
risks at its widespread facilities in the region, except for at the Agbami field. The impact of CSR 
on political risk is significant as can be seen by the experience of Shell, which suggests that the 
frequency of political risk was slightly reduced after embracing a stakeholder-oriented CSR 
approach, although the incidents of political risk were still high. The research study thus 
established that the failure of CSR projects could, in fact, negatively impact political risk.  
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It should be noted that several of the detections made by this study are supported by other 
academic journals and reports that point in the same direction. The elements contributing to 
Statoil’s success can be aligned with the real option theory for the proactive response by the 
company can be regarded as an investment, generating direct and indirect benefits (Husted 
2005:177). Sound environmental performance and effectively contributing to sustainable 
development, for example, by addressing governmental challenges are supported by MIGA 
(2010:9) and Frynas (2010:163) among others. At the same time, it was established in the 
research that several of these elements were not provided by Shell or Chevron, for example 
sound environmental performance and consistency of corporate responsiveness, which resulted 
in a lack of compliance, negatively affecting political and reputational risks. This is also 
supported by Wheeler et al. (2002) and Heugens and Dentchev (2007).  
 
The evaluation of this research would be incomplete without addressing the main limitations of 
the study. Ideally, more specific and accurate calculations should have been made by accessing 
MNOCs’ internal evaluations of their CSR initiatives and recording frequency of political risks, 
in order to assess concrete measures of correspondence between time and place for CSR projects 
and attacks. Secondly, the case study of comparing Shell and Statoil has taken into account the 
companies’ disproportionate presence in the Niger Delta, with Shell being the largest MNOC in 
the area with a longer history than Statoil, and the implications this has for the findings. The 
omission of a discussion of the MNOCs’ organisational structure incorporating their values and 
codes of ethics should also be accounted for, as this could have limited the enhancement of 
explanatory factors. Lastly, the time and space aspect of this research study has brought natural 
limitations of scope and in-depth analysis, forcing the study to narrow its focus. For instance, the 
academic debate concerning the concept of CSR was limited in its scope, and several other 
elements relevant to the research were not discussed, for example the relevance of the company’s 
organisational structure, and the MNOCs take on engaging security personnel to address the 
security situation. 
 
To encapsulate, the research question in this study was successfully answered by using two 
supportive questions. The aims and objectives presented in chapter one were achieved, 
contributing to the existing literature by addressing a little-explored field, and importantly 
highlighting a potential business advantage for MNOCs in mitigating political risk. The aim of 
investigating how MNOCs can contribute to sustainable development in their host communities 
was also achieved. The following section will suggest recommendations for future research. 
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5.3 Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
Several recommendations for future research can be made from this evaluation. Firstly, it is 
recommended that this study’s findings be built upon, as it would be valuable to carry out a more 
in-depth engagement of the problem statement underlined by political risk management theory. 
This could enhance the understanding of the relationship between CSR and political risk 
mitigation, thus contribute to knowledge for MNOCs to utilise to inform business decisions. 
Secondly, this thesis dealt with a narrowed scope of CSR, and a broader definition of the concept 
could provide a broader analysis, including the aspects of contribution to economic development, 
health and safety, work environment, and corporate governance, and this could be beneficial for 
the study. Identifying areas of CSR that are more relevant to political risk mitigation than others, 
could provide valuable insight into which areas to attend to when seeking to reduce political risk. 
Thirdly, from the findings in this research, it is suggested that failed CSR initiatives can 
negatively affect political risk. A recommendation for future research will thus be to investigate 
the implications of failed CSR strategies on political risk, scrutinising the relationship between 
the two variables CSR and political risk further. Lastly, as this study only looked at one region of 
the MNOCs’ global operations, a comparative study of a firm’s strategies in other countries 
could be a valuable contribution and indicator to determine the effects of CSR as a political risk 
mitigating tool.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
‘The private sector and security are linked in many ways, most obviously because thriving 
markets and human security go hand in hand. Global corporations can do more than simply 
endorse the virtue of the market, however. Their active support for better governance policies 
can help create environments in which both markets and human security flourish.’ 
Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General 1999 (NHO and PRIO 2003:2). 
 
The petroleum industry is increasingly recognising that constructive social engagement may 
facilitate stability and development, which is also constructive for business. By applying the 
concept of CSR as a catalyst for such engagement, a political risk mitigating tool has been 
identified. This chapter has summarised this thesis’ findings by exploring the progress of the 
research, evaluating the study, and by finally suggesting recommendations for future research.  
The extent to which a MNOC is able to influence its surroundings has shown to be significant, 
either creating a relationship based on compliance or resentment. The final conclusion of this 
thesis is that social engagement through CSR can serve as a political risk mitigating tool, 
however, the implementation needs to be one of commitment to a stakeholder-oriented approach.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Geographical overview of Distribution of Oil Reserves, adapted from Berlin et.al. 2003:2. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Map 3: Map of pipelines in the Niger Delta (Zhao, 2009). 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 3: Historical Timeline of Important Political Events in the Niger Delta 
1995 - Ken Saro-Wiwa, writer and campaigner against oil industry damage to his Ogoni 
homeland, is executed following a hasty trial. In protest, European Union imposes sanctions until 
1998, Commonwealth suspends Nigeria's membership until 1998. 
1999 - Parliamentary and presidential elections. Olusegun Obasanjo sworn in as president. 
2001 - Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, South African President Mbeki and Algerian 
President Bouteflika launch New Partnership for African Development, which aims to foster 
development and open government and end wars in return for aid, foreign investment and the 
lifting of trade barriers to African exports. 
2003 April - First civilian-run presidential elections since end of military rule in 1999. Olusegun 
Obasanjo elected for second term with more than 60% of vote. Opposition parties reject result. 
EU poll observers cite "serious irregularities". 
2003 - Inter-communal violence in the Niger Delta town of Warri kills about 100 people, injures 
1,000. 
2004 August-September - Deadly clashes between gangs in oil city of Port Harcourt prompts 
strong crackdown by troops. Human Rights group Amnesty International cites death toll of 500, 
authorities say about 20 died. 
2006 January onwards - Militants in the Niger Delta attack pipelines and other oil facilities and 
kidnap foreign oil workers. The rebels demand more control over the region's oil wealth. 
2006 April - Helped by record oil prices, Nigeria becomes the first African nation to pay off its 
debt to the Paris Club of rich lenders. 
2006 May - The Senate rejects proposed changes to the constitution which would have allowed 
President Obasanjo to stand for a third term in 2007. 
2007 April - Umaru Yar'Adua of the ruling People's Democratic Party is proclaimed winner of 
the presidential election.  
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2007 September - The rebel Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
threatens to end a self-imposed ceasefire and to launch fresh attacks on oil facilities and 
abductions of foreign workers. 
2008 January - Oil trades at $100 a barrel for the first time, with violence in oil producing 
countries such as Nigeria and Algeria helping to drive up prices. 
2008 February - MEND leaders Henry Okah and Edward Atata extradited from Angola on 
suspicion of involvement in attacks on oil companies. Report that Okah was subsequently killed 
in custody proved to be untrue. 
Tribunal upholds election of Umaru Yar'Adua as president following challenge by rivals who 
wanted the vote annulled because of vote rigging. 
2008 April - Oil production cut by about half as a result of strike action and attacks on pipelines 
by militants; problems in Nigeria help keep world oil prices at record highs. 
2008 September - Militants in the Niger Delta step up their attacks on oil installations, in 
response to what they describe as unprovoked attacks by the military on their bases. 
2008 October - The government announces major budget cuts following steep falls in the price 
of oil. 
2009 January - The main militant group in Niger Delta, MEND, calls off four-month cease-fire 
after army attacks camp of an allied group. 
2009 May - Niger Delta militant group MEND rejects government offer of amnesty and declares 
offensive against Nigerian military. 
2009 July - Government frees the leader of the Niger Delta militant group MEND, Henry Okah, 
after he accepts an amnesty offer. 
2009 August - Two-month offer of a government amnesty for Niger Delta militants comes into 
force. 
2009 November - President Yar'Adua travels to Saudi Arabia to be treated for a heart condition. 
His extended absence triggers a constitutional crisis and leads to calls for him to step down. 
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2010 May - President Umaru Yar'Adua dies after a long illness. Vice-president Goodluck 
Jonathan, already acting in Yar'Adua's stead, succeeds him. 
2010 October - Nigeria marks 50 years of independence. Celebrations in Abuja marred by 
deadly bomb blasts. 
2011 March - Goodluck Jonathan wins presidential elections. 
2011 July - President Jonathan says he will ask parliament to amend the constitution so that 
presidents will serve a single, longer term in office. 
201145 August - Suicide bomb attack on UN headquarters in Abuja kills 23 people. Radical 
Islamist group Boko Haram claims responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
45
 The timeline is adapted from BBC (2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13951696, 27.10.2011. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 117 
 
APPENDIX D 
 Environmental and Social Consequences of Oil Exploration in the Niger Delta 
Problem Immediate 
causes 
Underlying 
causes 
Root causes 
Poverty and hunger Environmental 
degradation 
Poor 
environmental 
performance and 
lack of 
enforcement of 
standards and 
regulations 
Oil industry 
 
Unemployment Loss of livelihood Major arable land 
acquisition and 
lack of adequate 
compensation 
Oil industry 
activities 
Underdevelopment Lack of social 
infrastructure, 
corruption and 
lack of rule of law 
Ethnicity-based 
politics and lack 
of patriotism 
Poor 
governance 
Low life expectancy Widespread 
transfer of 
bacteria, viruses 
and parasites, 
contaminating 
water resources, 
soil and food 
 
Air pollution from 
gas flaring 
 
Water 
contamination 
from oil spills 
Water and 
sanitation crisis 
 
Local air pollution 
 
Poor diet and poor 
health 
Oil industry 
activities 
 
Poor 
governance 
Environmental degradation Depletion of flora 
and fauna 
 
Air pollution 
Water 
contamination 
Destruction of 
habitats 
 
Gas flaring oil 
spillage 
Oil industry 
activities 
Table 1: Environmental and Social Consequences of Oil Exploration in the Niger Delta. Adapted from ECCR 
2010:54-55. 
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APPENDIX E                                                                                                                              
Status of Shell’s Gbarain-Ubie GMoU Project Commitments 
Table 2: Status of Shell’s Gbarain-Ubie GMoU Project commitments 
 
Item Shell Commitments Projects Status 
 
Water supply 
 
 
 
• Provide all 
communities in Gbarain 
and Ekpetiama 
kingdoms access to 
reliable sources of 
potable water through 
the construction and/or 
installations of 
appropriate water 
supply 
facilities/equipment 
No functional or successful 
water supply project. Saipem 
is trucking in the area to 
cushion the effect 
Electricity supply • To connect 
communities to the 
Bayelsa State 
Electricity Board power 
supply system 
• To work with the 
Bayelsa State 
Electricity Board to 
enhance the capacity of 
its power supply system 
No positive action 
 
 
 
 
No action 
 
 
Construction of health centres • To construct and equip 
two health centres at 
Gbaraintoru and 
Ogboloma 
Health centres constructed 
but not equipped or 
commissioned 
Provision of hospital equipment • To complement the 
efforts of Bayelsa State 
government to equip 
the two hospitals at 
Okoloibiri and 
Agudama 
No action taken 
Scholarship awards • To award a total of 80 
post-secondary scholars 
to indigenes of Gbarain 
and Ekpetiama 
kingdoms who pass a 
qualifying test jointly 
administered by the 
community and Shell 
No evidence of progress 
Provision of craft, technical and 
laboratory equipment 
• To provide laboratory 
equipment in five 
schools 
Implemented 
Economic empowerment 
projects 
• To provide buses for 
the Gbarain and 
Ekpetiama kingdoms 
including driver 
training 
Implemented 
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